8 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1942–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fletchergreen2 sentences2015Sept. 20, 1995) (“We find there is no prejudice to the appellant in this case as a result of the two inadvertent references to a polygraph.”); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 605 (Del.2001) (“On harmless error analysis, therefore, we hold that the erroneous admission of Lyons’ testimony concerning Gerry’s polygraph test .... did not substantially prejudice the defense and that admission of this testimony does not warrant a reversal of Capano’s conviction and sentence.”); People v. Fletcher, 328 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1075 , 263 Ill.Dec. 312 , 768 N.E.2d 72, 83 (2002) (“Therefore, even assuming, argue 2015Sept. 20, 1995) (“We find there is no prejudice to the appellant in this case as a result of the two inadvertent references to a polygraph.”); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 605 (Del.2001) (“On harmless error analysis, therefore, we hold that the erroneous admission of Lyons’ testimony concerning Gerry’s polygraph test .... did not substantially prejudice the defense and that admission of this testimony does not warrant a reversal of Capano’s conviction and sentence.”); People v. Fletcher, 328 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1075 , 263 Ill.Dec. 312 , 768 N.E.2d 72, 83 (2002) (“Therefore, even assuming, argue | 1 | 1 |
Capano v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Sept. 20, 1995) (“We find there is no prejudice to the appellant in this case as a result of the two inadvertent references to a polygraph.”); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 605 (Del.2001) (“On harmless error analysis, therefore, we hold that the erroneous admission of Lyons’ testimony concerning Gerry’s polygraph test .... did not substantially prejudice the defense and that admission of this testimony does not warrant a reversal of Capano’s conviction and sentence.”); People v. Fletcher, 328 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1075 , 263 Ill.Dec. 312 , 768 N.E.2d 72, 83 (2002) (“Therefore, even assuming, argue | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harveygreen2 sentences2015The probable impact of the polygraph reference upon the verdict is of prime importance.”); Lay v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind.1995) (“because the mention of a polygraph test here could not be said to have guaranteed a conviction, we cannot say that Pike’s testimony before the jury amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal of Lay’s conviction.”); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205-06 , 699 A.2d 596, 639 (1997) (“On this record, the reference to an unindicted suspect’s polygraph results does not constitute reversible error-..., Any prejudice to defendant was minimal.”); Mayes v. Sta 2015The probable impact of the polygraph reference upon the verdict is of prime importance.”); Lay v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind.1995) (“because the mention of a polygraph test here could not be said to have guaranteed a conviction, we cannot say that Pike’s testimony before the jury amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal of Lay’s conviction.”); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205-06 , 699 A.2d 596, 639 (1997) (“On this record, the reference to an unindicted suspect’s polygraph results does not constitute reversible error-..., Any prejudice to defendant was minimal.”); Mayes v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Mayes v. Stategreen1 sentence2015The probable impact of the polygraph reference upon the verdict is of prime importance.”); Lay v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind.1995) (“because the mention of a polygraph test here could not be said to have guaranteed a conviction, we cannot say that Pike’s testimony before the jury amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal of Lay’s conviction.”); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205-06 , 699 A.2d 596, 639 (1997) (“On this record, the reference to an unindicted suspect’s polygraph results does not constitute reversible error-..., Any prejudice to defendant was minimal.”); Mayes v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Lay v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The probable impact of the polygraph reference upon the verdict is of prime importance.”); Lay v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind.1995) (“because the mention of a polygraph test here could not be said to have guaranteed a conviction, we cannot say that Pike’s testimony before the jury amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal of Lay’s conviction.”); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205-06 , 699 A.2d 596, 639 (1997) (“On this record, the reference to an unindicted suspect’s polygraph results does not constitute reversible error-..., Any prejudice to defendant was minimal.”); Mayes v. Sta 2015The probable impact of the polygraph reference upon the verdict is of prime importance.”); Lay v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind. 1995) (“because the mention of a polygraph test here could not be said to have guaranteed a conviction, we cannot say that Pike’s testimony before the jury amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal of Lay’s conviction.”); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205-06 , 699 A.2d 596, 639 (1997) (“On this record, the reference to an unindicted suspect’s polygraph results does not constitute reversible error. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Majors v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Sept. 20, 1995) (“We find there is no prejudice to the appellant in this case as a result of the two inadvertent references to a polygraph.”); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 605 (Del.2001) (“On harmless error analysis, therefore, we hold that the erroneous admission of Lyons’ testimony concerning Gerry’s polygraph test .... did not substantially prejudice the defense and that admission of this testimony does not warrant a reversal of Capano’s conviction and sentence.”); People v. Fletcher, 328 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1075 , 263 Ill.Dec. 312 , 768 N.E.2d 72, 83 (2002) (“Therefore, even assuming, argue 2015App. 3d 1062, 1075 , 768 N.E.2d 72, 83 (2002) 22 (“Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the polygraph evidence was improperly admitted, we find the resulting error harmless.”); Majors v. State, 773 N.E.2d 231, 239 (Ind. 2002) (“the admission of polygraph evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ford v. Coiner
green
2 sentences2022Petitioner, however, could have advanced this contention on direct appeal, failed to do so, and offered no rebuttal to the resulting presumption that such contention was intelligently and knowingly waived. 3 See Ford, 156 W. 2022Va. at 362 , 196 S.E.2d at 92 , Syl. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
STATE EX REL. DEPUTY SHERIFFS'ASS'N v. Sims
green
2 sentences2019Va. 442 , 513 S.E.2d 669 (1998). 26 Id. at 446 , 513 S.E.2d at 673 . 13 of government.”27 For those same reasons, our dislike of judicial review statutes and the resulting test cases remains. 2019Va. 442 , 513 S.E.2d 669 (1998). 26 Id. at 446 , 513 S.E.2d at 673 . 13 of government.”27 For those same reasons, our dislike of judicial review statutes and the resulting test cases remains. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cahill v. Mercer County Board of Education
green
1 sentence2015While we acknowledge the circuit court’s obligation of deference (see Syl. pt. 1, Cahill, at 177, 539 S.E.2d at 437 ), we believe that this case, like petitioner’s appeal of the circuit court’s decision regarding her unemployment compensation benefits, “presents the rare circumstance wherein application of the requisite deference is not supported by common sense.” Smith, No. 14-0851 at 5. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Tax Assessment Against Stonestreet
green
2 sentences2009This Court, in both In re Stonestreet, 147 W.Va. 719 , 131 S.E.2d 52 (1963), and Rawl Sales, explained that where the petition, though presented within the thirty-day period, is not accompanied by the record of the proceeding below and no record of such proceeding is filed in the circuit court within thirty days, the appeal is to be refused by the circuit court. 2009This Court, in both In re Stonestreet, 147 W.Va. 719 , 131 S.E.2d 52 (1963), and Rawl Sales, explained that where the petition, though presented within the thirty-day period, is not accompanied by the record of the proceeding below and no record of such proceeding is filed in the circuit court within thirty days, the appeal is to be refused by the circuit court. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1994When a jury inquiry is not handled in this manner, the resulting violation of constitutional rights cannot be viewed as harmless error unless the reviewing court is “able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 711 . 1994When a jury inquiry is not handled in this manner, the resulting violation of constitutional rights cannot be viewed as harmless error unless the reviewing court is “able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 711 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Nardone v. United States
green
2 sentences1980Therefore, the prosecution will be faced with the task of showing by clear and substantial proof that “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed.307 (1939). 1980Therefore, the prosecution will be faced with the task of showing by clear and substantial proof that “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed.307 (1939). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1980Therefore, the prosecution will be faced with the task of showing by clear and substantial proof that “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed.307 (1939). 1980Therefore, the prosecution will be faced with the task of showing by clear and substantial proof that “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed.307 (1939). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. City of Chicago
neutral
2 sentences1942R. 281, it is said that: *96 “However, relator in seeking on certiorari to have the revocation of its license set aside, and thus to re-establish its license and the resulting privilege, under the ordinance, as a valid enactment, cannot, while thus insistihg on the exercise of a privilege by virtue of the ordinance, also assert that the ordinance under which he claims such privilege is invalid.” The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Pittsburgh, etc., Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 178 , 89 N. E. 1022, 1024 , 44 L. 1942R. 281, it is said that: *96 “However, relator in seeking on certiorari to have the revocation of its license set aside, and thus to re-establish its license and the resulting privilege, under the ordinance, as a valid enactment, cannot, while thus insistihg on the exercise of a privilege by virtue of the ordinance, also assert that the ordinance under which he claims such privilege is invalid.” The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Pittsburgh, etc., Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 178 , 89 N. E. 1022, 1024 , 44 L. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.