deadly weapon defense in Florida

1966The point relied on for appeal is error on the part of the trial court in giving an instruction requested by the State, which reads as follows : “Gentlemen of the Jury, the Court instructs you that before a person can avail himself of the defense that he used a deadly weapon in defense of his life, he must satisfy the jury that the defense was necessary at the time and that he did all he could to avoid it, and that it was necessary to protect his own life, or protect himself from great bodily harm, as would give him reasonable apprehension that his life was in imminent danger.” It is apparent,

1965The point relied on for reversal is as follows: “Was it reversible error for the trial court in the instant case to give the following instruction to the jury: ‘The court further instructs you that before a person can avail himself of the defense that he used a deadly weapon in defense of his life, he must satisfy the jury that the defense was necessary at the time and that he did all he could to avoid it, and that it was necessary to protect his own life, or protect himself from great bodily harm, as would give him reasonable apprehension that his life was in imminent danger.’?” It is apparen

2009The next year, interpreting the 1999 amendments to section 800.04, see ch. 99-201, § 6, Laws of Fla., the Florida Supreme Court held in Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 595 (Fla. 2007), that despite its absence from the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses for sexual battery contained in the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, see Fla. Std.

1988Appellant was charged by indictment with first degree murder in the death of his wife, in that he "did kill and murder Joy Pinkerton by slitting the victim's throat with a knife." The jury found appellant "Guilty of the lesser included offense of Third Degree Murder With A Deadly Weapon in violation of F.S. 782.04(4)." The court had instructed the jury that a finding of guilt on the lesser offense of third degree murder could be made only in the event that "the death occurred as a consequence of and while [defendant] was engaged in the commission of aggravated battery." [1] Because the jury ha

1988Defendant contends this statute does not permit reclassification, because the use of the weapon is an essential element of the underlying felony of aggravated battery, relying on Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

1966The point relied on for appeal is error on the part of the trial court in giving an instruction requested by the State, which reads as follows : “Gentlemen of the Jury, the Court instructs you that before a person can avail himself of the defense that he used a deadly weapon in defense of his life, he must satisfy the jury that the defense was necessary at the time and that he did all he could to avoid it, and that it was necessary to protect his own life, or protect himself from great bodily harm, as would give him reasonable apprehension that his life was in imminent danger.” It is apparent,

1923An instruction given that “before a' person, can avail himself of the defense that he used a deadly weapon in defense of his life and be justified, he must satisfy the jury that the defense was necessary at the time,” etc., and assigned as error, was erroneous (Hathaway v. State, 32 Fla. 56 , 13 South.

1923Rep. 592 ; Hubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156 , 20 South.

1902By a charge prepared and given by the court to the jury they were instructed that “before a person can avail himself of the defense that he used a deadly weapon in defense of his life and be justified, he must satisfy the jury that the defense was necessary at the time; that he did all he could to avoid it, and that it was necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself from such great bodily harm as would give him a reasonable apprehension that his life was in immediate danger.” This instruction was evidently copied from the eleventh, head-note in the case of Gladden v. State, 12 Fla