110 California opinions name it 4 courts 1974–2026 32 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Windhamgreen2 sentences2025For a Faretta request to be timely, it must be made within “a reasonable time prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing.” (Miller, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham), our Supreme Court cautioned the “ ‘reasonable time’ requirement should not be and, indeed, must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s consti 2021Our high court has “long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is made ‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 499 .) “[T]he ‘reasonable time’ requirement ‘must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation,’ but rather to prevent the defendant from ‘misus[ing] the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) A timeliness requirement “reflects that ‘the government’s interest in ensuring the integrit | 9 | 16 |
People v. Lynchgreen2 sentences2022(People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch), disapproved on another ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637, 643 .) A trial court must not use the timeliness requirement to limit a defendant’s constitutional right to self- representation. 2021(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) “[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self- representation | 3 | 17 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2009Analysis In this case, the trial court concluded that the Lab Report did not meet the timeliness requirement of subdivision (b) of section 1280 because it did not establish that it was prepared at or near the time of the analysis of the blood sample. “ ‘How soon a writing must be made after the act or event is a matter of degree and calls for the exercise of reasonable judgment on the part of the trial judge.’ ” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 128, fn. 7 .) “[T]he timeliness requirement ‘is not to be judged ... by arbitrary or artificial time limits, measured by hours or days or even weeks. 2009(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 126 [in applying the timeliness requirement from § 1280 “to computer printouts from a database, we consider the length of time between the act, condition, or event and the date of its recording, not the date of its eventual retrieval by computer printout”].) The appellate court examined the admissibility of forensic lab reports in DMV proceedings under section 1280 in Glatman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 700 and Molenda, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 974 . | 3 | 6 |
People v. Halvorsengreen2 sentences2021(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 .) Faretta warned that a trial court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46.) According to the California Supreme Court, “the same rule applies to the denial of a motion for self-representation in the first instance when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will create disruption.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 (Windham) [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administrat | 3 | 3 |
Gutale v. Stategreen2 sentences2021And although the PCPA does not contain an explicit provision regarding claims that hinge on inadequate understanding of adverse immigration consequences, Oregon petitioners can raise an Oregon 14 We emphasize that a timeliness inquiry is always discretionary; as long as a petitioner is no longer in criminal custody, the trial court is never obligated to deny an immigration-related section 1473.7 petition for lack of timeliness. ( Perez, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015‒1016.) 16 Annotated Statutes, section 138.530(1)(a) claim using a Padilla theory. 15 (See, e.g., Gutale v. State (Or. 2019) 4 2021And although the PCPA does not contain an explicit provision regarding claims that hinge on inadequate understanding of adverse immigration consequences, Oregon petitioners can raise an Oregon 14 We emphasize that a timeliness inquiry is always discretionary; as long as a petitioner is no longer in criminal custody, the trial court is never obligated to deny an immigration-related section 1473.7 petition for lack of timeliness. ( Perez, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015‒1016.) 16 Annotated Statutes, section 138.530(1)(a) claim using a Padilla theory.15 (See, e.g., Gutale v. State (Or. 2019) 43 | 3 | 3 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2021(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) “[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self- representation 2015(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 (Williams) [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128 [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of | 3 | 3 |
People v. Simongreen2 sentences2024(Id., subd. (c)(1)–(3).) The Lashon court opined it would not make sense “for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal.” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813; accord People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76 , 115 (Singh) [“To permit a defendant 2024(Id., subd. (c)(1)–(3).) The Lashon court opined it would not make sense “for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal.” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813; accord People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76 , 115 (Singh) [“To permit a defendant | 2 | 2 |
April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTVgreen2 sentences2023The timeliness of a claim is thus 2 See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) (delayed discovery rule applies to fraud-based claims); Goverment Code section 1092, subdivision (b) (incorporating delayed discovery principles for conflict-of-interest claims); April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 830 (delayed discovery rule applies to contract claims involving fraud); Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 9 (delayed discovery rule applies to professional negligence claims under some circumstances); Pincay v. Andrews (9th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 1106 , 1109 (RI 1989(April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 828 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 ].) In the present case the final wrongful act alleged by plaintiff occurred on September 25, 1981. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Paul W.green2 sentences2015(Kristin H., at p. 1664.) “[R]eversal [of an order in a dependency proceeding] because of ineffective assistance of counsel does not preclude further dependency proceedings in juvenile court . . . .” (In re Emilye A., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1707, fn. 9.) But it does “required that the proceedings be reconducted.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Paul W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 71 (cone. opn. of Bamattre-Manoukian, J.).) A legal malpractice claim is different. 2015(Ibid.) "[R]eversal of an order in a dependency proceeding [because of incompetency of counsel] . . . does not preclude further dependency proceedings in juvenile court . . . ." (In re Emilye A., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1707, fn. 9 .) But it does "require[ ] that the proceedings be reconducted . . . ." (Ibid.; accord, In re Paul W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 71 (conc. opn. of Bamattre-Manoukian, J.).) A legal malpractice claim is different. | 2 | 2 |
San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services v. Ebrahim A.green2 sentences2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child 2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hortongreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2022(People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch), disapproved on another ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637, 643 .) A trial court must not use the timeliness requirement to limit a defendant’s constitutional right to self- representation. 2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 , 127–128.) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) When considering whether a motion for self-representation is timely, “a trial court 6. properly considers not only the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witn | 1 | 6 |
In Re Clarkred2 sentences2011We decline to adopt the Ninth Circuit standard and instead apply the broader conception of laches used in California, which is closely related to the timeliness requirement, and thus “reflects recognition that a substantial delay will prejudice the respondent’s ability to answer the petition, respects the importance of finality of judgments to the state, and recognizes the difficulty of retrial in the event that a judgment is set aside on habeas corpus many years after the conviction.” (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 787 .) Here, the People have been prejudiced both with regard to retrying Defe 1999If, on the other hand, we find petitioner fails to show good cause for the delay, we need only read the petition to assure ourselves petitioner’s factual allegations do not make a prima facie showing his case falls within one of the four exceptions to the timeliness requirement set forth in Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2025For a Faretta request to be timely, it must be made within “a reasonable time prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing.” (Miller, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham), our Supreme Court cautioned the “ ‘reasonable time’ requirement should not be and, indeed, must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s consti 2022(Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .) In determining timeliness, the sentencing hearing is considered “a proceeding separate and distinct from the trial.” (People v. Miller (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1024 (Miller).) The Wright court acknowledged our Supreme Court has declined to articulate what standard a reviewing court applies when determining timeliness but concluded in that case it was untimely under both de novo and abuse of discretion standards. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2021(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426 ; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103 14 (Valdez).) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its rulings “fall ‘outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 (Smith); People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).) As our high court noted in Lynch, it has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .)11 The Lynch court went on to explain that motions made “long before trial” have been considered timely, citing a ca 2018(People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 .) The timeliness requirement is meant to ensure that a defendant does not “misuse the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably delay a scheduled [hearing] or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, fn. 5 (Windham).) To this end, relevant factors in evaluating an untimely request for self- representation include “the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedi | 1 | 2 |
In Re Kristin H.green2 sentences2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child 2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child | 1 | 2 |
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.green2 sentences2014(Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 443 .) Like the fraud claim, the UCL claim fails as untimely given the statute of limitations. 2014(Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 443.) Like the fraud claim, the UCL claim fails as untimely given the statute of limitations. | 1 | 2 |
| Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| California School Employees Ass'n v. Del Norte County Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Jenkins v. County of Contra Costagreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Herreragreen | 1 | 2 |
| DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Claragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tri-Delta Engineering, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samuels v. Mixgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cruzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conservatorship of the Pers. v. M.M.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| R & G Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| 16 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1089, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8164 Maria Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, Robert Beaver, Applicant-Intervenorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lyons v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barrett v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Los Angeles v. Glairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conservatorship of Romogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Doolin
green
2 sentences2025Otherwise, requests for self-representation are addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. [Citation.] (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 453 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) Thus, if the circumstances indicate the defendant’s request for self- representation is untimely and would disrupt or delay the proceedings, the trial court has every right to deny it. 2025Otherwise, requests for self-representation are addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. [Citation.] (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 453 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) Thus, if the circumstances indicate the defendant’s request for self- representation is untimely and would disrupt or delay the proceedings, the trial court has every right to deny it. | 6 | 2014–2025 |
People v. Burton
green
2 sentences2016An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is ‘to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lynch, supra, at p. 724 , quoting People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852 .) A consideration of the totality of the circumstances should include such factors as “the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, . . .whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availa 2016An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is ‘to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lynch, supra, at p. 724 , quoting People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852 .) A consideration of the totality of the circumstances should include such factors as “the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, . . .whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availa | 4 | 2010–2016 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2026Timeliness “ ‘[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self-representation motion is made. . . [This] is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is “to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426 .) The Supreme Court has “routinely declined to identify a specific period in time at which a se 2025In Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 475 the 19 California Supreme Court acknowledged that “most federal courts have concluded that a Faretta motion is timely as a matter of law if it is made before trial, unless the motion is made for the purpose of delay,” but the Supreme Court in Johnson rejected any such “bright-line rule” for California, observing many states have adopted a timeliness test consistent with Lynch. | 3 | 2021–2026 |
Hernandez-Zurita v. State
red
2 sentences2021(Hernandez-Zurita v. State (Or. 2018) 417 P.3d 548 (Hernandez-Zurita).) Without the benefit of Gutale’s reasoning, Hernandez-Zurita rejected a petitioner’s timeliness claim that he qualified under the PCPA escape clause due to obstacles he faced in obtaining legal materials and counsel while in Mexico. 2021(Hernandez-Zurita v. State (Or. 2018) 417 P.3d 548 (Hernandez-Zurita).) Without the benefit of Gutale’s reasoning, Hernandez-Zurita rejected a petitioner’s timeliness claim that he qualified under the PCPA escape clause due to obstacles he faced in obtaining legal materials and counsel while in Mexico. | 3 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Robbins
green
2 sentences2021The question of how timeliness of a subsequent but nonsuccessive petition may be 16 In re FRIEND Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. determined is beyond the scope of this case, but suffice it to say that Proposition 66 did not provide a new timeliness rule for any kind of petition other than initial petitions (and nothing in the measure appears to preclude continued application of the traditional timeliness standards that have been developed and applied in this court’s habeas cases (see Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 )). 2021The question of how timeliness of a subsequent but nonsuccessive petition may be 16 In re FRIEND Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. determined is beyond the scope of this case, but suffice it to say that Proposition 66 did not provide a new timeliness rule for any kind of petition other than initial petitions (and nothing in the measure appears to preclude continued application of the traditional timeliness standards that have been developed and applied in this court’s habeas cases (see Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 )). | 3 | 1998–2021 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2014(Id. at pp. 726, 770.)4 4 Leon cites several federal cases in which, he claims, the reviewing court found that a request for self-representation was timely when made “weeks before trial” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 ; Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 ), “before the jury was empaneled” unless a delay tactic (Armant v. Marquez 10 Because Leon’s fourth Faretta motion was untimely, the trial court had discretion to deny the motion. 2010An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is "to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice." ( Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 852 .) Some Ninth Circuit cases contain dicta suggesting that "requests made `weeks before trial'" are invariably timely, purporting to divine such a rule from Faretta itself. ( Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 .) It is true that the particular request for self-representation in Faretta was made "wee | 3 | 1998–2014 |
People v. Buenrostro
green
2 sentences2026Timeliness “ ‘[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self-representation motion is made. . . [This] is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is “to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426 .) The Supreme Court has “routinely declined to identify a specific period in time at which a se 2021(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426 ; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103 14 (Valdez).) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its rulings “fall ‘outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 (Smith); People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).) As our high court noted in Lynch, it has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .)11 The Lynch court went on to explain that motions made “long before trial” have been considered timely, citing a ca | 2 | 2021–2026 |
People v. Welch
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 .) Faretta warned that a trial court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46.) According to the California Supreme Court, “the same rule applies to the denial of a motion for self-representation in the first instance when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will create disruption.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 , 127–128.) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) When considering whether a motion for self-representation is timely, “a trial court 6. properly considers not only the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witn | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2021(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426 ; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103 14 (Valdez).) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its rulings “fall ‘outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 (Smith); People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).) As our high court noted in Lynch, it has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .)11 The Lynch court went on to explain that motions made “long before trial” have been considered timely, citing a ca 2018(See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 82 P.3d 296 ( Valdez ).) Defendant does not dispute that whether to grant an untimely Faretta motion is addressed to the trial court's discretion. **1222 But she argues that the only factor the trial court may properly consider is the potential for delay or other disruption resulting from the granting of the motion. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2019(See Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106 , 120-121, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 595 , 205 P.3d 1047 ( Silverbrand ) [describing the prison-delivery rule].) Bontilao was required to file his challenge by July 16, and it was therefore untimely when given to the prison officials on July 23. 2019(See Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106 , 120-121, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 595 , 205 P.3d 1047 ( Silverbrand ) [describing the prison-delivery rule].) Bontilao was required to file his challenge by July 16, and it was therefore untimely when given to the prison officials on July 23. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority
green
2 sentences2016(Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1499 (Mandjik); Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827-828 .) The issue of accrual was properly submitted to the trial court and reviewed by us on appeal. 1992(Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 829 ; Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 476, 482 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 785 ].) Rather, where a claim submitted along with an application for leave to present a late claim alleges facts which, if true, would make the claim timely, the public entity must give specific written notice of rejection under section 913. | 2 | 1992–2016 |
People v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2015(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 (Williams) [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128 [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of 2001In People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121 , 137 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 560 P.2d 1187 , the court stated that a self-representation motion is timely if it is asserted "within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. " ( Id. at p. 128, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8 , 560 P.2d 1187 , italics added; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 959 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 997 P.2d 1044 .) Windham noted that the timeliness requirement was intended to preclude defendants from misusing the Faretta self-representation right to unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of just | 2 | 2001–2015 |
People v. Bradford
green
2 sentences2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 (Windham) [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administrat 2013(Windham, supra, 19 19 Cal.3d at p. 129, fn. 6 ; People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354 .) A trial court’s denial of an untimely Faretta motion is properly affirmed if substantial evidence supports the inference that the court had the Windham factors in mind when it ruled. ( Bradford, supra, at p. 1354 .) Although defendant did not explicitly request a continuance, the court was nonetheless entitled to consider the Windham factors. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
William Allen Marshall v. Don Taylor, Warden Attorney General of the State of California
green
2 sentences2014(Id. at pp. 726, 770.)4 4 Leon cites several federal cases in which, he claims, the reviewing court found that a request for self-representation was timely when made “weeks before trial” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 ; Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 ), “before the jury was empaneled” unless a delay tactic (Armant v. Marquez 10 Because Leon’s fourth Faretta motion was untimely, the trial court had discretion to deny the motion. 2010An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is "to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice." ( Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 852 .) Some Ninth Circuit cases contain dicta suggesting that "requests made `weeks before trial'" are invariably timely, purporting to divine such a rule from Faretta itself. ( Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 .) It is true that the particular request for self-representation in Faretta was made "wee | 2 | 2010–2014 |
| GLATMAN v. Valverde green | 2 | 2009–2009 |
| Napa Ass'n of Public Employees v. County of Napa green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc. v. Ensher green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Robinson v. Lewis green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Villanueva v. City of Colton green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Williams v. City of Belvedere green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| ALHUSAINY v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Mixon v. Riverview Hospital green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| City of San Jose v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Munoz v. State of California green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Laffit Pincay, Jr. v. Vincent S. Andrews green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Olsen v. Harbison green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Morales green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Pittman v. Canham green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| South Bay Radiology Medical Associates v. W. M. Asher, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| County Of Orange v. Air California green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Ziani Homeowners Ass'n v. Brookfield Ziani LLC green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Estill v. Cnty. of Shasta green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Guerrina v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In Re Harris green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Grant v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.