7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cler v. Providence Health System-Oregongreen2 sentences2012See also Cler v. Providence Health *258 System-Oregon, 349 Or 481, 493 , 245 P3d 642 (2010) (when in closing argument defense counsel characterized the purported testimony of a witness who did not make it to trial to testify, and despite the trial court’s admonition to the jury that arguments were not evidence, the error created “an unacceptable risk that the jury would consider the statement as that of the unsworn witness” and thereby substantially affected the plaintiffs’ rights in a trial resulting in a defense verdict). 2012See also Cler v. Providence Health *258 System-Oregon, 349 Or 481, 493 , 245 P3d 642 (2010) (when in closing argument defense counsel characterized the purported testimony of a witness who did not make it to trial to testify, and despite the trial court’s admonition to the jury that arguments were not evidence, the error created “an unacceptable risk that the jury would consider the statement as that of the unsworn witness” and thereby substantially affected the plaintiffs’ rights in a trial resulting in a defense verdict). | 1 | 1 |
Coorough v. DeLaygreen1 sentence1971Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 107 F2d 446, 449 (9th Cir 1939); Coorough v. DeLay, 171 Cal App 2d 41, 339 P2d 963, 967 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ingle v. Matteucci
green
1 sentence2023That the court did not intend to move away from a “reasonable person” Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023) 451 standard is confirmed by the court’s comparison of ORS 138.510(3) to a “discovery rule”: “The resulting standard, therefore, requires assessing both whether the petitioner reasonably could have accessed the ground for relief and whether a reasonable person in the petitioner’s situation would have thought to investigate the existence of that ground for relief. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Holdorf
green
1 sentence2016The Supreme Court most recently has explained the resulting test for reasonable suspicion as follows: “[I]f an officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts that a person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime, the officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ and may stop the person to investigate.” Holdorf, 355 Or at 823 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bennett v. Board of Optometry
green
2 sentences2014“A defendant appearing pro se must inform himself of and comply with court rules as any other litigant.” State v. Palmer, 35 Or App 125, 128 , 580 P2d 592 (1978); cf. Bennett v. Board of Optometry, 125 Or App 66, 71 , 865 P2d 362 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 582 (1994) (“[A]n agency is not compelled to excuse a pro se litigant from procedural requirements.”). 2014“A defendant appearing pro se must inform himself of and comply with court rules as any other litigant.” State v. Palmer, 35 Or App 125, 128 , 580 P2d 592 (1978); cf. Bennett v. Board of Optometry, 125 Or App 66, 71 , 865 P2d 362 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 582 (1994) (“[A]n agency is not compelled to excuse a pro se litigant from procedural requirements.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Palmer
green
2 sentences2014“A defendant appearing pro se must inform himself of and comply with court rules as any other litigant.” State v. Palmer, 35 Or App 125, 128 , 580 P2d 592 (1978); cf. Bennett v. Board of Optometry, 125 Or App 66, 71 , 865 P2d 362 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 582 (1994) (“[A]n agency is not compelled to excuse a pro se litigant from procedural requirements.”). 2014“A defendant appearing pro se must inform himself of and comply with court rules as any other litigant.” State v. Palmer, 35 Or App 125, 128 , 580 P2d 592 (1978); cf. Bennett v. Board of Optometry, 125 Or App 66, 71 , 865 P2d 362 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 582 (1994) (“[A]n agency is not compelled to excuse a pro se litigant from procedural requirements.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Van v. Fox
green
2 sentences1985The Supreme Court said in Van v. Fox, 278 Or 439 , 564 P2d 695 (1977): “Essentially, then, the resulting standard becomes one of substantial fairness to both parties. 1985The Supreme Court said in Van v. Fox, 278 Or 439 , 564 P2d 695 (1977): “Essentially, then, the resulting standard becomes one of substantial fairness to both parties. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re Brown's Estate
neutral
2 sentences1945In such a case, this court, in reversing a nisi prius decision by the present writer, characterized the resulting presumption as a “strong presumption of undue influence created by law to protect those who are dependent upon others in transactions of this character.” In re Brown’s Estate, 165 Or. 575 , 108 P. (2d) 775 . 1945In such a case, this court, in reversing a nisi prius decision by the present writer, characterized the resulting presumption as a “strong presumption of undue influence created by law to protect those who are dependent upon others in transactions of this character.” In re Brown’s Estate, 165 Or. 575 , 108 P. (2d) 775 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.