resulting error in Georgia

2012See Arnau v. Arnau, 207 Ga. App. 696, 696-697 (1) ( 429 SE2d 116 ) (1993) (judge who acknowledged ex parte meeting with a witness did not provide evidence sufficient to overcome presumption that the communication was error); compare In re Martin, 218 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 460 SE2d 304 ) (1995) (ex parte letter sent to judge by witness was not harmful error when party asserting error did not argue that the judge responded in any manner or gave the letter any consideration).

2012See Arnau v. Arnau, 207 Ga. App. 696, 696-697 (1) ( 429 SE2d 116 ) (1993) (judge who acknowledged ex parte meeting with a witness did not provide evidence sufficient to overcome presumption that the communication was error); compare In re Martin, 218 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 460 SE2d 304 ) (1995) (ex parte letter sent to judge by witness was not harmful error when party asserting error did not argue that the judge responded in any manner or gave the letter any consideration).

2012See Arnau v. Arnau, 207 Ga. App. 696, 696-697 (1) ( 429 SE2d 116 ) (1993) (judge who acknowledged ex parte meeting with a witness did not provide evidence sufficient to overcome presumption that the communication was error); compare In re Martin, 218 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 460 SE2d 304 ) (1995) (ex parte letter sent to judge by witness was not harmful error when party asserting error did not argue that the judge responded in any manner or gave the letter any consideration).

2012See Arnau v. Arnau, 207 Ga. App. 696, 696-697 (1) ( 429 SE2d 116 ) (1993) (judge who acknowledged ex parte meeting with a witness did not provide evidence sufficient to overcome presumption that the communication was error); compare In re Martin, 218 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 460 SE2d 304 ) (1995) (ex parte letter sent to judge by witness was not harmful error when party asserting error did not argue that the judge responded in any manner or gave the letter any consideration).

2024The Voluntary and Intelligent Standard The standard for whether a guilty plea satisfies constitutional due process is well established: guilty pleas are valid if they are “both ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’” Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I).

2016After hearing this inconclusive and somewhat conflicting evidence, and without the benefit of a transcript of the special master hearing and subject to the resulting presumption that the special master’s conduct of the hearing was lawful,2 2 Davenport v. Smith, 157 Ga. App. 870, 871 ( 278 SE2d 691 ) (1981) (“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume that” a party made any showing required for the relief requested, “for there is a presumption that a trial judge performed faithfully and lawfully the duties devolving upon him by law, and enumerations of error dependent upon consideration of

2016After hearing this inconclusive and somewhat conflicting evidence, and without the benefit of a transcript of the special master hearing and subject to the resulting presumption that the special master’s conduct of the hearing was lawful,2 2 Davenport v. Smith, 157 Ga. App. 870, 871 ( 278 SE2d 691 ) (1981) (“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume that” a party made any showing required for the relief requested, “for there is a presumption that a trial judge performed faithfully and lawfully the duties devolving upon him by law, and enumerations of error dependent upon consideration of

2015We are mindful, however, that the intent exception must not be allowed to swallow the general rule against admission of prior bad acts.25 As we have explained, to determine whether 25 See United States v. Miller, 673 F3d 688, 697 (III) (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a mere claim of innocence were enough to automatically put intent at issue, the resulting exception would swallow the general rule against admission of prior bad acts. . . . [I]dentifying a Rule 404 (b) exception, such as intent, that is ‘at issue’ is only the first step of the analysis.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Matthews, 43

2015The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a]n erroneous evidentiary ruling will result in reversal only if the resulting error was not harmless.” United States v. Hands, 184 F3d 1322, 1329 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 1999), corrected, 194 F3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1999).

2015We are mindful, however, that the intent exception must not be allowed to swallow the general rule against admission of prior bad acts.25 As we have explained, to determine whether 25 See United States v. Miller, 673 F3d 688, 697 (III) (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a mere claim of innocence were enough to automatically put intent at issue, the resulting exception would swallow the general rule against admission of prior bad acts. . . . [I]dentifying a Rule 404 (b) exception, such as intent, that is ‘at issue’ is only the first step of the analysis.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Matthews, 43

2015“Evidentiary and other nonconstitutional errors do not constitute grounds for reversal unless there is a reasonable likelihood that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights; where an error had no substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict, reversal is not warranted.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Khan, 794 F3d 1288, 1299 (IV) (A) (2) (11th Cir. 2015).

1989Whelchel v. Thomas Ford Tractor, 190 Ga. App. 156 (1) ( 378 SE2d 510 ); Thomas v. Clark, 188 Ga. App. 606, 608 ( 373 SE2d 668 ). *640 The dissent asserts, in part, that it is not possible to determine whether the jury's award did or did not include compensation to appellee for lack of access between September 1985 and April 30, 1986, for certain utility work; and, that because appellant would not be liable for such work done by the utility, the resulting error cannot be deemed harmless.

1989Whelchel v. Thomas Ford Tractor, 190 Ga. App. 156 (1) ( 378 SE2d 510 ); Thomas v. Clark, 188 Ga. App. 606, 608 ( 373 SE2d 668 ). *640 The dissent asserts, in part, that it is not possible to determine whether the jury's award did or did not include compensation to appellee for lack of access between September 1985 and April 30, 1986, for certain utility work; and, that because appellant would not be liable for such work done by the utility, the resulting error cannot be deemed harmless.

1989However, the resulting error was harmless, as the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming “it is ‘highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’ ” Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 ( 230 SE2d 869 ). 5.

1989However, the resulting error was harmless, as the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming “it is ‘highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’ ” Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 ( 230 SE2d 869 ). 5.

1977See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (1972)." 'A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,’ for there are no perfect trials.” Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223, 231 (93 SC 1565, 36 LE2d 208) (1973).

1977See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (1972)." 'A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,’ for there are no perfect trials.” Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223, 231 (93 SC 1565, 36 LE2d 208) (1973).