54 California opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. B.M. (In re B.M.)green2 sentences2026(B.M., supra, 6 Cal. 5th at p. 534 , italics added.) It is appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what serious injury could have resulted to the victim from the way the defendant was using the object. 2024(See Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1065 & 1067; see also In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528 , 530 & 535 (B.M.) [“it is appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what harm could have resulted from the way the object was actually used. . . . [T]he evidence may show that serious injury was likely, even if it did not come to pass”].) The extent of actual injury or lack of injury is relevant, but “an aggressor should not receive the benefit of a potential victim fortuitously taking a defensive measure . . . .” ( B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 535 & 537.) Thomas’s conduct “could have resulte | 2 | 10 |
People v. Aguilargreen2 sentences2026(In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 276 .) “Great bodily injury is significant or substantial injury.” (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087 .) Under section 245(a)(1), “whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is immaterial.” (Aguilar, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1028 .) But “if injuries result, the extent of such injuries and their location are relevant facts” to the deadly weapon inquiry. 2023In determining whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue. [Citations.]” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029 .) In B.M., our Supreme Court elucidated three principles that help guide the analysis as to whether an object that is not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). ( B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 533-537.) “First, the object alleged to be a deadly weapon | 2 | 6 |
People v. Grayden N.green2 sentences2022(In re Grayden N. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 598, 604 .) “Simply put, the … court is bound, under the statute, to report to the [DMV] the true finding [defendant] committed an assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), and the true finding the weapon … used was a vehicle.” (Ibid.) License revocation is a civil, not a criminal, sanction. 2015(In re Grayden N. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 598, 604 (Grayden N.).) “Simply put, the . . . court is bound, under the statute, to report to the [DMV] the true finding [defendant] committed an assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), and the true finding the weapon . . . used was a vehicle.” (Ibid.) License revocation is a civil, not a criminal, sanction. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Delgadogreen2 sentences2022In this petition, defendant argued his two prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245 were not strikes because they did not involve the actual infliction of great bodily injury or the use of a firearm within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d)(1), 667.5, subdivision (c)(8), or 1192.7, subdivision (c), based on People v. Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1059 . 3 Prior to approval of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes law provided that defendants who committed a felony and had two or more prior convictions for serious or violent felonies were to be sentenced 2022In this petition, defendant argued his two prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245 were not strikes because they did not involve the actual infliction of great bodily injury or the use of a firearm within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d)(1), 667.5, subdivision (c)(8), or 1192.7, subdivision (c), based on People v. Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1059 . 3 Prior to approval of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes law provided that defendants who committed a felony and had two or more prior convictions for serious or violent felonies were to be sentenced | 2 | 3 |
People v. McDanielgreen2 sentences2022(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d 450 ; People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 749 [a violation of § 245, subd. (a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon, is a lesser included offense of § 4501].6 In doing so, we urge the Supreme Court to reconsider Noah in light of the subsequent amendments to section 4501. 2021(People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 747-748 .) The jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 875 that appellant was guilty of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) if the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he “did an act with a deadly weapon other than a firearm;” (2) he “did that act willfully;” (3) when appellant committed the act, “he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;” (4) when appellant so ac | 1 | 2 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1980(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Furthermore, although the Supreme Court’s denial of hearing is not to be regarded as expressing approval of the propositions of law set forth in a Court of Appeal opinion, “it does not follow that such denial is without significance as to the views of the members of that court.” (McGlothlen, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017 , citing DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 178 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 367 P.2d 865 ], and 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 669-6 1980(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Furthermore, although the Supreme Court’s denial of hearing is not to be regarded as expressing approval of the propositions of law set forth in a Court of Appeal opinion, “it does not follow that such denial is without significance as to the views of the members of that court.” (McGlothlen, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017 , citing DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 178 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 367 P.2d 865 ], and 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 669-6 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Carmonygreen1 sentence2024THE ROMERO MOTION “When a defendant is convicted of a felony, and it is pleaded and proved he had committed prior ‘violent’ or ‘serious’ felonies, the Three Strikes law provides for the imposition of increased sentences. [Citations.] A trial court is presumed to have acted properly whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the Three Strikes law. [Citation.] A sentencing court nonetheless has the power to dismiss one or more prior strike convictions in the interests of justice.” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362 , 370 (Nunez).) “In deciding whether to exercise its discretion | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2024THE ROMERO MOTION “When a defendant is convicted of a felony, and it is pleaded and proved he had committed prior ‘violent’ or ‘serious’ felonies, the Three Strikes law provides for the imposition of increased sentences. [Citations.] A trial court is presumed to have acted properly whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the Three Strikes law. [Citation.] A sentencing court nonetheless has the power to dismiss one or more prior strike convictions in the interests of justice.” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362 , 370 (Nunez).) “In deciding whether to exercise its discretion | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2024(See generally CALCRIM No. 875 [assault with a deadly weapon instruction providing “No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant’s act”]; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [noting cases have found harmless error where record indicates jury resolved basic credibility dispute against defendant and would have convicted him of any of the various offenses shown by the 16. evidence].) In summary, based on counsel’s arguments, the jury instructions, the prosecution evidence, and the defense offered at trial, we conclude any error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury s | 1 | 1 |
People v. Aznavolehgreen1 sentence2024(See Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1065 & 1067; see also In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528 , 530 & 535 (B.M.) [“it is appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what harm could have resulted from the way the object was actually used. . . . [T]he evidence may show that serious injury was likely, even if it did not come to pass”].) The extent of actual injury or lack of injury is relevant, but “an aggressor should not receive the benefit of a potential victim fortuitously taking a defensive measure . . . .” ( B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 535 & 537.) Thomas’s conduct “could have resulte | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Hernandezgreen1 sentence2024(See generally People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [noting split of opinion in appellate courts as to whether harmless error standard of Chapman or Watson applies in a unanimity instruction case].) Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510 and People v. King (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 493 is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
| Hurst v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Arnettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Villarrealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McCoygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Matthewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Childsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fultongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cuevasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Savalagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Frederick G.green | 1 | 1 |
| DiGenova v. State Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Southackgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wildergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Aguayo
green
2 sentences2025The Attorney General agrees, noting that the California Supreme Court decided this question in Johnson’s favor in People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974 (Aguayo).15 In Aguayo, the California Supreme Court concluded that subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (a)(4) of section 245 are different statements of the same offense, and that one cannot be convicted of both offenses based on the same act or course of conduct. 2023The Attorney General agrees, noting that the California Supreme Court decided this question in Johnson’s favor in People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974 (Aguayo).15 In Aguayo, the California Supreme Court concluded that subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (a)(4) of section 245 are different statements of the same offense, and that one cannot be convicted of both offenses based on the same act or course of conduct. | 3 | 2023–2025 |
People v. Linares
green
2 sentences2022(Linares, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199 .) The DMV, not the court, has the power to administratively suspend or revoke a driver’s license under Vehicle Code section 13351.5. 2015(People v. Linares, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199 .) It is the DMV, not the court, that has the power administratively to suspend or revoke a driver’s license under Vehicle Code section 13351.5. | 3 | 2013–2022 |
People v. Perez
green
2 sentences2024(See Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1065 & 1067; see also In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528 , 530 & 535 (B.M.) [“it is appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what harm could have resulted from the way the object was actually used. . . . [T]he evidence may show that serious injury was likely, even if it did not come to pass”].) The extent of actual injury or lack of injury is relevant, but “an aggressor should not receive the benefit of a potential victim fortuitously taking a defensive measure . . . .” ( B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 535 & 537.) Thomas’s conduct “could have resulte 2022In this petition, defendant argued his two prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245 were not strikes because they did not involve the actual infliction of great bodily injury or the use of a firearm within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d)(1), 667.5, subdivision (c)(8), or 1192.7, subdivision (c), based on People v. Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1059 . 3 Prior to approval of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes law provided that defendants who committed a felony and had two or more prior convictions for serious or violent felonies were to be sentenced | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Aledamat
green
2 sentences2021(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 6-7 .) Following Aledamat, however, it was not an error that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 2021(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15 .) Just as in the instant case, the defendant in Aledamat was charged with both an assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and making a criminal threat in violation of section 422, subdivision (a). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Gularte v. Pradia
green
2 sentences2015His interpretation is based, ostensibly, on the plain 3 language of section 1170.126 (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 ), the principle of statutory construction that courts should construe ambiguities in penal statutes to avoid constitutional problems (ibid.), that remedial statutes should be liberally construed (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 242 ), and the rule of lenity (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545 ). 2015His interpretation is based on the principles of statutory construction that courts should construe ambiguities in penal statutes to avoid constitutional problems (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 ), remedial statutes should be liberally construed (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 242 ), and the rule of lenity (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545 ). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. M.M.
green
2 sentences2015His interpretation is based, ostensibly, on the plain 3 language of section 1170.126 (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 ), the principle of statutory construction that courts should construe ambiguities in penal statutes to avoid constitutional problems (ibid.), that remedial statutes should be liberally construed (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 242 ), and the rule of lenity (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545 ). 2015His interpretation is based on the principles of statutory construction that courts should construe ambiguities in penal statutes to avoid constitutional problems (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 ), remedial statutes should be liberally construed (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 242 ), and the rule of lenity (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545 ). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Leiva
green
2 sentences2015His interpretation is based, ostensibly, on the plain 3 language of section 1170.126 (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 ), the principle of statutory construction that courts should construe ambiguities in penal statutes to avoid constitutional problems (ibid.), that remedial statutes should be liberally construed (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 242 ), and the rule of lenity (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545 ). 2015His interpretation is based on the principles of statutory construction that courts should construe ambiguities in penal statutes to avoid constitutional problems (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 ), remedial statutes should be liberally construed (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236, 242 ), and the rule of lenity (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545 ). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Carmen
green
2 sentences1974(People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Cal.2d 768, 774-775 .)” This language, Escarcega insists, must be read as holding that the conduct proscribed by section 417 is necessarily committed in every Penal Code section 245 assault with a deadly weapon violation, requiring jury instructions such as he requested at his trial. 1974(People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Cal.2d 768, 774-775 .)” This language, Escarcega insists, must be read as holding that the conduct proscribed by section 417 is necessarily committed in every Penal Code section 245 assault with a deadly weapon violation, requiring jury instructions such as he requested at his trial. | 2 | 1974–1974 |
People v. Jose R.
green
1 sentence2026(In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 276 .) “Great bodily injury is significant or substantial injury.” (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087 .) Under section 245(a)(1), “whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is immaterial.” (Aguilar, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1028 .) But “if injuries result, the extent of such injuries and their location are relevant facts” to the deadly weapon inquiry. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Beasley
green
2 sentences2026(In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 276 .) “Great bodily injury is significant or substantial injury.” (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087 .) Under section 245(a)(1), “whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is immaterial.” (Aguilar, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1028 .) But “if injuries result, the extent of such injuries and their location are relevant facts” to the deadly weapon inquiry. 2026(Beasley, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086 .) C. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2024(See generally People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [noting split of opinion in appellate courts as to whether harmless error standard of Chapman or Watson applies in a unanimity instruction case].) Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510 and People v. King (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 493 is misplaced. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Hatchett
green
1 sentence2024The two cases cited by Sahagun—People v. Hatchett (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 144 and People v. Newcomer (1897) 118 Cal. 263—do not hold that such a broad rule applies. 16 would have accounted for the discrepancy. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. King
green
1 sentence2024(See generally People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [noting split of opinion in appellate courts as to whether harmless error standard of Chapman or Watson applies in a unanimity instruction case].) Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510 and People v. King (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 493 is misplaced. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Newcomer
green
1 sentence2024The two cases cited by Sahagun—People v. Hatchett (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 144 and People v. Newcomer (1897) 118 Cal. 263—do not hold that such a broad rule applies. 16 would have accounted for the discrepancy. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Deegan
green
1 sentence2024Section 654 Under section 654, subdivision (a), “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” In determining whether section 654 applies, “the trial court is entitled to make any necessary factual findings not already made by the jury.” (People v. Deegan (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 532, 545 .) While a jury verdict must be unanimous, the jury is not required to make findings as to which of multiple acts supported its verdict | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Estrada
green
1 sentence2022In this petition, defendant argued his two prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245 were not strikes because they did not involve the actual infliction of great bodily injury or the use of a firearm within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d)(1), 667.5, subdivision (c)(8), or 1192.7, subdivision (c), based on People v. Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1059 . 3 Prior to approval of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes law provided that defendants who committed a felony and had two or more prior convictions for serious or violent felonies were to be sentenced | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Banuelos
green
1 sentence2022Assault With a Deadly Weapon and Delgado “Before the passage of Proposition 21 in 2000, section 245 was not among the crimes enumerated in section 1192.7, and a conviction under section 245 could qualify as a prior serious felony only if the defendant ‘personally inflict[ed] great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice,’ ‘personally use[d] a firearm,’ or ‘personally use[d] a dangerous or deadly weapon.’ [Citations.] Because a conviction under section 245, subdivision (a)(1) could result from aiding and abetting another in an assault committed with a deadly weapon, or from persona | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Wende
green
1 sentence2022The court denied the motion and defendant appealed. 4 DISCUSSION Defendant’s counsel has filed a “no-issues” brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S 738 setting forth statements of the case and facts. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Kimbrel
green
1 sentence2021(Kimbrel, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 870 .) Because the trial court instructed the jury that a “‘deadly weapon’” was “‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing, and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury,’” the defendant contended that the court erred in not defining “‘great bodily injury’” sua sponte. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Marsh green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Flood green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Connecticut v. Johnson green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Dixon green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Allen green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Lema green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Brandon T. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Chiu red | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Missouri v. Frye green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In Re Mosley green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Lawson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| The People v. Harrison green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Geiger red | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Capitol Meats, Inc. v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Trustees of the Monroe Avenue Church of Christ v. Perkins green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Rocha green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Hood green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Jennings green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| People v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.