timeliness exception in Pennsylvania

2026Id. at 1271-72. 98 Id. at 1271 (“While the additional requirements [of Section 9543(a)(2)(vi)] are consistent with a Brady claim, . . . none of these requirements exist in § 9545(b)(1)(ii).”). 99 Id. [J-56-2025] - 33 The newly discovered facts exception “is not so narrow as to limit itself to only claims involving ‘after-discovered evidence.’”100 A petitioner may satisfy the timeliness exception even if his or her underlying, substantive claim turns out to be meritless.

2026Id. at 1271-72. 98 Id. at 1271 (“While the additional requirements [of Section 9543(a)(2)(vi)] are consistent with a Brady claim, . . . none of these requirements exist in § 9545(b)(1)(ii).”). 99 Id. [J-56-2025] - 33 The newly discovered facts exception “is not so narrow as to limit itself to only claims involving ‘after-discovered evidence.’”100 A petitioner may satisfy the timeliness exception even if his or her underlying, substantive claim turns out to be meritless.

2026This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the] petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

2026See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining “a successful first PCRA does not ‘reset the clock’ for the calculation of the finality of the judgment of sentence for purposes of the PCRA where the relief granted in the first petition neither restored a petitioner’s direct appeal rights nor disturbed his conviction, but, rather, affected his sentence only”). -5- J-S08022-26 claim, Lugo attempted to establish the PCRA’s timeliness exception found at section 9545(b)(1)(ii).

2025See Hernandez, supra. Johnston concedes the untimeliness of his petition, but he asserts that the contents of his nephew’s letter establishes the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). 2 This Court has explained the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar as follows: The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did ____________________________________________ 1 We use the finality of sentence date regarding the Conner case, even though Johnston filed a notice of appeal at each

2025The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

2024See Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720 ; Branthafer, 315 A.3d at 129-31 (holding alleged newly-discovered - 14 - J-S12021-24 witnesses concerning a defendant’s location at the time of the offense was a newly-discovered source that did not state a timeliness exception; the defendant’s “own whereabouts on the evening of the incident were always known to him, as it cannot seriously be asserted that [the defendant] did not know his physical location on the night in question”).

2022Any petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2 “We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587 , 947 A.2d 714, 719 (2008) (citation omitted).

2024As this Court has explained: “The timeliness exception set forth in [s]ection 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

2024See generally Commonwealth v. -5- J-S20035-23 Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (comparing Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s newly discovered fact exception to Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) which pertains to claims of newly discovered exculpatory evidence raised in a timely PCRA petition).4 Rather, the timeliness exception requires a petitioner “to demonstrate [that] he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis added).

2023See Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980 , ____________________________________________ section 9545(b)(2) by presenting the claim within [one year] of discovering the new fact”) (internal citations and emphasis omitted). -5- J-S33041-22 986 ([Pa.] 2011) (holding[ that] a judicial opinion does not qualify as a previously-unknown fact capable of triggering the timeliness exception set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA[).] As you failed to plead and prove one of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar, this [c]ourt is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of your claim or offer any f

2023See Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 ([Pa.] 2011) (holding, a judicial opinion does not qualify as a previously-unknown fact capable of triggering the timeliness exception set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA). **** As you fail to plead and prove one of the exceptions to the PCRA time-bar, this [c]ourt is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of your claim or offer any form of relief.

2026Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that a claim that previous counsel was ineffective is, in the vast majority of cases, not a newly-discovered fact entitling an appellant to the benefit of the newly-discovered fact exception and does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA petition for review on the merits.3 See Commonwealth v. Gamboa Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits because a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of newly-discovered fa

2025See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits because a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of after-discovered evidence encompassed by the timeliness exception); see also Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa. 2000) (holding that couching argument in terms of ineffectiveness cannot save a petition that does not fall into an exception to the jurisdictional time bar).

2025However, this Court has made clear that “the courts of Pennsylvania will only entertain a ‘miscarriage of justice’ claim when the initial timeliness requirement is met.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 96 A.2 521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)).

2023Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)[;] Commonwealth v. Carr, 68 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2001). [Appellant] does not plead or prove an exception to the timeliness rule.

2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the timeliness of the PCRA petition

2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and -6- J-S45044-25 cannot grant relief”); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the timeliness of the PCRA p

2019First, we observe that “claims relating to ineffectiveness of counsel . . . do not qualify [for a timeliness exception] due to the specific provision in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4) that the term ‘government officials’ does not include defense counsel.” Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4); Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“[A]llegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”) (citation omitted).

2018Id. at 11; see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”) (citations omitted).2 ____________________________________________ 2 In any event, even if each of Appellant’s claims met a timeliness exception, we would have to deem his arguments waived, as they could have been raised in an appeal from his judgment of sentence, or in his prior PCRA petition.

2026The timeliness requirement “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the -2- J-S47037-25 petition and cannot grant relief”).

2026The timeliness requirement “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”).

2020Commonwealth v. Greco, 203 A.3d 1120, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 405-06 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 195 A.3d 559 (Pa. 2018)). -7- J-S01020-20 & J-S01021-20 Here, Little’s PCRA petition was untimely and he cannot establish a timeliness exception.8 See Commonwealth v. Knecht, 219 A.3d 689 (Pa. Super. 2019) (reiterating that Muniz does not establish a timeliness exception under the PCRA).9 Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Little’s PCRA petition.

2020Murphy, 180 A.3d at 405 ; see also Commonwealth v. Greco, 203 A.3d 1120, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2019) (applying Murphy and holding “the rule recognized in Muniz does not establish a timeliness exception to the PCRA”).

2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions ‘is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.’” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions ‘is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.’” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

2021The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

2020The PCRA’s timeliness requirement is “mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013).

2026However, this Court has explained that “a court’s decision to deny an untimely petition absent directing an amendment does not warrant reversal where the claim is record-based and our review indicates that the issue does not fall within a timeliness exception.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa.Super. 2013).

2025However, this Court has explained that “a court’s decision to deny an untimely petition absent directing an amendment does not warrant reversal where the claim is record-based and our review indicates that the issue does not fall within a timeliness exception.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa.Super. 2013).

2026“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered fact] exception to the timeliness requirement, nor would such a claim, even if timely, entitle [the petitioner] to - 10 - J-S21028-25 relief under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 501 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12 , 731 A.2d 581 (1999)).

2026“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered fact] exception to the timeliness requirement, nor would such a claim, even if timely, entitle [the petitioner] to - 10 - J-S21028-25 relief under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 501 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12 , 731 A.2d 581 (1999)).

2025Any petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(2). “[E]xceptions to the time-bar must be pled in the PCRA petition[.]” Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2024See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating that “the courts of Pennsylvania will only entertain a ‘miscarriage of justice’ claim when the initial timeliness requirement is met”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). -5- J-S41040-24 Pennsylvania courts may nevertheless consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), and he filed his PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

2022See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (discussing the jurisdictional dimensions of the PCRA’s timeliness requirement and stating that a court may not address the claims raised in a PCRA petition if it is not timely filed).

2017It is well-settled that petitioners cannot rely on Alleyne to satisfy the timeliness exception of section 9545(b)(1)(iii) because “neither our Supreme Court, nor the United States Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases in which the judgment of sentence had become final.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2017However, as discussed infra, Appellant fails to plead and prove the applicability of the timeliness exception, or Alleyne (which is inapplicable on post-conviction review). 8 Appellant quoted the newly recognized constitutional right exception in his memorandum in support of his PCRA petition, (see Memorandum in Support of PCRA Petition, 3/05/15, at 1), but did not discuss its applicability in this case, and maintains that this was “an accidental citation.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 33; see id. at 31); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). 9 The Alleyne Court held that “facts that increase man

2019Relying on [Commonwealth v.] Furgess[, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016),] and [Commonwealth v.] Cintora, [ 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013),] this Court held that simply contending that a newly- recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not satisfy the new constitutional rule exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement.

2019Reiterating Miller only applies to defendants who were "under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes[,]" Furgess , 149 A.3d at 94 , we stated: "[A] contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not [satisfy the new constitutional rule exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirement.]" Id. at 95 (internal alteration omitted; emphasis removed), quoting Cintora , 69 A.3d at 764 .

2025“Therefore, if a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final[,] or is not eligible for one of the three limited statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirement[, …] then the court has no jurisdiction to address the substantive merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted).

2025“Therefore, if a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final[,] or is not eligible for one of the three limited statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirement[, …] then the court has no jurisdiction to address the substantive merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted).

2026The timeliness requirement “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the -2- J-S47037-25 petition and cannot grant relief”).

2026“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered fact] exception to the timeliness requirement, nor would such a claim, even if timely, entitle [the petitioner] to - 10 - J-S21028-25 relief under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 501 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12 , 731 A.2d 581 (1999)).

2026See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017) (eliminating any public record presumption with regard to facts contained in a public record for incarcerated individuals, but maintaining the traditional test regarding the timeliness exception for newly-discovered facts). - 13 - J-A29042-25 requirement when he did not raise a claim related to the criminal conviction of his trial judge until five and one-half years after his sentencing; our Court found that Appellant had not acted with due diligence in discovering the facts upon which his claim was predicated).

2025Once the PCRA court makes a factual determination as to when the scientific principles underlying Appellee’s expert reports entered the public domain, Appellee still has the burden of establishing “that the facts upon which his claim of a timeliness exception under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) is based were unknown to him and not ascertainable by the exercise of due diligence.” Id. (quoting Burton, 158 A.3d at 638 n.23 (emphasis in original)). 7 We may cite to this Court’s unpublished memoranda filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value.

2023In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held that the petitioner's discovery of his counsel's per se ineffectiveness constituted a newly discovered ‘fact’ that satisfied the timeliness exception of section 9545(b)(l)(ii), as the petitioner had pled applicability of the timeliness exception within 60 days of learning of his counsel's (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A01043-23 6.

2022We recognize that in Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a claim of per se ineffectiveness of counsel can, in limited circumstances, satisfy the timeliness exception of Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).

2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).

2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2020The timeliness exception for newly recognized constitutional rights applies only where the defendant is entitled to relief under the holding of a United States or Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii); Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 9-11 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 93-94 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2020Furgess, supra. In sum, because Perez-Miranda did not plead and prove a timeliness exception, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his untimely petition.3 Order affirmed. ____________________________________________ 3Even were we to consider Perez-Miranda’s newly-discovered evidence claim, he could not establish due diligence.