purposes behind the confrontation requirement in Texas

1977The Supreme Court in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), noted that the exception to the confrontation requirement has been explained and “justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.” Where the State seeks to reproduce testimony of an absent witness given at a prior hearing, it has the burden of establishing an exception to the right of confrontation.

1977The Supreme Court in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), noted that the exception to the confrontation requirement has been explained and “justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.” Where the State seeks to reproduce testimony of an absent witness given at a prior hearing, it has the burden of establishing an exception to the right of confrontation.

1977Forbes v. State, supra; Carver v. State, supra; Whitehead v. State, 450 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Cumpston v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 385 , 235 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.Cr.App.1951).

1977Forbes v. State, supra; Carver v. State, supra; Whitehead v. State, 450 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Cumpston v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 385 , 235 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.Cr.App.1951).

1993For this reason, we have never insisted on an actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance in which testimony is admitted against a defendant. (emphasis theirs) In Gonzales v. State, 818 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the plurality opinion stated in substance that the state constitution has never required that the accused and the witnesses against him actually come "face-to-face" in all situations.

1993For this reason, we have never insisted on an actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance in which testimony is admitted against a defendant, (emphasis theirs) In Gonzales v. State, 818 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the plurality opinion stated in substance that the state constitution has never required that the accused and the witnesses against him actually come “face-to-face” in all situations.

1993See Delaware v Fensterer, 474 US 15, 22 , 88 L Ed 2d 15 , 106 S Ct 292 [295] (1985) (per curiam) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony”); [State of Ohio v. ] Roberts, supra [ 448 U.S. 56 ], at 69, 65 L Ed 2d 597 , 100 S Ct 2531 [at 2540] (oath, cross-examination, and demeanor provide “all that the

1993See Delaware v Fensterer, 474 US 15, 22 , 88 L Ed 2d 15 , 106 S Ct 292 [295] (1985) (per curiam) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony”); [State of Ohio v. ] Roberts, supra [ 448 U.S. 56 ], at 69, 65 L Ed 2d 597 , 100 S Ct 2531 [at 2540] (oath, cross-examination, and demeanor provide “all that the

1980He then concluded: “Since there was adequate opportunity to cross-examine Holm at the first trial, and counsel for Stubbs availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript of Holm’s testimony in the first trial bore sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ and afforded ‘ “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,” ’ Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89 , 91 S.Ct. at 219 .” Following Pointer and Barber, supra, this Court has on several occasions dealt with the issue in similar contexts. 10 Carver v. State, 510 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Forbes v. State,

1980(T)he right of cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement . . ” Furthermore, following in the wake of Pointer v. Texas, Barber v. Page, both supra, and their progeny, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 , 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) teaches that: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury . . . ’ and to ‘afford the trier of the fact a satisfactory basis fo

1980(T)he right of cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement . . ” Furthermore, following in the wake of Pointer v. Texas, Barber v. Page, both supra, and their progeny, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 , 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) teaches that: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury . . . ’ and to ‘afford the trier of the fact a satisfactory basis fo

1980(T)he right of cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement . . ” Furthermore, following in the wake of Pointer v. Texas, Barber v. Page, both supra, and their progeny, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 , 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) teaches that: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury . . . ’ and to ‘afford the trier of the fact a satisfactory basis fo

1980(T)he right of cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement . . ” Furthermore, following in the wake of Pointer v. Texas, Barber v. Page, both supra, and their progeny, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 , 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) teaches that: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury . . . ’ and to ‘afford the trier of the fact a satisfactory basis fo

1980He then concluded: “Since there was adequate opportunity to cross-examine Holm at the first trial, and counsel for Stubbs availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript of Holm’s testimony in the first trial bore sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ and afforded ‘ “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,” ’ Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89 , 91 S.Ct. at 219 .” Following Pointer and Barber, supra, this Court has on several occasions dealt with the issue in similar contexts. 10 Carver v. State, 510 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Forbes v. State,

1980He then concluded: “Since there was adequate opportunity to cross-examine Holm at the first trial, and counsel for Stubbs availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript of Holm’s testimony in the first trial bore sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ and afforded ‘ “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,” ’ Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89 , 91 S.Ct. at 219 .” Following Pointer and Barber, supra, this Court has on several occasions dealt with the issue in similar contexts. 10 Carver v. State, 510 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Forbes v. State,