making exception in Alabama

1997Brown , 326 Ark. at 694 -95 , 932 S.W.2d at 771 .

1997Brown , 326 Ark. at 694 -95 , 932 S.W.2d at 771 .

1991"We hold, therefore, that the validity of the rule announced in Brown was not undermined by the Chambers opinion, and where the declarant is not available, his out-of-court declarations against penal interest are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify the Court in making an exception to the hearsay rule." Thompson v. State , 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 924 , 96 S.Ct. 266 , 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975).

1991"We hold, therefore, that the validity of the rule announced in Brown was not undermined by the Chambers opinion, and where the declarant is not available, his out-of-court declarations against penal interest are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify the Court in making an exception to the hearsay rule." Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 , 96 S.Ct. 266 , 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975).

1991"We hold, therefore, that the validity of the rule announced in Brown was not undermined by the Chambers opinion, and where the declarant is not available, his out-of-court declarations against penal interest are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify the Court in making an exception to the hearsay rule." Thompson v. State , 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 924 , 96 S.Ct. 266 , 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975).

1991"We hold, therefore, that the validity of the rule announced in Brown was not undermined by the Chambers opinion, and where the declarant is not available, his out-of-court declarations against penal interest are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify the Court in making an exception to the hearsay rule." Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 , 96 S.Ct. 266 , 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975).

1991"We hold, therefore, that the validity of the rule announced in Brown was not undermined by the Chambers opinion, and where the declarant is not available, his out-of-court declarations against penal interest are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify the Court in making an exception to the hearsay rule." Thompson v. State , 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 924 , 96 S.Ct. 266 , 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975).

1991"We hold, therefore, that the validity of the rule announced in Brown was not undermined by the Chambers opinion, and where the declarant is not available, his out-of-court declarations against penal interest are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify the Court in making an exception to the hearsay rule." Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 , 96 S.Ct. 266 , 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975).

1984Allen v. State , 414 So.2d 989 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), affirmed, 414 So.2d 993 (Ala. 1982).

1984Allen v. State , 414 So.2d 989 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), affirmed, 414 So.2d 993 (Ala. 1982).

1939A stipulation of similar character was considered in Abercrombie & Williams v. Vandiver, 126 Ala. 513 , 28 So. 491 , 493, wherein it was provided that “no claim for extra work will be considered except it be' made in writing to the resident engineer within one month after said work has been done.” Speaking of this provision, the Court said: “The making of the claim in the manner stipulated, was a condition precedent to the right of plaintiffs to claim compensation, and as there is nothing in such a condition offensive to public policy,, it only remains for the courts to give it force and effec

1938As we construe the opinion of the Supreme Court, •on certiorari, 186 So. 580 , the making of the inquiry, and a flat denial by the witness that he had had the conversation, was a sufficient predicate to authorize the State witness on redirect examination, to testify and relate in detail , what the mother of the defendant, in the absence of defendant, -did say to the witness as to her paying him the money he claimed to have been taken away from him.

1909It does not limit the defendant’s liability for negligence, but only requires a reasonable notice to the defendant of claims for damages.” Coleman, J., in the case of Southern Express Co. v. Bank of Tupelo, 108 Ala. 517 , 18 South 664 , speaking of the provision of the contract which required presentation of the claim in writing to the defendant within 32 days from the date of the contract, used the folloAving language: “In the case of Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101 , 4 Am.

1909It does not limit the defendant’s liability for negligence, but only requires a reasonable notice to the defendant of claims for damages.” Coleman, J., in the case of Southern Express Co. v. Bank of Tupelo, 108 Ala. 517 , 18 South 664 , speaking of the provision of the contract which required presentation of the claim in writing to the defendant within 32 days from the date of the contract, used the folloAving language: “In the case of Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101 , 4 Am.