timeliness requirement in Texas

2025App. 2012) (discussing policies underlying the timeliness requirement); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim.

2024App. 2012) (discussing policies underlying the timeliness requirement); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. 8 Crim.

2011Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. Crim.

2011Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

2015See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 372 ; Ray, 400 S.W.3d at 222 (noting that amended complaint related back to unsworn intake questionnaire filed 174 days after termination); Alexander, 300 S.W.3d at 73 (noting that timely filed intake questionnaires can sometimes be used to 11 satisfy the timeliness requirement under the TCHRA); City of La Joya v. Ortiz, No. 13-06-401-CV, 2007 WL 293019 , at *3 n. 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (verified charge of discrimination related back to, and satisfied any deficiencies in, unverified intake questionnaire); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

2009We begin with the evidence presented by Garza, which included: (1) a copy of her intake questionnaire, signed by her and dated on May 21, 2002; and (2) an affidavit stating that she “filed a charge of discrimination concerning the [November 2001 promotion process]” on or before May 21, 2002. 10 Although Garza’s intake questionnaire contained specific information about the conduct of which she complained, and although intake questionnaires can sometimes be used to satisfy the timeliness requirement, see Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 373 , Garza’s questionnaire does not fall within the specified circu

2019These factors “give structure” to the timeliness analysis, but the “analysis remains contextual” and “should not be used as a tool of retribution to punish the tardy would-be intervenor, but rather should serve as a guard against prejudicing the original parties.” Ross, 426 F.3d at 754 (internal quotations omitted).

2006The second factor in the Fifth Circuit’s timeliness test is the extent of prejudice that the existing parties may suffer as a result of the applicant’s failure to apply for intervention at an earlier time; this factor “ ⅛ concerned only with the prejudice caused by the applicants’ delay, not that prejudice which may result if intervention is allowed.’ ” Ross, 426 F.3d at 755 (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1002).

2015Id.

2015See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 372 ; Ray, 400 S.W.3d at 222 (noting that amended complaint related back to unsworn intake questionnaire filed 174 days after termination); Alexander, 300 S.W.3d at 73 (noting that timely filed intake questionnaires can sometimes be used to 11 satisfy the timeliness requirement under the TCHRA); City of La Joya v. Ortiz, No. 13-06-401-CV, 2007 WL 293019 , at *3 n. 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (verified charge of discrimination related back to, and satisfied any deficiencies in, unverified intake questionnaire); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

2025See In re Lumbermens, 184 S.W.3d at 727 .

2024See Urias v. Owl Springs N., LLC, 662 S.W.3d 561 , 567–68 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (collecting cases); see also Waggoner v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 402 , 404 n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (expressly rejecting argument that a statute of limitations defense must be raised in the first-filed answer of defendant).

2021Our conclusion that Kinder Morgan satisfied the TCPA’s timeliness requirement should not be construed as a comment on the 70 Aliunde, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“From another source; from elsewhere[.]”). 71 Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979) (emphases added); see Fairdale, 651 S.W.2d at 725 (“In determining [whether] a cause of action has been pleaded, the court must be able to determine from the pleadings alone the elements of the cause of action and the relief sought with reasonable certainty and without resorting to other sources.” (emphasis added)). 72 See DeR

2021Our conclusion that Kinder Morgan satisfied the TCPA’s timeliness requirement should not be construed as a comment on the 70 Aliunde, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“From another source; from elsewhere[.]”). 71 Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979) (emphases added); see Fairdale, 651 S.W.2d at 725 (“In determining [whether] a cause of action has been pleaded, the court must be able to determine from the pleadings alone the elements of the cause of action and the relief sought with reasonable certainty and without resorting to other sources.” (emphasis added)). 72 See DeR

2021Our conclusion that Kinder Morgan satisfied the TCPA’s timeliness requirement should not be construed as a comment on the 70 Aliunde, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“From another source; from elsewhere[.]”). 71 Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979) (emphases added); see Fairdale, 651 S.W.2d at 725 (“In determining [whether] a cause of action has been pleaded, the court must be able to determine from the pleadings alone the elements of the cause of action and the relief sought with reasonable certainty and without resorting to other sources.” (emphasis added)). 72 See DeR

2021Our conclusion that Kinder Morgan satisfied the TCPA’s timeliness requirement should not be construed as a comment on the 70 Aliunde, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“From another source; from elsewhere[.]”). 71 Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979) (emphases added); see Fairdale, 651 S.W.2d at 725 (“In determining [whether] a cause of action has been pleaded, the court must be able to determine from the pleadings alone the elements of the cause of action and the relief sought with reasonable certainty and without resorting to other sources.” (emphasis added)). 72 See DeR

2019See id.; see also Kunstoplast, 937 S.W.2d at 456 (“It is our policy to construe rules reasonably but liberally, when possible, so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the rule.”).

2019See id.; see also Kunstoplast, 937 S.W.2d at 456 (“It is our policy to construe rules reasonably but liberally, when possible, so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the rule.”).

2017State v. Arizmendi, No. 07-15-00238-CR, 2016 WL 2986041 *2, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 5385 *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 19, 2016) (not designated for publication). . 121 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 372 ; Ray, 400 S.W.3d at 222 (noting that amended complaint related back to unsworn intake questionnaire filed 174 days after termination); Alexander, 300 S.W.3d at 73 (noting that timely filed intake questionnaires can sometimes be used to 11 satisfy the timeliness requirement under the TCHRA); City of La Joya v. Ortiz, No. 13-06-401-CV, 2007 WL 293019 , at *3 n. 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (verified charge of discrimination related back to, and satisfied any deficiencies in, unverified intake questionnaire); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

2015See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 372 ; Ray, 400 S.W.3d at 222 (noting that amended complaint related back to unsworn intake questionnaire filed 174 days after termination); Alexander, 300 S.W.3d at 73 (noting that timely filed intake questionnaires can sometimes be used to 11 satisfy the timeliness requirement under the TCHRA); City of La Joya v. Ortiz, No. 13-06-401-CV, 2007 WL 293019 , at *3 n. 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (verified charge of discrimination related back to, and satisfied any deficiencies in, unverified intake questionnaire); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

2015See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 372 ; Ray, 400 S.W.3d at 222 (noting that amended complaint related back to unsworn intake questionnaire filed 174 days after termination); Alexander, 300 S.W.3d at 73 (noting that timely filed intake questionnaires can sometimes be used to 11 satisfy the timeliness requirement under the TCHRA); City of La Joya v. Ortiz, No. 13-06-401-CV, 2007 WL 293019 , at *3 n. 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (verified charge of discrimination related back to, and satisfied any deficiencies in, unverified intake questionnaire); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

2013Evid. 103(a)(1); Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 807 ; see Lackey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 837, 843-44 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (discussing policies underlying the timeliness requirement); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“We have consistently held that the failure to object in a timely and specific manner during trial forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence.

2013This is true even though the error may concern a constitutional right of the defendant.” (citations omitted)); Reyes v. State, 361 S.W.3d 222, 228-29 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref'd).

2009See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, No. 06-0778, 2009 Tex. LEXIS 253, *13-14 (Tex. May 1, 2009) (holding that immunity shields state and its subdivisions from declaratory-judgment claims seeking declaration that state violated statute but does not shield state officials in official capacity).

2008See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 157, 167 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1996, writ denied).