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1,520 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1977–2026 475 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2024It cites Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007), which held that the timeliness requirement should not apply where a -5- direct appeal is not filed due to abandonment of counsel. 2019However, Ross did not raise this claim in his first PCRA Petition, or within the time prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “[A]llegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005); but see Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Pa. 2007) (stating that the Wharton rule does not extend to claims alleging the complete abandonment of counsel). | 82 | 139 |
Commonwealth v. McKeevergreen2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining “a successful first PCRA does not ‘reset the clock’ for the calculation of the finality of the judgment of sentence for purposes of the PCRA where the relief granted in the first petition neither restored a petitioner’s direct appeal rights nor disturbed his conviction, but, rather, affected his sentence only”). -5- claim, Lugo attempted to establish the PCRA’s timeliness exception found at section 9545(b)(1)(ii). 2026This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the] petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). | 72 | 80 |
Commonwealth v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2025See Hernandez, supra. Johnston concedes the untimeliness of his petition, but he asserts that the contents of his nephew’s letter establishes the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). 2 This Court has explained the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar as follows: The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did ____________________________________________ 1 We use the finality of sentence date regarding the Conner case, even though Johnston filed a notice of appeal at each 2025The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). | 58 | 81 |
Commonwealth v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587 , 947 A.2d 714, 720 (2008) (stating, “the focus of the exception is on the newly[-]discovered facts, not a newly[-]discovered or newly[-]willing source for previously known facts” (citation, original quotation marks, and original brackets omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219 , 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 (2008) (holding that, affidavits, alleging two key Commonwealth witnesses perjured themselves at trial (a claim maintained by Abu-Jamal and, thus “known” to him), did not constitute newly-discovered facts, for purpose of the timeliness ex 2026See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 721 (Pa. 2008) (a PCRA petitioner fails to meet his burden of proving a time-bar exception where he offers only general allegations); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 404-05 (Pa. Super. 2018) (a PCRA petitioner fails to meet a timeliness exception where they fail to develop any meaningful argument as to which exception applies). | 48 | 48 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2024See generally Commonwealth v. -5- Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (comparing Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s newly discovered fact exception to Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) which pertains to claims of newly discovered exculpatory evidence raised in a timely PCRA petition).4 Rather, the timeliness exception requires a petitioner “to demonstrate [that] he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis added). 2024As this Court has explained: “The timeliness exception set forth in [s]ection 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). | 38 | 41 |
Commonwealth v. Wattsgreen2 sentences2023See Kretchmar, -6- 189 A.3d at 467 ; Watts, 23 A.3d at 987 .5 As Cacho failed to establish a newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, the PCRA court correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction over Cacho’s untimely petition. 2023See Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 ([Pa.] 2011) (holding, a judicial opinion does not qualify as a previously-unknown fact capable of triggering the timeliness exception set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA). **** As you fail to plead and prove one of the exceptions to the PCRA time-bar, this [c]ourt is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of your claim or offer any form of relief. | 37 | 42 |
Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylorgreen2 sentences2026Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that a claim that previous counsel was ineffective is, in the vast majority of cases, not a newly-discovered fact entitling an appellant to the benefit of the newly-discovered fact exception and does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA petition for review on the merits.3 See Commonwealth v. Gamboa Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits because a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of newly-discovered fa 2025Our Supreme Court has explained that “a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits.” Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000). -3- Appellant raises a sole issue for our review: “Did the PCRA court commit clear legal error in determining that the [PCRA] petition was untimely without a timeliness exception?” Appellant’s Br. at 4. | 33 | 39 |
Commonwealth v. Fahygreen2 sentences2025However, this Court has made clear that “the courts of Pennsylvania will only entertain a ‘miscarriage of justice’ claim when the initial timeliness requirement is met.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 96 A.2 521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)). 2023Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)[;] Commonwealth v. Carr, 68 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2001). [Appellant] does not plead or prove an exception to the timeliness rule. | 32 | 37 |
Commonwealth v. Callahangreen2 sentences2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and -6- cannot grant relief”); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the timeliness of the PCRA petition must 2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the timeliness of the PCRA petition | 31 | 31 |
Com. v. Fantauzzi, R.green2 sentences2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the timeliness of the PCRA petition 2026The timeliness requirement “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the -2- petition and cannot grant relief”). | 29 | 29 |
Commonwealth v. Whartongreen2 sentences2019First, we observe that “claims relating to ineffectiveness of counsel . . . do not qualify [for a timeliness exception] due to the specific provision in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4) that the term ‘government officials’ does not include defense counsel.” Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4); Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“[A]llegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”) (citation omitted). 2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not invoke timeliness exception); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700, 703 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating that mental illness claim does not invoke timeliness exception).4 Because Holloway did not successfully invoke any of the three exceptions necessary to circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of his claims on appeal. | 29 | 29 |
Commonwealth v. Murphygreen2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 721 (Pa. 2008) (a PCRA petitioner fails to meet his burden of proving a time-bar exception where he offers only general allegations); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 404-05 (Pa. Super. 2018) (a PCRA petitioner fails to meet a timeliness exception where they fail to develop any meaningful argument as to which exception applies). 2020See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 405-406 (Pa.Super. 2018) (finding that when the PCRA petition is untimely filed, in order to satisfy the timeliness exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), a petitioner must demonstrate that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has expressly held that Muniz applies retroactively). | 28 | 36 |
Com. of Pa. v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions ‘is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.’” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). 2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions ‘is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.’” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). | 26 | 31 |
Commonwealth v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2021The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 2020The PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 1, 2019, expressly noting that because “Appellant’s claim is untimely and does not allege an exception permitted by statute, [it] relie[d] on its [o]pinion and [o]rder outlining such dated March 13, 2019.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/1/19, at 1. -5- The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). | 26 | 27 |
Commonwealth v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2026However, this Court has explained that “a court’s decision to deny an untimely petition absent directing an amendment does not warrant reversal where the claim is record-based and our review indicates that the issue does not fall within a timeliness exception.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa.Super. 2013). 2025However, this Court has explained that “a court’s decision to deny an untimely petition absent directing an amendment does not warrant reversal where the claim is record-based and our review indicates that the issue does not fall within a timeliness exception.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa.Super. 2013). | 25 | 30 |
Commonwealth v. Burtongreen2 sentences2025Any petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(2). “[E]xceptions to the time-bar must be pled in the PCRA petition[.]” Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007). 2024See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating that “the courts of Pennsylvania will only entertain a ‘miscarriage of justice’ claim when the initial timeliness requirement is met”). | 25 | 28 |
Commonwealth v. Yarrisgreen2 sentences2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di 2026“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered fact] exception to the timeliness requirement, nor would such a claim, even if timely, entitle [the petitioner] to - 10 - relief under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 501 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12 , 731 A.2d 581 (1999)). | 24 | 28 |
Commonwealth v. Millergreen2 sentences2017It is well-settled that petitioners cannot rely on Alleyne to satisfy the timeliness exception of section 9545(b)(1)(iii) because “neither our Supreme Court, nor the United States Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases in which the judgment of sentence had become final.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014). 2017However, as discussed infra, Appellant fails to plead and prove the applicability of the timeliness exception, or Alleyne (which is inapplicable on post-conviction review). 8 Appellant quoted the newly recognized constitutional right exception in his memorandum in support of his PCRA petition, (see Memorandum in Support of PCRA Petition, 3/05/15, at 1), but did not discuss its applicability in this case, and maintains that this was “an accidental citation.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 33; see id. at 31); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). 9 The Alleyne Court held that “facts that increase man | 23 | 28 |
Commonwealth v. Albrechtgreen2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). -5- Pennsylvania courts may nevertheless consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), and he filed his PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 2022See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (discussing the jurisdictional dimensions of the PCRA’s timeliness requirement and stating that a court may not address the claims raised in a PCRA petition if it is not timely filed). | 23 | 27 |
Commonwealth v. Cintoragreen2 sentences2019Reiterating Miller only applies to defendants who were "under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes[,]" Furgess , 149 A.3d at 94 , we stated: "[A] contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not [satisfy the new constitutional rule exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirement.]" Id. at 95 (internal alteration omitted; emphasis removed), quoting Cintora , 69 A.3d at 764 . 2019Relying on [Commonwealth v.] Furgess[, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016),] and [Commonwealth v.] Cintora, [ 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013),] this Court held that simply contending that a newly- recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not satisfy the new constitutional rule exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. | 21 | 26 |
| Commonwealth v. Pewgreen | 20 | 20 |
Commonwealth v. Carrgreen2 sentences2025“Therefore, if a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final[,] or is not eligible for one of the three limited statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirement[, …] then the court has no jurisdiction to address the substantive merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted). 2025“Therefore, if a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final[,] or is not eligible for one of the three limited statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirement[, …] then the court has no jurisdiction to address the substantive merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted). | 19 | 35 |
Commonwealth v. Cox, J., Aplt.green2 sentences2026The PCRA’s requirement that a petition be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final “is jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of any claim raised unless the petition was timely filed or the petitioner proves that one of the three exceptions to the timeliness requirement applies.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). 2026“This timeliness requirement is jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of any claim raised unless the petition was timely filed or the petitioner proves that one of the three exceptions to the timeliness requirement applies.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016). | 19 | 22 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the timeliness of the PCRA petition | 17 | 53 |
Commonwealth v. Petersongreen2 sentences2023In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held that the petitioner's discovery of his counsel's per se ineffectiveness constituted a newly discovered ‘fact’ that satisfied the timeliness exception of section 9545(b)(l)(ii), as the petitioner had pled applicability of the timeliness exception within 60 days of learning of his counsel's (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- 6. 2022We recognize that in Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a claim of per se ineffectiveness of counsel can, in limited circumstances, satisfy the timeliness exception of Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). | 17 | 24 |
| Commonwealth v. Larkyellow | 17 | 20 |
| Commonwealth v. Derricksongreen | 17 | 18 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Burton, S.green2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017) (eliminating any public record presumption with regard to facts contained in a public record for incarcerated individuals, but maintaining the traditional test regarding the timeliness exception for newly-discovered facts). - 13 - requirement when he did not raise a claim related to the criminal conviction of his trial judge until five and one-half years after his sentencing; our Court found that Appellant had not acted with due diligence in discovering the facts upon which his claim was predicated). 2024See generally Commonwealth v. -5- Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (comparing Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s newly discovered fact exception to Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) which pertains to claims of newly discovered exculpatory evidence raised in a timely PCRA petition).4 Rather, the timeliness exception requires a petitioner “to demonstrate [that] he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis added). | 16 | 22 |
| Commonwealth v. Stokesgreen | 16 | 18 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). 2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). | 15 | 37 |
| Commonwealth v. Edmistonyellow | 15 | 20 |
| Commonwealth v. Brandongreen | 14 | 15 |
Commonwealth v. Furgessgreen2 sentences2020Furgess, supra. In sum, because Perez-Miranda did not plead and prove a timeliness exception, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his untimely petition.3 Order affirmed. ____________________________________________ 3Even were we to consider Perez-Miranda’s newly-discovered evidence claim, he could not establish due diligence. 2020The timeliness exception for newly recognized constitutional rights applies only where the defendant is entitled to relief under the holding of a United States or Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii); Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 9-11 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 93-94 (Pa. Super. 2016). | 12 | 29 |
| Schuylkill Township v. Pennsylvania Builders Associationgreen | 12 | 15 |
| Commonwealth v. Medinagreen | 12 | 14 |
| Commonwealth v. Garciagreen | 12 | 14 |
| Commonwealth v. Breakirongreen | 12 | 13 |
| Commonwealth v. Shannongreen | 12 | 12 |
| Commonwealth v. Fennellgreen | 12 | 12 |
| Commonwealth v. Leggettgreen | 12 | 12 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2024It cites Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007), which held that the timeliness requirement should not apply where a -5- direct appeal is not filed due to abandonment of counsel. 2019However, Ross did not raise this claim in his first PCRA Petition, or within the time prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “[A]llegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005); but see Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Pa. 2007) (stating that the Wharton rule does not extend to claims alleging the complete abandonment of counsel). | 1 | 139 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Commonwealth v. Montgomery green | 14 | 2019–2026 |
| Commonwealth v. Turner green | 12 | 2014–2025 |
| Commonwealth v. Finley green | 12 | 2014–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.