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8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See id. at 228-29 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. at 1264 ); Ramirez v. State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref d). 2006See id. at 228-29 (citing Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309-10 , 111 S. Ct. at 1264 ); Ramirez v. State , 76 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2007See id. at 228-29 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. at 1264 ); Ramirez v. State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref d). 2007See id. at 228-29 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. at 1264 ); Ramirez v. State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref d). | 2 | 2 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See id. at 228-29 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. at 1264 ); Ramirez v. State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref d). 2006See id. at 228-29 (citing Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309-10 , 111 S. Ct. at 1264 ); Ramirez v. State , 76 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Penny v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994); and Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)); see Shepherd v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no pet.). 1994Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1994, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Calderongreen1 sentence2015See Ex parte Calderon, 309 S.W.3d 64, 71 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Benavidez v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Benavidez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 179, 182-83 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (An appellant who has established a claim of trial error is still entitled to appellate consideration of a sufficiency of the evidence claim because the relief for such a claim is greater than for a claim of trial error.). . | 1 | 1 |
Shepherd v. Stategreen1 sentence1995Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994); and Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)); see Shepherd v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
1 sentence2013Citing to Gideon , the Supreme Court in Martinez determined that a "prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel," a right that is "a bedrock principle in our justice system." Id. at 1317 (citing Gideon , 372 U.S. at 344 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Martinez v. Ryan
green
1 sentence2013Citing to Gideon , the Supreme Court in Martinez determined that a "prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel," a right that is "a bedrock principle in our justice system." Id. at 1317 (citing Gideon , 372 U.S. at 344 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lyon v. Texas
green
1 sentence1995Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994); and Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)); see Shepherd v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no pet.). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence1995Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994); and Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)); see Shepherd v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no pet.). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Morris v. State
green
1 sentence1995Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994); and Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)); see Shepherd v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no pet.). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Lyon v. State
green
1 sentence1995Penny v. State, 880 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994); and Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)); see Shepherd v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no pet.). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Meredith v. State
neutral
2 sentences1987However, for purposes of determining the adequacy of an indictment, we deem it sufficient that a fact is susceptible to establishment by judicial notice in the trial court, to obviate the need to allege that fact, under Art. 21.18, supra. As we have shown, the incorporation of the city of San Antonio is certainly susceptible to judicial notice, under the terms of Art. 1174, supra. The omission of allegation of the fact of incorporation was therefore not fatal to the indictment, by operation of Art. 21.18, supra. See Meredith v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 277 , 184 S.W. 204 (1916); Carrillo v. State, 1987However, for purposes of determining the adequacy of an indictment, we deem it sufficient that a fact is susceptible to establishment by judicial notice in the trial court, to obviate the need to allege that fact, under Art. 21.18, supra. As we have shown, the incorporation of the city of San Antonio is certainly susceptible to judicial notice, under the terms of Art. 1174, supra. The omission of allegation of the fact of incorporation was therefore not fatal to the indictment, by operation of Art. 21.18, supra. See Meredith v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 277 , 184 S.W. 204 (1916); Carrillo v. State, | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Legg v. State
green
1 sentence1987However, for purposes of determining the adequacy of an indictment, we deem it sufficient that a fact is susceptible to establishment by judicial notice in the trial court, to obviate the need to allege that fact, under Art. 21.18, supra. As we have shown, the incorporation of the city of San Antonio is certainly susceptible to judicial notice, under the terms of Art. 1174, supra. The omission of allegation of the fact of incorporation was therefore not fatal to the indictment, by operation of Art. 21.18, supra. See Meredith v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 277 , 184 S.W. 204 (1916); Carrillo v. State, | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Oliver v. State
green
1 sentence1987However, for purposes of determining the adequacy of an indictment, we deem it sufficient that a fact is susceptible to establishment by judicial notice in the trial court, to obviate the need to allege that fact, under Art. 21.18, supra. As we have shown, the incorporation of the city of San Antonio is certainly susceptible to judicial notice, under the terms of Art. 1174, supra. The omission of allegation of the fact of incorporation was therefore not fatal to the indictment, by operation of Art. 21.18, supra. See Meredith v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 277 , 184 S.W. 204 (1916); Carrillo v. State, | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Carrillo v. State
green
1 sentence1987However, for purposes of determining the adequacy of an indictment, we deem it sufficient that a fact is susceptible to establishment by judicial notice in the trial court, to obviate the need to allege that fact, under Art. 21.18, supra. As we have shown, the incorporation of the city of San Antonio is certainly susceptible to judicial notice, under the terms of Art. 1174, supra. The omission of allegation of the fact of incorporation was therefore not fatal to the indictment, by operation of Art. 21.18, supra. See Meredith v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 277 , 184 S.W. 204 (1916); Carrillo v. State, | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.