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8 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶13 The State primarily relies on Williams II to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court’s failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wn.2d at 751-54 . 2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶13 The State primarily relies on Williams II to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court’s failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wn.2d at 751-54 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. McFarland
green
2 sentences2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶13 The State primarily relies on Williams II to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court’s failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wn.2d at 751-54 . 2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶13 The State primarily relies on Williams II to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court’s failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wn.2d at 751-54 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2008Williams II is distinguishable: Williams did not challenge an incriminating statement but disputed a minor fact going to “ ‘credibility and weight, but not legal admissibility,’ ” and he did not question the voluntariness of his statement. 137 Wn.2d at 755 (quoting State v. Williams, 91 Wn. 2008Williams is distinguishable, Williams did not challenge an incriminating statement but disputed a minor fact going to "credibility and weight, not legal admissibility" and he did not question the voluntariness of his statement. 137 Wash.2d at 755 , 975 P.2d 963 (quoting State v. Williams, 91 Wash.App. 344, 352 , 955 P.2d 865 (1998)). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶13 The State primarily relies on Williams II to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court’s failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wn.2d at 751-54 . 2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wash.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶ 13 The State primarily relies on Williams to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court's failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court's failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wash.2d at 751-54 , 975 P.2d 963 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Twelker, 88 Wn.2d at 474-75 . 1997Twelker, 88 Wash.2d at 474-75 , 564 P.2d 1131 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Ameline
green
1 sentence2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Larson
green
2 sentences2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). 2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Ameline
green
2 sentences2019Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wn. 2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
King v. Snohomish County
green
1 sentence2011In King, 146 Wn.2d 420 , the defendant raised a claim-filing defense in its answer but did not clarify the defense in response to an interrogatory, and the parties engaged in 45 months of litigation and discovery, during which time the defendant sought four continuances and filed a motion for summary judgment that did not mention the defense. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Noyes
green
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2008State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 333 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Scott, 110 Wash.2d 682, 688 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). ¶ 13 The State primarily relies on Williams to argue that SW cannot appeal the juvenile court's failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing because our Supreme Court has held that a trial court's failure to advise a defendant of his right under CrR 3.5(b) to testify at a CrR 3.5 hearing did not require reversal when the defendant raised the error for the first time on appeal. 137 Wash.2d at 751-54 , 975 P.2d 963 . 2008Williams is distinguishable, Williams did not challenge an incriminating statement but disputed a minor fact going to "credibility and weight, not legal admissibility" and he did not question the voluntariness of his statement. 137 Wash.2d at 755 , 975 P.2d 963 (quoting State v. Williams, 91 Wash.App. 344, 352 , 955 P.2d 865 (1998)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co.
green
2 sentences1984In Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn.2d 347 , 378 P.2d 298 (1963), we held where, in an action for dermatitis allegedly caused by defendant's hair tint product, the defendant raised the defense of allergy, the trial court on remand had to determine whether the product was "harmful to a reasonably foreseeable and appreciable class or number of potential users." Esborg , at 358. 1984In Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn.2d 347 , 378 P.2d 298 (1963), we held where, in an action for dermatitis allegedly caused by defendant's hair tint product, the defendant raised the defense of allergy, the trial court on remand had to determine whether the product was "harmful to a reasonably foreseeable and appreciable class or number of potential users." Esborg , at 358. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.