timeliness requirement (California) · Go Syfert
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timeliness requirement in California

110 California opinions name it 4 courts 1974–2026 32 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (35)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Windhamgreen
cal · 1977 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–2025
2 sentences

2025For a Faretta request to be timely, it must be made within “a reasonable time prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing.” (Miller, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham), our Supreme Court cautioned the “ ‘reasonable time’ requirement should not be and, indeed, must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s consti

2021Our high court has “long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is made ‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 499 .) “[T]he ‘reasonable time’ requirement ‘must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation,’ but rather to prevent the defendant from ‘misus[ing] the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) A timeliness requirement “reflects that ‘the government’s interest in ensuring the integrit

916
People v. Lynchgreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 17 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2022
2 sentences

2022(People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch), disapproved on another ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637, 643 .) A trial court must not use the timeliness requirement to limit a defendant’s constitutional right to self- representation.

2021(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) “[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self- representation

317
People v. Martinezgreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2013
2 sentences

2009Analysis In this case, the trial court concluded that the Lab Report did not meet the timeliness requirement of subdivision (b) of section 1280 because it did not establish that it was prepared at or near the time of the analysis of the blood sample. “ ‘How soon a writing must be made after the act or event is a matter of degree and calls for the exercise of reasonable judgment on the part of the trial judge.’ ” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 128, fn. 7 .) “[T]he timeliness requirement ‘is not to be judged ... by arbitrary or artificial time limits, measured by hours or days or even weeks.

2009(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 126 [in applying the timeliness requirement from § 1280 “to computer printouts from a database, we consider the length of time between the act, condition, or event and the date of its recording, not the date of its eventual retrieval by computer printout”].) The appellate court examined the admissibility of forensic lab reports in DMV proceedings under section 1280 in Glatman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 700 and Molenda, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 974 .

36
People v. Halvorsengreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2021
2 sentences

2021(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 .) Faretta warned that a trial court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46.) According to the California Supreme Court, “the same rule applies to the denial of a motion for self-representation in the first instance when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will create disruption.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th

2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 (Windham) [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administrat

33
Gutale v. Stategreen
or · 2019 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021And although the PCPA does not contain an explicit provision regarding claims that hinge on inadequate understanding of adverse immigration consequences, Oregon petitioners can raise an Oregon 14 We emphasize that a timeliness inquiry is always discretionary; as long as a petitioner is no longer in criminal custody, the trial court is never obligated to deny an immigration-related section 1473.7 petition for lack of timeliness. ( Perez, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015‒1016.) 16 Annotated Statutes, section 138.530(1)(a) claim using a Padilla theory. 15 (See, e.g., Gutale v. State (Or. 2019) 4

2021And although the PCPA does not contain an explicit provision regarding claims that hinge on inadequate understanding of adverse immigration consequences, Oregon petitioners can raise an Oregon 14 We emphasize that a timeliness inquiry is always discretionary; as long as a petitioner is no longer in criminal custody, the trial court is never obligated to deny an immigration-related section 1473.7 petition for lack of timeliness. ( Perez, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015‒1016.) 16 Annotated Statutes, section 138.530(1)(a) claim using a Padilla theory.15 (See, e.g., Gutale v. State (Or. 2019) 43

33
People v. Williamsgreen
cal · 2013 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2021
2 sentences

2021(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) “[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self- representation

2015(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 (Williams) [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128 [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of

33
People v. Simongreen
cal · 2001 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024(Id., subd. (c)(1)–(3).) The Lashon court opined it would not make sense “for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal.” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813; accord People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76 , 115 (Singh) [“To permit a defendant

2024(Id., subd. (c)(1)–(3).) The Lashon court opined it would not make sense “for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal.” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813; accord People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76 , 115 (Singh) [“To permit a defendant

22
April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTVgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–2023
2 sentences

2023The timeliness of a claim is thus 2 See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) (delayed discovery rule applies to fraud-based claims); Goverment Code section 1092, subdivision (b) (incorporating delayed discovery principles for conflict-of-interest claims); April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 830 (delayed discovery rule applies to contract claims involving fraud); Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 9 (delayed discovery rule applies to professional negligence claims under some circumstances); Pincay v. Andrews (9th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 1106 , 1109 (RI

1989(April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 828 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 ].) In the present case the final wrongful act alleged by plaintiff occurred on September 25, 1981.

22
In Re Paul W.green
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Kristin H., at p. 1664.) “[R]eversal [of an order in a dependency proceeding] because of ineffective assistance of counsel does not preclude further dependency proceedings in juvenile court . . . .” (In re Emilye A., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1707, fn. 9.) But it does “required that the proceedings be reconducted.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Paul W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 71 (cone. opn. of Bamattre-Manoukian, J.).) A legal malpractice claim is different.

2015(Ibid.) "[R]eversal of an order in a dependency proceeding [because of incompetency of counsel] . . . does not preclude further dependency proceedings in juvenile court . . . ." (In re Emilye A., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1707, fn. 9 .) But it does "require[ ] that the proceedings be reconducted . . . ." (Ibid.; accord, In re Paul W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 71 (conc. opn. of Bamattre-Manoukian, J.).) A legal malpractice claim is different.

22
San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services v. Ebrahim A.green
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child

2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child

22
People v. Hortongreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2009
22
People v. McKinnongreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2022
2 sentences

2022(People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch), disapproved on another ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637, 643 .) A trial court must not use the timeliness requirement to limit a defendant’s constitutional right to self- representation.

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 , 127–128.) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) When considering whether a motion for self-representation is timely, “a trial court 6. properly considers not only the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witn

16
In Re Clarkred
cal · 1993 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–2011
2 sentences

2011We decline to adopt the Ninth Circuit standard and instead apply the broader conception of laches used in California, which is closely related to the timeliness requirement, and thus “reflects recognition that a substantial delay will prejudice the respondent’s ability to answer the petition, respects the importance of finality of judgments to the state, and recognizes the difficulty of retrial in the event that a judgment is set aside on habeas corpus many years after the conviction.” (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 787 .) Here, the People have been prejudiced both with regard to retrying Defe

1999If, on the other hand, we find petitioner fails to show good cause for the delay, we need only read the petition to assure ourselves petitioner’s factual allegations do not make a prima facie showing his case falls within one of the four exceptions to the timeliness requirement set forth in Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750 .

13
People v. Millergreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2025
2 sentences

2025For a Faretta request to be timely, it must be made within “a reasonable time prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing.” (Miller, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454 .) In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham), our Supreme Court cautioned the “ ‘reasonable time’ requirement should not be and, indeed, must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s consti

2022(Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .) In determining timeliness, the sentencing hearing is considered “a proceeding separate and distinct from the trial.” (People v. Miller (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1024 (Miller).) The Wright court acknowledged our Supreme Court has declined to articulate what standard a reviewing court applies when determining timeliness but concluded in that case it was untimely under both de novo and abuse of discretion standards.

12
People v. Smithgreen
cal · 2018 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2021
2 sentences

2021(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426 ; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103 14 (Valdez).) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its rulings “fall ‘outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 (Smith); People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).) As our high court noted in Lynch, it has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .)11 The Lynch court went on to explain that motions made “long before trial” have been considered timely, citing a ca

2018(People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 .) The timeliness requirement is meant to ensure that a defendant does not “misuse the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably delay a scheduled [hearing] or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, fn. 5 (Windham).) To this end, relevant factors in evaluating an untimely request for self- representation include “the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedi

12
In Re Kristin H.green
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child

2015(Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667 .) This timeline protects the significant need for finality in the dependency system. *1094 The timeliness rule also reflects that the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency actions exists not only to safeguard the parent’s fundamental rights but also to ensure the correctness of the result — that the judgment/order promotes the child’s welfare. “ ‘If counsel’s ineffective representation of the parent has resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child

12
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.green
cal · 1945 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014(Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 443 .) Like the fraud claim, the UCL claim fails as untimely given the statute of limitations.

2014(Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 443.) Like the fraud claim, the UCL claim fails as untimely given the statute of limitations.

12
Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelsongreen
cal · 1993 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
12
California School Employees Ass'n v. Del Norte County Unified School Districtgreen
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
12
Jenkins v. County of Contra Costagreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1992
12
People v. Herreragreen
calctapp · 1980 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1992
12
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Claragreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
11
Tri-Delta Engineering, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North Americagreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
11
Samuels v. Mixgreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.green
calctapp5d · 2017 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
People v. Cruzgreen
cal · 1996 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Conservatorship of the Pers. v. M.M.green
calctapp5d · 2019 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
People v. Powellgreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
R & G Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.green
ca1 · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
16 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1089, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8164 Maria Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, Robert Beaver, Applicant-Intervenorsgreen
ca9 · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Lyons v. Stategreen
nev · 1990 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Barrett v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Districtgreen
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
City of Los Angeles v. Glairgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Conservatorship of Romogreen
calctapp · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (45)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Doolin green
cal · 2009
2 sentences

2025Otherwise, requests for self-representation are addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. [Citation.] (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 453 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) Thus, if the circumstances indicate the defendant’s request for self- representation is untimely and would disrupt or delay the proceedings, the trial court has every right to deny it.

2025Otherwise, requests for self-representation are addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. [Citation.] (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 453 .) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) Thus, if the circumstances indicate the defendant’s request for self- representation is untimely and would disrupt or delay the proceedings, the trial court has every right to deny it.

62014–2025
People v. Burton green
cal · 1989
2 sentences

2016An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is ‘to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lynch, supra, at p. 724 , quoting People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852 .) A consideration of the totality of the circumstances should include such factors as “the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, . . .whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availa

2016An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is ‘to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lynch, supra, at p. 724 , quoting People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852 .) A consideration of the totality of the circumstances should include such factors as “the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, . . .whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availa

42010–2016
People v. Johnson green
cal · 2019
2 sentences

2026Timeliness “ ‘[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self-representation motion is made. . . [This] is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is “to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426 .) The Supreme Court has “routinely declined to identify a specific period in time at which a se

2025In Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 475 the 19 California Supreme Court acknowledged that “most federal courts have concluded that a Faretta motion is timely as a matter of law if it is made before trial, unless the motion is made for the purpose of delay,” but the Supreme Court in Johnson rejected any such “bright-line rule” for California, observing many states have adopted a timeliness test consistent with Lynch.

32021–2026
Hernandez-Zurita v. State red
orctapp · 2018
2 sentences

2021(Hernandez-Zurita v. State (Or. 2018) 417 P.3d 548 (Hernandez-Zurita).) Without the benefit of Gutale’s reasoning, Hernandez-Zurita rejected a petitioner’s timeliness claim that he qualified under the PCPA escape clause due to obstacles he faced in obtaining legal materials and counsel while in Mexico.

2021(Hernandez-Zurita v. State (Or. 2018) 417 P.3d 548 (Hernandez-Zurita).) Without the benefit of Gutale’s reasoning, Hernandez-Zurita rejected a petitioner’s timeliness claim that he qualified under the PCPA escape clause due to obstacles he faced in obtaining legal materials and counsel while in Mexico.

32021–2021
In Re Robbins green
cal · 1998
2 sentences

2021The question of how timeliness of a subsequent but nonsuccessive petition may be 16 In re FRIEND Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. determined is beyond the scope of this case, but suffice it to say that Proposition 66 did not provide a new timeliness rule for any kind of petition other than initial petitions (and nothing in the measure appears to preclude continued application of the traditional timeliness standards that have been developed and applied in this court’s habeas cases (see Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 )).

2021The question of how timeliness of a subsequent but nonsuccessive petition may be 16 In re FRIEND Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. determined is beyond the scope of this case, but suffice it to say that Proposition 66 did not provide a new timeliness rule for any kind of petition other than initial petitions (and nothing in the measure appears to preclude continued application of the traditional timeliness standards that have been developed and applied in this court’s habeas cases (see Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 )).

31998–2021
Faretta v. California green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

2014(Id. at pp. 726, 770.)4 4 Leon cites several federal cases in which, he claims, the reviewing court found that a request for self-representation was timely when made “weeks before trial” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 ; Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 ), “before the jury was empaneled” unless a delay tactic (Armant v. Marquez 10 Because Leon’s fourth Faretta motion was untimely, the trial court had discretion to deny the motion.

2010An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is "to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice." ( Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 852 .) Some Ninth Circuit cases contain dicta suggesting that "requests made `weeks before trial'" are invariably timely, purporting to divine such a rule from Faretta itself. ( Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 .) It is true that the particular request for self-representation in Faretta was made "wee

31998–2014
People v. Buenrostro green
cal · 2018
2 sentences

2026Timeliness “ ‘[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self-representation motion is made. . . [This] is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is “to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426 .) The Supreme Court has “routinely declined to identify a specific period in time at which a se

2021(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426 ; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103 14 (Valdez).) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its rulings “fall ‘outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 (Smith); People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).) As our high court noted in Lynch, it has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .)11 The Lynch court went on to explain that motions made “long before trial” have been considered timely, citing a ca

22021–2026
People v. Welch green
cal · 1999
2 sentences

2021(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 .) Faretta warned that a trial court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46.) According to the California Supreme Court, “the same rule applies to the denial of a motion for self-representation in the first instance when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will create disruption.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 , 127–128.) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 454 .) When considering whether a motion for self-representation is timely, “a trial court 6. properly considers not only the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witn

22020–2021
People v. Valdez green
cal · 2004
2 sentences

2021(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426 ; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103 14 (Valdez).) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its rulings “fall ‘outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182 (Smith); People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).) As our high court noted in Lynch, it has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 .)11 The Lynch court went on to explain that motions made “long before trial” have been considered timely, citing a ca

2018(See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 103, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 82 P.3d 296 ( Valdez ).) Defendant does not dispute that whether to grant an untimely Faretta motion is addressed to the trial court's discretion. **1222 But she argues that the only factor the trial court may properly consider is the potential for delay or other disruption resulting from the granting of the motion.

22018–2021
Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles green
cal · 2009
2 sentences

2019(See Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106 , 120-121, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 595 , 205 P.3d 1047 ( Silverbrand ) [describing the prison-delivery rule].) Bontilao was required to file his challenge by July 16, and it was therefore untimely when given to the prison officials on July 23.

2019(See Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106 , 120-121, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 595 , 205 P.3d 1047 ( Silverbrand ) [describing the prison-delivery rule].) Bontilao was required to file his challenge by July 16, and it was therefore untimely when given to the prison officials on July 23.

22019–2019
Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority green
calctapp · 1988
2 sentences

2016(Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1499 (Mandjik); Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827-828 .) The issue of accrual was properly submitted to the trial court and reviewed by us on appeal.

1992(Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 829 ; Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 476, 482 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 785 ].) Rather, where a claim submitted along with an application for leave to present a late claim alleges facts which, if true, would make the claim timely, the public entity must give specific written notice of rejection under section 913.

21992–2016
People v. Jenkins green
cal · 2000
2 sentences

2015(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 (Williams) [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128 [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of

2001In People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121 , 137 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 560 P.2d 1187 , the court stated that a self-representation motion is timely if it is asserted "within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. " ( Id. at p. 128, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8 , 560 P.2d 1187 , italics added; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 959 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 997 P.2d 1044 .) Windham noted that the timeliness requirement was intended to preclude defendants from misusing the Faretta self-representation right to unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of just

22001–2015
People v. Bradford green
calctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutional right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 (Windham) [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administrat

2013(Windham, supra, 19 19 Cal.3d at p. 129, fn. 6 ; People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354 .) A trial court’s denial of an untimely Faretta motion is properly affirmed if substantial evidence supports the inference that the court had the Windham factors in mind when it ruled. ( Bradford, supra, at p. 1354 .) Although defendant did not explicitly request a continuance, the court was nonetheless entitled to consider the Windham factors.

22013–2014
William Allen Marshall v. Don Taylor, Warden Attorney General of the State of California green
ca9 · 2005
2 sentences

2014(Id. at pp. 726, 770.)4 4 Leon cites several federal cases in which, he claims, the reviewing court found that a request for self-representation was timely when made “weeks before trial” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 ; Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 ), “before the jury was empaneled” unless a delay tactic (Armant v. Marquez 10 Because Leon’s fourth Faretta motion was untimely, the trial court had discretion to deny the motion.

2010An analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is "to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice." ( Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 852 .) Some Ninth Circuit cases contain dicta suggesting that "requests made `weeks before trial'" are invariably timely, purporting to divine such a rule from Faretta itself. ( Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 .) It is true that the particular request for self-representation in Faretta was made "wee

22010–2014
GLATMAN v. Valverde green
calctapp · 2006
22009–2009
Napa Ass'n of Public Employees v. County of Napa green
calctapp · 1979
22005–2005
Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc. v. Ensher green
calctapp · 1965
12026–2026
Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego green
calctapp · 2006
12026–2026
Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. green
calctapp · 2003
12026–2026
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC green
calctapp5d · 2019
12026–2026
Robinson v. Lewis green
cal · 2020
12025–2025
Villanueva v. City of Colton green
calctapp · 2008
12025–2025
Williams v. City of Belvedere green
calctapp · 1999
12025–2025
J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. green
cal · 2017
12025–2025
ALHUSAINY v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2006
12024–2024
Mixon v. Riverview Hospital green
calctapp · 1967
12024–2024
City of San Jose v. Superior Court green
cal · 1974
12023–2023
Munoz v. State of California green
calctapp · 1995
12023–2023
Laffit Pincay, Jr. v. Vincent S. Andrews green
ca9 · 2001
12023–2023
Olsen v. Harbison green
calctapp · 2005
12022–2022
People v. Morales green
calctapp5d · 2018
12022–2022
Pittman v. Canham green
calctapp · 1992
12021–2021
South Bay Radiology Medical Associates v. W. M. Asher, Inc. green
calctapp · 1990
12021–2021
County Of Orange v. Air California green
ca9 · 1986
12020–2020
Ziani Homeowners Ass'n v. Brookfield Ziani LLC green
calctapp · 2015
12020–2020
California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, Inc. green
ca9 · 2002
12020–2020
Estill v. Cnty. of Shasta green
calctapp5d · 2018
12020–2020
Guerrina v. State green
nev · 2018
12019–2019
In Re Harris green
cal · 1993
12019–2019
Grant v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2001
12017–2017

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (13) CA § Cal. Government Code § 810 (7) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (7) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 352 (5) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1280 (4) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 801 (4) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 211 (4) USC § 28u.s.c.2244 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 1486 (1977–2026) CA 110 (1974–2026) NY 71 (1972–2026) OH 58 (1984–2026) IL 49 (1975–2026) TX 32 (1972–2025) AZ 27 (1979–2022) CT 22 (1982–2016) NM 19 (1988–2024) MO 19 (1992–2023) FL 16 (1985–2025) UT 13 (1937–2017) MD 13 (1992–2011) WA 13 (1984–2024) IA 12 (1979–2026) AL 12 (1983–2024) TN 12 (2010–2026) CO 10 (1984–2026) AR 10 (1994–2024) MA 9 (1985–2022) IN 9 (2013–2025) DE 9 (1997–2026) GA 9 (1973–2026) NJ 8 (1979–2021) MN 8 (1975–2015) OR 7 (1977–2018) MT 6 (2001–2015) ID 6 (1993–2015) LA 6 (1991–2016) MI 5 (1992–2006) KS 5 (1980–2021) WI 5 (1980–2019) NC 4 (2006–2025) VA 4 (2007–2026) MS 4 (2006–2017) WV 4 (2012–2024) NH 4 (1992–2003) HI 3 (2015–2021) VT 3 (2005–2025) WY 3 (2001–2021) NV 3 (2016–2023) SC 3 (2009–2019) VI 3 (2012–2014) RI 3 (2003–2014) ME 2 (2009–2025) DC 2 (1996–2022) AK 2 (1974–1987) SD 2 (1990–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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