making claim in Nebraska

1976In Simon v. Cathroe Co., 101 Neb. 211 , we recognize the giving of notice and the making of the claim as distinct and separate prerequisites to the bringing of an action.” The statute in this regard has not been amended since this statement was made.

1908In Simon v. Cathroe Co., 101 Neb. 211 , we recognize the giving of notice and the making of the claim as distinct- and separate prerequisites to the bringing of an action.

2022The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Morgan, but based its decision on § 6 of the FAA, which, it observed, provides that “any application [to the court thereunder] ‘shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions,’” except as otherwise therein expressly provided. 44 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the phrase “any application” in § 6 of the FAA includes 41 Id., 142 S. Ct. at 1711 . 42 Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 992 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 2021), vacated and remanded, Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., supra note 2. 43 Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., su

2022The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Morgan, but based its decision on § 6 of the FAA, which, it observed, provides that “any application [to the court thereunder] ‘shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions,’” except as otherwise therein expressly provided. 44 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the phrase “any application” in § 6 of the FAA includes 41 Id., 142 S. Ct. at 1711 . 42 Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 992 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 2021), vacated and remanded, Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., supra note 2. 43 Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., su

2000We have previously stated, however, that “ ‘[a] reading of the entire statute [§ 48-118] makes it quite clear that a strict compliance with the written, certified, or registered mail notice provision was not intended to be mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ” Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 253 , 220 N.W.2d 8, 10-11 (1974) (quoting Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986)).

2000We have previously stated, however, that “ ‘[a] reading of the entire statute [§ 48-118] makes it quite clear that a strict compliance with the written, certified, or registered mail notice provision was not intended to be mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ” Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 253 , 220 N.W.2d 8, 10-11 (1974) (quoting Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986)).

2000We have previously stated, however, that “ ‘[a] reading of the entire statute [§ 48-118] makes it quite clear that a strict compliance with the written, certified, or registered mail notice provision was not intended to be mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ” Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 253 , 220 N.W.2d 8, 10-11 (1974) (quoting Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986)).

2000We have previously stated, however, that “ ‘[a] reading of the entire statute [§ 48-118] makes it quite clear that a strict compliance with the written, certified, or registered mail notice provision was not intended to be mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ” Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 253 , 220 N.W.2d 8, 10-11 (1974) (quoting Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986)).

1997We believe this is precisely the type of “verbal quibble” that Hallowell v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322 , 34 N.W.2d 404 (1948), cautions not be entirely depended upon in resolving the “true facts of the case.” In reality, the issue is not whether the DeMontignys made a claim, but whether they occupied the land with the intention of claiming ownership of it.

1997We believe this is precisely the type of “verbal quibble” that Hallowell v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322 , 34 N.W.2d 404 (1948), cautions not be entirely depended upon in resolving the “true facts of the case.” In reality, the issue is not whether the DeMontignys made a claim, but whether they occupied the land with the intention of claiming ownership of it.

1942Co. v. Metzger, 167 Md. 27 , 172 Atl. 610 , is found the following: “In the making of the error in the office of the insurer there would seem to have been no such negligence as defeats an application for reformation.

1942Co. v. Metzger, 167 Md. 27 , 172 Atl. 610 , is found the following: “In the making of the error in the office of the insurer there would seem to have been no such negligence as defeats an application for reformation.

1932If it should be considered that this statement gave Dr. Hawes knowledge of an additional injury to be claimed by the appellee, then we are cited to the case of Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654 , which holds: “The mere fact that the employer has knowledge that the employee has received an injury will not dispense with the necessity of the claimant’s making his claim for compensation.” In Duhrkopf v. Bennett, 108 Neb. 142 , reference is made to the Massachusetts employer’s liability act, in which there is a provision that an action thereunder must be brought within a year after the accident,

1932If it should be considered that this statement gave Dr. Hawes knowledge of an additional injury to be claimed by the appellee, then we are cited to the case of Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654 , which holds: “The mere fact that the employer has knowledge that the employee has received an injury will not dispense with the necessity of the claimant’s making his claim for compensation.” In Duhrkopf v. Bennett, 108 Neb. 142 , reference is made to the Massachusetts employer’s liability act, in which there is a provision that an action thereunder must be brought within a year after the accident,

1909It is true, as argued by plaintiff, that we have consistently held, since Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 31 , that occupation of real estate will not ripen into title unless that possession is adverse to the true owner and with the intent and purpose of the occupant of asserting ownership to the land.