429 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mathews v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The Court explained: The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). 2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton, | 119 | 130 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement applies only “when the error Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-917| April 24, 2023 Page 12 of 17 constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quotation omitted). 2021Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Smith claims that the error was fundamental because it brought attention to his absence and violated “his right against self-incrimination without any adverse comment at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. [12] The fundamental error exception is exceedingly narrow and applies only where “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Mathews v. State, 84 | 46 | 82 |
Clark v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The error claimed must either “make[ ] a fair trial impossible” or constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009). 2017Rather, Hutchison argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to order a competency evaluation before finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. 2 “The ‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). *311 The error claimed must, either “make a fair trial., impossible” , or constitute “clearly blatant viol | 34 | 36 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016To be fundamental error, the error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987). 2015Put another way, “the error ‘must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987)). [10] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 702, if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1407-CR-318 | Ma | 29 | 30 |
Delarosa v. Stategreen2 sentences2024“The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Delarosa v. State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024 Page 23 of 33 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). 2019Etter argues that admission of this hearsay statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. 2 Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Etter claims that admission of this statement amounted to fundamental error. [17] The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is “extremely narrow” and applies only in egregious circumstances “when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due proce | 22 | 32 |
Benson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible” and must “constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). [11] Indiana Evidence Rule 702(a) provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an Court of Appeal 2019To qualify as fundamental error, the " 'error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible' and must 'constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.' " Id. (quoting Benson v. State , 762 N.E.2d 748 , 755 (Ind. 2002) ). [7] In Indiana, a crime may not be proven based solely on a confession. | 18 | 22 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“To constitute fundamental error, the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. 2003) (citation and quotations omitted). 2013To constitute fundamental error, “the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. 2003). 4 Derry specifically claims that the trial court rejected the plea agreement because it was presented after the plea bargain deadline had expired and fundamental error resulted when the trial court imposed a harsher sentence than the one-year sentence on work release that the State had recommended. | 15 | 15 |
Lehman v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.”). 2012“The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. | 11 | 14 |
Maul v. Stategreen2 sentences2019To rise to the level of fundamental error, an error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2000)). 2019To rise to the level of fundamental error, an error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2000) (citations omitted)). [8] Shelton contends that the hearsay statements of Dr. Sharma were the centerpiece of the State’s arguments “that [he] failed to take the pain medications so he could be evaluated and that he could work any job,” which he asserts serve as the primary bases upon which the court foun | 11 | 12 |
Tyrice J. Halliburton v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton, 2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton, | 9 | 23 |
Barany v. Stategreen2 sentences2002To constitute fundamental error, the error “ ‘must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987)); see also Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind.l995)(defin-ing fundamental error as error “so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible”). 2002To constitute fundamental error, the error "`must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.'" Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987)); see also Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind.1995) (defining fundamental error as error "so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible"). | 9 | 9 |
Boesch v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“The ‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1312| December 16, 2020 Page 3 of 6 Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002)). 2020Thus, to prevail on appeal, Littleton must demonstrate that the court committed fundamental error. [20] The fundamental error rule is “extremely narrow” and occurs “only when the error ‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002)). [21] On appeal, Littleton makes thorough and cogent argument on the question of whether the trial court abused its disc | 8 | 14 |
Spears v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Spears v. State , 811 N.E.2d 485 , 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (fundamental error "must constitute a blantant violation of basic principles, the harm, or potential harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process"). 2017To be considered fundamental error, an error must “constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm, or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Spears v. State, 811 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 2 Over eighteen months elapsed between the filing of the charging information and the start of his jury trial. | 8 | 8 |
McQueen v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fundamental error exception “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 . “‘For error to be ‘fundamental,’ prejudice to the defendant is required.’” Id. (quoting Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003)). [16] Childress contends that the admission of the challenged hearsay evidence constituted fundamental error because the evidence was not substantially trustworthy under Reyes and was “the only evide 2017The fundamental error exception “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 . “‘For error to be ‘fundamental,’ prejudice to the defendant is required.’” Id. (quoting Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003)). [16] Childress contends that the admission of the challenged hearsay evidence constituted fundamental error because the evidence was not substantially trustworthy under Reyes and was “the only evide | 6 | 10 |
Ford v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See also Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind.1998) (“This Court views the fundamental error exception to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 66A03-1508-CR-1184 | June 7, 2016 Page 24 of 26 the waiver rule as an extremely narrow one, available only ‘when the record reveals clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles [of due process], and the harm or potential for harm [can]not be denied.’”) (quoting Warriner v. State, 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ind. 1982)). 2011Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind.2002) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind.1998) (stating court views fundamental error exception as extremely narrow, available only when record reveals clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles and harm or potential harm cannot be denied), reh’g denied. | 6 | 6 |
Kimbrough v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Thus, to prevail on appeal, Littleton must demonstrate that the court committed fundamental error. [20] The fundamental error rule is “extremely narrow” and occurs “only when the error ‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002)). [21] On appeal, Littleton makes thorough and cogent argument on the question of whether the trial court abused its disc 2017Fundamental error is a “blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). | 5 | 9 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Fundamental error is “error so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial is rendered impossible.” The fundamental error rule is extremely narrow, and applies only when “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). 2018Given this record, we do not find that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. [16] Furthermore, even if, as Lugo claims, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, Lugo has failed to establish that the comments placed him “in a position of grave peril to which [he] would not have been subjected otherwise,” nor did the comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which applies “only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendan | 4 | 8 |
Absher v. Stategreen2 sentences2019To qualify as fundamental error, the " 'error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible' and must 'constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.' " Id. (quoting Benson v. State , 762 N.E.2d 748 , 755 (Ind. 2002) ). [7] In Indiana, a crime may not be proven based solely on a confession. 2018To qualify as fundamental error, the “‘error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible’” and must “‘constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’” Id. (citing Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002)). [17] Here, our review of the trial court’s statement to the jury during the colloquy between the trial court and the jury foreperson reveals that the State is correct that the “trial court did not make a specifi | 4 | 7 |
Carden v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“Fundamental error is error that constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 2020“Fundamental error is error that constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). | 4 | 6 |
Covey v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The fundamental error doctrine “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Covey v. State, 929 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 2018The fundamental error doctrine “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Covey v. State, 929 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). ‘A finding of fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred ... by not acting when he or she should have....’ Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide | 4 | 6 |
Boatright v. Stategreen2 sentences2019“The standard for fundamental error is whether the error was so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial was impossible.” Id. (citing Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ind. 2001)). [14] Rivera contends that the admission of testimony by Na.M. that E.M. had also made allegations against him constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence and violated his right to confrontation and that E.M.’s allegations destroyed his credibility, were not relevant, and that the danger of undue prejudice outweighed their probative value. 2012“The standard for fundamental error is whether the error was so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial was impossible.” Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ind. 2001). | 4 | 5 |
Hayworth v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The fundamental error exception "applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 ). 2009The fundamental error exception "applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 ). | 4 | 4 |
| Etienne v. Stategreen | 4 | 4 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2018He therefore argues that the admission of the messages constituted fundamental error. [7] To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Ind. 2000). “[T]he error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. [8] Hauk argues that the text messages constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the State does not disagree. 2018He therefore argues that the admission of the messages constituted fundamental error. [7] To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Ind. 2000). “[T]he error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. [8] Hauk argues that the text messages constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the State does not disagree. | 3 | 9 |
Bruce Ryan v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2024The appellant “faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to [their] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). 2018Given this record, we do not find that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. [16] Furthermore, even if, as Lugo claims, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, Lugo has failed to establish that the comments placed him “in a position of grave peril to which [he] would not have been subjected otherwise,” nor did the comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which applies “only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendan | 3 | 4 |
| Benefield v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
| R.W. v. State of Indianagreen | 3 | 3 |
| Bostick v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
Munford v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Id. at 13-14 . 8 When we consider a claim of fundamental error with respect to jury instructions, we look to the jury instructions as a whole to determine if they were adequate. 2013Id. | 2 | 5 |
Mendenhall v. Stategreen2 sentences2023“The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. 2012Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. | 2 | 4 |
| Johnson v. Waitgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Warriner v. Stategreen | 2 | 3 |
| Greer v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Whiting v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Thomas W. Oster, II v. State of Indianagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hopkins v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Ajabu v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Hoglund v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted; rather harm is found when error is so prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1239 . 2014This exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (citation omitted). 10 Conclusion Concluding the search of Mosley’s residence did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment and that any error in the admission of the other evidence challenged by Mosley is harmless, we affirm. | 1 | 6 |
| Robert Lewis III v. State of Indianagreen | 1 | 4 |
Craig Sampson v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2018Sampson, 38 N.E.3d at 992 . 2017Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted; rather harm is found when error is so prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible. 38 N.E.3d 985, 992 (Ind. 2015) (citations and internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Willey v. State
green
2 sentences2015Put another way, “the error ‘must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987)). [10] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 702, if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1407-CR-318 | Ma 2010To be fundamental error, an error "must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process." Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987)). | 5 | 2001–2015 |
Jerry L. Kindred v. State of Indiana
green
2 sentences2020Fundamental error is a “blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Kindred, 973 N.E.2d at 1252 (quoting 5 As for Sanders’ argument that the State failed to present evidence that Sanders had a motive to kill Naugle, we note the State had no such obligation. 2014Error is fundamental when it is a “blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (quoting Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). 1. | 4 | 2014–2020 |
| Staley v. State green | 4 | 2010–2014 |
| Howard v. State green | 3 | 2005–2018 |
| Sandifur v. State green | 3 | 2007–2012 |
| Whatley v. State green | 2 | 2014–2019 |
| Canaan v. State green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Salinas v. Texas green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Ruggieri v. State green | 2 | 2004–2013 |
| Okuly v. State green | 2 | 1992–2012 |
| Perez v. State green | 2 | 2010–2012 |
| Glotzbach v. State green | 2 | 2008–2010 |
| Doyle v. Ohio green | 2 | 1985–2001 |
| Peters v. State green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Byers v. State green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Jeffrey Fairbanks v. State of Indiana green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Dill v. State green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Workman v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Penley v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Thomas L. Hale v. State of Indiana green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.