timeliness requirement (Washington) · Go Syfert
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timeliness requirement in Washington

13 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschkegreen
wash · 2021 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Id. at 329 (González, C.J., concurring).

11
State v. Fergusongreen
wash · 1983 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Ferguson, 100 Wn.2d at 135-36 ("[t]he rule admits only such evidence as will establish that the complaint was timely made").

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Parra green
wash · 1993
2 sentences

2017In State v. Parra, this court explained that the purpose of this timeliness requirement is to avoid the absurd result of "parties invoking the court's discretion and then waiting to see the disposition of the judge before asserting the right." 122 Wn.2d 590,599 , 859 P.2d 1231 (1993) (citing State ex. rel.

2017In State v. Parra, this court explained that the purpose of this timeliness requirement is to avoid the absurd result of "parties invoking the court's discretion and then waiting to see the disposition of the judge before asserting the right." 122 Wn.2d 590,599 , 859 P.2d 1231 (1993) (citing State ex. rel.

22016–2017
State v. Breedlove green
washctapp · 1995
2 sentences

2010App. at 107 . ¶30 Further, Breedlove held that “the timeliness requirement should not operate as a bar to a defendant’s right to defend pro se.” Breedlove, 79 Wn.

2010Breedlove, 79 Wash.App. at 107 , 900 P.2d 586 . ¶ 30 Further, Breedlove held that "the timeliness requirement should not operate as a bar to a defendant's right to defend pro se." Breedlove, 79 Wash.App. at 109 , 900 P.2d 586 .

22010–2010
State v. Norman green
washctapp · 1979
2 sentences

2003The trial court rejected the affidavit of prejudice as untimely, but the Norman court reversed finding that the purpose of the timeliness requirement in a one-judge county is to “assure the court sufficient time to arrange for a visiting judge to preside over a defendant’s trial.” Id. at 813 .

2003The trial court rejected the affidavit of prejudice as untimely, but the Norman court reversed finding that the purpose of the timeliness requirement in a one-judge county is to "assure the court sufficient time to arrange for a visiting judge to preside over a defendant's trial." Id. at 813 , 603 P.2d 1280 .

22003–2003
In re D. W. neutral
wash · 2019
1 sentence

2019Thus, the trial court did not err in evaluating the State’s proffered evidence under the “fact of the complaint” exception Martinez next argues the trial court erred in admitting Y M ‘s out-of-court statements because they were not timely as required by the exception The trial court appears to have concluded that Murley dispensed with the timeliness requirement But the Supreme Court has reiterated the timeliness requirement since Murley In Ferguson, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he rule admits only such evidence as will establish that the complaint was timely made” 100 Wn 2d at 135-36, see

12019–2019
State v. Kilgore green
wash · 2002
1 sentence

2019The trial court recounted on the record that the State had presented evidence that even after Y.M.’s disclosure to A.T. and Rios in June 2014, the rapes continued “largely unabated until December 2014.” Thus, the 7 No. 77776-9-1/8 record supports a determination that Y.M.’s complaints in June and November 2014 were timely because they occurred while she was still being abused Although the State did not elicit evidence at trial that Martinez continued to rape Y M throughout 2013 and 2014, the trial court’s admissibility ruling was not based on trial evidence but instead on the State’s pretrial

12019–2019
State v. Powell green
wash · 1995
1 sentence

2019Thus, the trial court did not err in evaluating the State’s proffered evidence under the “fact of the complaint” exception Martinez next argues the trial court erred in admitting Y M ‘s out-of-court statements because they were not timely as required by the exception The trial court appears to have concluded that Murley dispensed with the timeliness requirement But the Supreme Court has reiterated the timeliness requirement since Murley In Ferguson, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he rule admits only such evidence as will establish that the complaint was timely made” 100 Wn 2d at 135-36, see

12019–2019
State v. Jones green
washctapp · 1988
1 sentence

2019The trial court recounted on the record that the State had presented evidence that even after Y.M.’s disclosure to A.T. and Rios in June 2014, the rapes continued “largely unabated until December 2014.” Thus, the 7 No. 77776-9-1/8 record supports a determination that Y.M.’s complaints in June and November 2014 were timely because they occurred while she was still being abused Although the State did not elicit evidence at trial that Martinez continued to rape Y M throughout 2013 and 2014, the trial court’s admissibility ruling was not based on trial evidence but instead on the State’s pretrial

12019–2019
Badgley Mullins Turner, Pllc App./x-resp. v. Leslie Spencer & Tammy S., Blakey, Resp./x-app. green
washctapp · 2018
1 sentence

2019Thus, the trial court did not err in evaluating the State’s proffered evidence under the “fact of the complaint” exception Martinez next argues the trial court erred in admitting Y M ‘s out-of-court statements because they were not timely as required by the exception The trial court appears to have concluded that Murley dispensed with the timeliness requirement But the Supreme Court has reiterated the timeliness requirement since Murley In Ferguson, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he rule admits only such evidence as will establish that the complaint was timely made” 100 Wn 2d at 135-36, see

12019–2019
Rae v. Scharf green
washctapp · 1997
1 sentence

2017But, this is not to say that other fact patterns might not give rise to a valid claim for more timely proceedings, or that the mere scheduling of a prehearing conference will indefinitely toll a claimant's right to a timely hearing."). 24 Id. at 324 . 8 No. 76435-7-1-9 Here, the length of the delay, if any, was minimal because the hearing occurred within 105 days of seizure.25 White did not assert any need for an earlier hearing.26 And he has not shown the timing hampered his defense in any way.27 In fact, White did not present any defense before the hearing examiner, he contested only the tim

12017–2017
State ex rel. Lefebvre v. Clifford neutral
wash · 1911
2 sentences

2017Lefebvre v. Clifford, 65 Wash. 313,315 , 118 P. 40 (1911)).

2017Lefebvre v. Clifford, 65 Wash. 313,315 , 118 P. 40 (1911)).

12017–2017
State v. McCorkell green
washctapp · 1992
1 sentence

2015In State v. McCorkell, 63 Wn.

12015–2015
Hessler Construction Co. v. Looney green
washctapp · 1988
1 sentence

1990App. 110 , 757 P.2d 988 (1988) (local rule can require service of response to summary judgment motion on civil motions coordinator, as *574 well as parties, but sanctions can be imposed upon failure to do so only after notice and a hearing). [4] It is apparent that an overall timeliness requirement has been superimposed on the statute by case law.

11990–1990
State v. Dixon green
wash · 1968
2 sentences

1984The case of State v. Dixon, 74 Wn.2d 700 , 446 P.2d 329 (1968), upon which the trial court largely relied, raised some question whether RCW 4.12.050 contained an additional timeliness requirement.

1984The case of State v. Dixon, 74 Wn.2d 700 , 446 P.2d 329 (1968), upon which the trial court largely relied, raised some question whether RCW 4.12.050 contained an additional timeliness requirement.

11984–1984

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.12.040 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.12.050 (6)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 1486 (1977–2026) CA 110 (1974–2026) NY 71 (1972–2026) OH 58 (1984–2026) IL 49 (1975–2026) TX 32 (1972–2025) AZ 27 (1979–2022) CT 22 (1982–2016) NM 19 (1988–2024) MO 19 (1992–2023) FL 16 (1985–2025) UT 13 (1937–2017) MD 13 (1992–2011) WA 13 (1984–2024) IA 12 (1979–2026) AL 12 (1983–2024) TN 12 (2010–2026) CO 10 (1984–2026) AR 10 (1994–2024) MA 9 (1985–2022) IN 9 (2013–2025) DE 9 (1997–2026) GA 9 (1973–2026) NJ 8 (1979–2021) MN 8 (1975–2015) OR 7 (1977–2018) MT 6 (2001–2015) ID 6 (1993–2015) LA 6 (1991–2016) MI 5 (1992–2006) KS 5 (1980–2021) WI 5 (1980–2019) NC 4 (2006–2025) VA 4 (2007–2026) MS 4 (2006–2017) WV 4 (2012–2024) NH 4 (1992–2003) HI 3 (2015–2021) VT 3 (2005–2025) WY 3 (2001–2021) NV 3 (2016–2023) SC 3 (2009–2019) VI 3 (2012–2014) RI 3 (2003–2014) ME 2 (2009–2025) DC 2 (1996–2022) AK 2 (1974–1987) SD 2 (1990–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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