48 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adame v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Whether an airgun is loaded at the time of a criminal transaction is insignificant to the deadly-weapon analysis, since the crucial question is only whether it is “capable of causing serious bodily injury.” Adame , 69 S.W.3d at 582 . 2012Whether an airgun is loaded at the time of a criminal transaction is insignificant to the deadly-weapon analysis, since the crucial question is only whether it is “capable of causing serious bodily injury.” Adame, 69 S.W.3d at 582 . | 6 | 15 |
Denham v. Stategreen2 sentences2026In addition to the three Johnson factors, we may also consider the “presence and severity of wounds,” which, however, “are not a prerequisite to a finding of deadliness.” Hammons v. State, 856 S.W.2d 797, 800–01 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (citing Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. 2005Denham v. State , 574 S.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 919 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). 2012Also, ownership is not necessary to a finding that a defendant used a deadly weapon in violation of article 42.12, section 3g of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 919 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2026App. 2002); see Johnson, 509 S.W.3d at 323 (“These, however, are just factors used to guide a court’s sufficiency analysis; they are not inexorable commands.”), the Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized the third factor, declaring that “generally speaking, the nature of the object itself does not limit whether that object may be a deadly weapon; rather, it is only the ‘manner of [the defendant’s] use or 8 intended use’ that provides any meaningful limitation to the broad statutory definition,” Flores, 620 S.W.3d at 158–59 (quoting Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17)(B)) (brackets in original); se 2021Id. at 502-03 . 6 Such analysis was not 6 See also Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Piontek Younggreen2 sentences2015See United States v. Young, 68 Fed. 2015See United States v. Young, 68 Fed. | 2 | 2 |
Dimas v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Dimas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). 2005Dimas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d). | 2 | 2 |
Narron v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Id. 1997In a possession of a prohibited weapon case, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the weapon was not "used" in the furtherance of any collateral felony and held: "Because there was no associated felony facilitated by appellant's possession of the short-barrel firearm, our holding in Ex parte Petty . . . dictates that the affirmative finding of a deadly weapon was error." Narron v. State , 835 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 3 |
Prichard v. Stategreen1 sentence2022JURY CHARGE ERROR By his second issue, Baites argues a deadly weapon instruction was not permissible because the weapon used was exhibited on a “nonhuman.” See Prichard v. State, 533 S.W.3d 315, 321, 330 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See e.g., Stephens v. State, 717 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Drichas v. Stategreen1 sentence2015III:119-120. 88 See Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798 (danger to responding officers may be considered in Deadly Weapon analysis); but c.f. | 1 | 1 |
Josue Ignacio Castillo v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Nor is evidence of fingerprints or ownership “necessary to a finding that a person used a deadly weapon in violation of article 42.12.” See Castillo, 426 S.W.3d at 139 (rejecting argument that State did not establish ownership of gun). | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Lastly, Appellant asserts the trial courtâs judgment of conviction should be modified because he was convicted of a second degree felony offense rather than a third degree felony offense as stated in the judgment.           I.         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel           We examine ineffective assistance of counsel claims by the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and adopted by Texas in Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Blanson v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Blanson v. State , 107 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. App. C Texarkana 2003, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Adame v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Adame, 37 S.W.3d at 143 . 2002The court of appeals observed that "[t]he fact that a BB pistol is loaded or unloaded is significant in the deadly weapon analysis," and that "a BB pistol is generally not `capable' of causing death or serious bodily injury unless it is loaded." Adame, 37 S.W.3d at 143-44 . | 1 | 1 |
Stevens v. Stategreen1 sentence1985See Parr v. State, 658 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Stevens v. State, 636 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.App.—Waco 1982, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Parr v. Stategreen1 sentence1985See Parr v. State, 658 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Stevens v. State, 636 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.App.—Waco 1982, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Petty
green
2 sentences2008Thus, because there was no associated felony facilitated by the Applicant's possession of the deadly weapon, the holding in Patterson dictates that the affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon was error." Petty , 833 S.W.2d at 145 . 2006Thus, because there was no associated felony facilitated by the Applicant’s possession of the deadly weapon, the holding in Patterson dictates that the affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon was error.” Petty, 833 S.W.2d at 145-46 . | 6 | 1992–2008 |
LaFleur v. State
green
2 sentences2009Without examining any of this Court’s precedent on the issue (Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)), the majority concludes that the jury made an express deadly-weapon finding because the indictment for the greater offense mentioned a deadly weapon. 2009Id. at 92-93 . | 3 | 2009–2009 |
McCain v. State
green
2 sentences2021Id. 2021Id. at 502-03 . 6 Such analysis was not 6 See also Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Hammons v. State
green
1 sentence2026In addition to the three Johnson factors, we may also consider the “presence and severity of wounds,” which, however, “are not a prerequisite to a finding of deadliness.” Hammons v. State, 856 S.W.2d 797, 800–01 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (citing Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence2021We find no harm and overrule the ground of error.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 9 Here, appellant grounds his allegation of error with respect to the deadly weapon instruction in cases concerning sufficiency of the evidence and a trial court’s authority to enter an affirmative deadly weapon finding in the absence of an affirmative finding by the jury. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Coleman v. State
green
1 sentence2012Courts must determine whether the cumulative effect of the factors could have allowed a rational jury to determine that the defendant used the weapons to protect the drugs and the proceeds therefrom. coleman, 145 S.W.3d at 655 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009Lastly, Appellant asserts the trial courtâs judgment of conviction should be modified because he was convicted of a second degree felony offense rather than a third degree felony offense as stated in the judgment.           I.         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel           We examine ineffective assistance of counsel claims by the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and adopted by Texas in Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). 2009Lastly, Appellant asserts the trial courtâs judgment of conviction should be modified because he was convicted of a second degree felony offense rather than a third degree felony offense as stated in the judgment.           I.         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel           We examine ineffective assistance of counsel claims by the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and adopted by Texas in Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Polk v. State
green
2 sentences2009Without examining any of this Court's precedent on the issue ( Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)), the majority concludes that the jury made an express deadly-weapon finding because the indictment for the greater offense mentioned a deadly weapon. 2009Without examining any of this Court’s precedent on the issue (Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)), the majority concludes that the jury made an express deadly-weapon finding because the indictment for the greater offense mentioned a deadly weapon. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Patterson v. State
green
2 sentences2004There we held that “the holding in Patterson [v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1989),] dictates that the affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon was error.” 4 We did not discuss the question, whether a habe-as-corpus applicant like Petty could raise for the first time a claim of error like the one that Patterson raised on his direct appeal. 2004There we held that "the holding in Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1989),] dictates that the affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon was error. [4] We did not discuss the question, whether a habeas-corpus applicant like Petty could raise for the first time a claim of error like the one that Patterson raised on his direct appeal. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.