resulting immunity in California

2025(See Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 221, fn. 13 .) The Thomas court correctly described that to find the defendant guilty of forcible sexual penetration, “[t]he jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt [the] defendant used ‘enough physical force to overcome the other person’s will.’ ” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 .) It then specified two types of circumstances that fall under the general definition of force: those “where the victim did not want to engage in the act and the evidence does not otherwise establish the victim’s positive cooperation in act or attitude,” and those

2025(See Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 221, fn. 13 .) The Thomas court correctly described that to find the defendant guilty of forcible sexual penetration, “[t]he jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt [the] defendant used ‘enough physical force to overcome the other person’s will.’ ” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 .) It then specified two types of circumstances that fall under the general definition of force: those “where the victim did not want to engage in the act and the evidence does not otherwise establish the victim’s positive cooperation in act or attitude,” and those

2023(See, e.g., Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 511 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in making a comment to a witness about her appearance, it was “trifling” and not likely to influence the juror]; People v. Loot (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 694, 698 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in discussing the prosecutor’s personal life, the resulting presumption of prejudice was rebutted].) We conclude that the court did not err by denying the motion because the presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct was rebutted.

2023(See, e.g., Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 511 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in making a comment to a witness about her appearance, it was “trifling” and not likely to influence the juror]; People v. Loot (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 694, 698 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in discussing the prosecutor’s personal life, the resulting presumption of prejudice was rebutted].) We conclude that the court did not err by denying the motion because the presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct was rebutted.

2023(See, e.g., Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 511 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in making a comment to a witness about her appearance, it was “trifling” and not likely to influence the juror]; People v. Loot (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 694, 698 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in discussing the prosecutor’s personal life, the resulting presumption of prejudice was rebutted].) We conclude that the court did not err by denying the motion because the presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct was rebutted.

2023(See, e.g., Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 511 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in making a comment to a witness about her appearance, it was “trifling” and not likely to influence the juror]; People v. Loot (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 694, 698 [concluding that although a juror committed misconduct in discussing the prosecutor’s personal life, the resulting presumption of prejudice was rebutted].) We conclude that the court did not err by denying the motion because the presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct was rebutted.

2023When specific legislation provides a ‘safe harbor,’ plaintiffs may not use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor.” (Id. at p. 182.) Consistent with these now-settled principles, the Rubin Court held that the plaintiff in that case could “not avoid the bar of section 47(b) by pleading his claim as one for injunctive relief under the unfair competition statute.” (Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1193 ; see also pp. 1200–1204.) In reaching this conclusion the Court recognized that the coverage of the UCL is “indeed sweeping” (id. at p. 1200), but reasoned that “[i]f the policies

2015If the 21 policies underlying section 47(b) are sufficiently strong to support an absolute privilege, the resulting immunity should not evaporate merely because the plaintiff discovers a conveniently different label for pleading what is in substance an identical grievance arising from identical conduct as that protected by section 47(b).’ [Citation.]” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 182 .) In other words, “[a] plaintiff may thus not ‘plead around’ an ‘absolute bar to relief’ simply ‘by recasting the cause of action as one for unfair competition.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court there

2026(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) Resulting error is reviewed under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , which requires the prosecution to show federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or under the less strenuous standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , which requires the defendant to demonstrate the reasonable probability of a more favorable result and generally applies to state-law errors.

2016(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59 ; see People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462 .) Third, if the trial court erred by admitting the statements, we determine whether the resulting error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2013In that footnote, Roberts identifies the existence of "some debate in our state" as to "whether delay alone is sufficient to establish 'prejudice' and a resulting waiver of arbitration." (Ibid.) The Roberts court explained: "In Burton v. Cruise [(2010)] 190 Cal.App.4th [939,] 947, the Court of Appeal noted that an 'egregious delay may result in prejudice' and concluded that to the extent there is a conflict between Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 996 , which found the bank waived arbitration when it allowed its customers to spend 10 months preparing their case for trial

2011In Burton v. Cruise, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at page 947 , the Court of Appeal noted that an “egregious delay may result in prejudice” and concluded that to the extent there is a conflict between Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 996 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ], which found the bank waived arbitration when it allowed its customers to spend 10 months preparing their case for trial at considerable expense and time, and Groom v. Health Net (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1189 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 ], which reversed an order denying arbitration after the petitioning party waited 11 months afte

2003First, the federal government’s determination that a 20 percent inaccuracy on the label of a dietary supplement is acceptable does not mean a reasonable consumer would not be misled by it, nor does it mean that under California law the advertising cannot be deemed false. “[T]he policies which are furthered by the California statutes would be undermined by the filed rate doctrine’s presumption of a consumer’s omniscience of filed rates, and the resulting immunity to common carriers, regardless of any advertising deception used to lure the consumer.” (Day v. AT & T Corp., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 3

2003First, the federal government's determination that a 20 percent inaccuracy on the label of a dietary supplement is acceptable does not mean a reasonable consumer would not be misled by it, nor does it mean that under California law the advertising cannot be deemed false. "[T]he policies which are furthered by the California statutes would be undermined by the filed rate doctrine's presumption of a consumer's omniscience of filed rates, and the resulting immunity to common carriers, regardless of any advertising deception used to lure the consumer." ( Day v. AT & T Corp., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th

2026“An instructional error involving a single element will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances, such as where the element was undisputed, the defense was not prevented from contesting the omitted element, and overwhelming evidence supports the omitted element.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 828 [cleaned up].) It is undisputed the court failed to give the entire pattern instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

2016(See People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 [“‘“‘[c]onfrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman’”’”]; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 [an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside because of a violation of the right to confrontation if, on the whole record, the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) “Th[e] [Chapman] test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 6

2016(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59 ; see People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462 .) Third, if the trial court erred by admitting the statements, we determine whether the resulting error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2016(See People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 [“‘“‘[c]onfrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman’”’”]; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 [an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside because of a violation of the right to confrontation if, on the whole record, the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) “Th[e] [Chapman] test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 6

2016(See People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 [“‘“‘[c]onfrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman’”’”]; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 [an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside because of a violation of the right to confrontation if, on the whole record, the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) “Th[e] [Chapman] test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 6

2015Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950, 958-964 [unfair competition action against lumber company alleging that company made misstatements and submitted false data in California Environment Quality Act proceedings was barred under section 47(b) litigation privilege].) The decision in Rubin and as discussed in Cel-Tech guides our analysis here.

2013In that footnote, Roberts identifies the existence of "some debate in our state" as to "whether delay alone is sufficient to establish 'prejudice' and a resulting waiver of arbitration." (Ibid.) The Roberts court explained: "In Burton v. Cruise [(2010)] 190 Cal.App.4th [939,] 947, the Court of Appeal noted that an 'egregious delay may result in prejudice' and concluded that to the extent there is a conflict between Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 996 , which found the bank waived arbitration when it allowed its customers to spend 10 months preparing their case for trial

2013In that footnote, Roberts identifies the existence of "some debate in our state" as to "whether delay alone is sufficient to establish 'prejudice' and a resulting waiver of arbitration." (Ibid.) The Roberts court explained: "In Burton v. Cruise [(2010)] 190 Cal.App.4th [939,] 947, the Court of Appeal noted that an 'egregious delay may result in prejudice' and concluded that to the extent there is a conflict between Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 996 , which found the bank waived arbitration when it allowed its customers to spend 10 months preparing their case for trial