defendant raised claim in Connecticut

2000I CT Page 8474 STANDING "The question of standing implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction and, as such, may be raised at any time during the proceedings." Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 54 n. 4, 661 A.2d 988 (1995); In re Michelle G. , 52 Conn. App. 187 , 190 , 727 A.2d 226 (1999).

2000I CT Page 8474 STANDING "The question of standing implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction and, as such, may be raised at any time during the proceedings." Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 54 n. 4, 661 A.2d 988 (1995); In re Michelle G. , 52 Conn. App. 187 , 190 , 727 A.2d 226 (1999).

2000I CT Page 8474 STANDING "The question of standing implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction and, as such, may be raised at any time during the proceedings." Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 54 n. 4, 661 A.2d 988 (1995); In re Michelle G. , 52 Conn. App. 187 , 190 , 727 A.2d 226 (1999).

2000I CT Page 8474 STANDING "The question of standing implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction and, as such, may be raised at any time during the proceedings." Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 54 n. 4, 661 A.2d 988 (1995); In re Michelle G. , 52 Conn. App. 187 , 190 , 727 A.2d 226 (1999).

2026During his testimony, February 17, 2026 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 39 354 Conn. 212 FEBRUARY, 2026 217 State v. Matheney the defendant admitted that, after he failed to gain pos- session of the BB gun, he wildly fired shots from his own gun toward the truck and immediately fled the scene.

2024Nevertheless, the defendant raised the claim in its brief to the Appellate Court, as well as in its brief to this court, and the plaintiff has responded to the claim in her reply brief. ‘‘Given the fact that neither party would be prejudiced by our doing so, we treat [this claim] as if [it] had been properly raised as . . . [an alternative ground] for affirmance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gerardi v. Bridgeport, 294 Conn. 461, 466 , 985 A.2d 328 (2010). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9 0 Conn. 483 ,0 11 Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. contends that the plaintiff had to appeal

2024Nevertheless, the defendant raised the claim in its brief to the Appellate Court, as well as in its brief to this court, and the plaintiff has responded to the claim in her reply brief. ‘‘Given the fact that neither party would be prejudiced by our doing so, we treat [this claim] as if [it] had been properly raised as . . . [an alternative ground] for affirmance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gerardi v. Bridgeport, 294 Conn. 461, 466 , 985 A.2d 328 (2010). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9 0 Conn. 483 ,0 11 Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. contends that the plaintiff had to appeal

2021Ed. 2d 162 (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805 , 807 n.1, 772 A.2d 690 (2001). 2 For convenience, we have reordered the defendant’s claims as they are set forth in his brief. 3 Although the court noted that the defendant’s April 26, 2019 letter indi- cated that the defendant sought to represent himself, at the May 22, 2019 hearing he requested time t

2021Ed. 2d 162 (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805 , 807 n.1, 772 A.2d 690 (2001). 2 For convenience, we have reordered the defendant’s claims as they are set forth in his brief. 3 Although the court noted that the defendant’s April 26, 2019 letter indi- cated that the defendant sought to represent himself, at the May 22, 2019 hearing he requested time t

2018Id.

2017Because a presentment proceeding in the trial court is de novo; e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin , 61 Conn.App. 445 , 453, 767 A.2d 732 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 64 (2001) ; the record of the grievance proceedings was not before the trial court and it is not before this court.

2017Because a presentment proceeding in the trial court is de novo; e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin , 61 Conn.App. 445 , 453, 767 A.2d 732 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 64 (2001) ; the record of the grievance proceedings was not before the trial court and it is not before this court.

2017Because a presentment proceeding in the trial court is de novo; e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin , 61 Conn.App. 445 , 453, 767 A.2d 732 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 64 (2001) ; the record of the grievance proceedings was not before the trial court and it is not before this court.

2017Because a presentment proceeding in the trial court is de novo; e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin , 61 Conn.App. 445 , 453, 767 A.2d 732 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 64 (2001) ; the record of the grievance proceedings was not before the trial court and it is not before this court.

2017In State v. Robert H. , 168 Conn.App. 419 , 421, 146 A.3d 995 , cert. granted, 323 Conn. 940 , 151 A.3d 845 2016), 13 a defendant raised a claim of evidentiary insufficiency.

2017In State v. Robert H. , 168 Conn.App. 419 , 421, 146 A.3d 995 , cert. granted, 323 Conn. 940 , 151 A.3d 845 2016), 13 a defendant raised a claim of evidentiary insufficiency.

2017In State v. Robert H. , 168 Conn.App. 419 , 421, 146 A.3d 995 , cert. granted, 323 Conn. 940 , 151 A.3d 845 2016), 13 a defendant raised a claim of evidentiary insufficiency.

2017In State v. Parham, 174 Conn. 500 , 506–509, 391 A.2d 148 (1978), the defendant raised a claim similar to the present claim.

2017In State v. Parham, 174 Conn. 500 , 506–509, 391 A.2d 148 (1978), the defendant raised a claim similar to the present claim.

2013See Plante v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 300 Conn. 33, 59 , 12 A.3d 885 (2011); Mangiafico v. State Board of Education, 138 Conn. App. 677 , 680-81 n.4, 53 A.3d 1066 (2012).

2013See Plante v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 300 Conn. 33, 59 , 12 A.3d 885 (2011); Mangiafico v. State Board of Education, 138 Conn. App. 677 , 680-81 n.4, 53 A.3d 1066 (2012).

2010“Appellate courts generally do not consider claims raised for the first time at oral argument.” State v. Marcelino S., 118 Conn. App. 589 , 592 n.4, 984 A.2d 1148 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 904 , 988 A.2d 879 (2010).

2010“Appellate courts generally do not consider claims raised for the first time at oral argument.” State v. Marcelino S., 118 Conn. App. 589 , 592 n.4, 984 A.2d 1148 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 904 , 988 A.2d 879 (2010).

2010“Appellate courts generally do not consider claims raised for the first time at oral argument.” State v. Marcelino S., 118 Conn. App. 589 , 592 n.4, 984 A.2d 1148 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 904 , 988 A.2d 879 (2010).

2010“Appellate courts generally do not consider claims raised for the first time at oral argument.” State v. Marcelino S., 118 Conn. App. 589 , 592 n.4, 984 A.2d 1148 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 904 , 988 A.2d 879 (2010).

2009The state claims that the facts of this case are similar to the facts in State v. Garrison, supra, 203 Conn. 466 , in which the defendant raised defense of premises as a justification for shooting his sister’s boyfriend, after the defendant had demanded that the victim leave his sister’s apartment.

2006Id., 4 .

2006Id., 190 .

2002In that case the Appellate Court referred to a Supreme Court case, Argentinis v. Gould, 219 Conn. 151 (1991), in which at page 157 the court said: "Generally, when a builder breaches a bilateral construction contract by an unexcused failure to render substantial performance, he cannot maintain an action on the contract to recover the unpaid balance of the contract price because substantial performance, a constructive condition of the owner's duty to pay the balance, has not been satisfied." In this case, the evidence indicates the defendant has been operating a business in the building in ques

2002DISCUSSION In closing argument, the defendant raised the defense of a lack of substantial performance by the plaintiff, citing Pisani Construction, Inc. v. Krueger, 68 Conn. App. 361 (2002).

1999In its posttrial brief, dated October 21, 1996, the defendant claimed: “Because Rte. 156 Realty Company was not a named insured under the fire insurance policy of Hermitage Insurance Company’s Policy #100131 at the time of the signing of the employment contract on August 22, 1988, and because Rte. 156 Realty Company failed, after exhausting every effort to reform said Policy #100131 to include it as a named insured, it could not be a party to an employment contract with a public adjuster as the same is defined in the State’s statutes and regulations thereunder.” Although this claim was perhaps

1999In its posttrial brief, dated October 21, 1996, the defendant claimed: “Because Rte. 156 Realty Company was not a named insured under the fire insurance policy of Hermitage Insurance Company’s Policy #100131 at the time of the signing of the employment contract on August 22, 1988, and because Rte. 156 Realty Company failed, after exhausting every effort to reform said Policy #100131 to include it as a named insured, it could not be a party to an employment contract with a public adjuster as the same is defined in the State’s statutes and regulations thereunder.” Although this claim was perhaps

1999In its posttrial brief, dated October 21, 1996, the defendant claimed: “Because Rte. 156 Realty Company was not a named insured under the fire insurance policy of Hermitage Insurance Company’s Policy #100131 at the time of the signing of the employment contract on August 22, 1988, and because Rte. 156 Realty Company failed, after exhausting every effort to reform said Policy #100131 to include it as a named insured, it could not be a party to an employment contract with a public adjuster as the same is defined in the State’s statutes and regulations thereunder.” Although this claim was perhaps

1999In its posttrial brief, dated October 21, 1996, the defendant claimed: “Because Rte. 156 Realty Company was not a named insured under the fire insurance policy of Hermitage Insurance Company’s Policy #100131 at the time of the signing of the employment contract on August 22, 1988, and because Rte. 156 Realty Company failed, after exhausting every effort to reform said Policy #100131 to include it as a named insured, it could not be a party to an employment contract with a public adjuster as the same is defined in the State’s statutes and regulations thereunder.” Although this claim was perhaps

1998We decline to review the defendant’s claim as the requirements of Practice Book § 852, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 42-16, were not followed. 4 Furthermore, we note that the defendant raised this claim in State v. Carter, supra, 228 Conn. 412 .