making rule in Pennsylvania

2012Finally, Appellant regards the Commonwealth Court’s present decision as inconsistent with its prior one in Cope , where the court indicated that “[r]eeeiving a bare writ of summons ... does not by itself provide notice that a claim is eligible for Section 715 coverage because it does not contain information that would enable a health care provider to make that determination.” Cope, 955 A.2d at 1050 .

1981See McFadden v. Pennzoil Co., 326 Pa. 277 , 191 A. 584 (1937); Caples v. Klugman, 202 Pa.Super. 517 , 198 A.2d 342 (1964); Stokes Estate, 167 Pa.Super. 128 , 74 A.2d 517 (1950); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 329 A.2d 335 (1974) (collecting cases).

1981See McFadden v. Pennzoil Co., 326 Pa. 277 , 191 A. 584 (1937); Caples v. Klugman, 202 Pa.Super. 517 , 198 A.2d 342 (1964); Stokes Estate, 167 Pa.Super. 128 , 74 A.2d 517 (1950); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 329 A.2d 335 (1974) (collecting cases).

1981See McFadden v. Pennzoil Co., 326 Pa. 277 , 191 A. 584 (1937); Caples v. Klugman, 202 Pa.Super. 517 , 198 A.2d 342 (1964); Stokes Estate, 167 Pa.Super. 128 , 74 A.2d 517 (1950); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 329 A.2d 335 (1974) (collecting cases).

1981See McFadden v. Pennzoil Co., 326 Pa. 277 , 191 A. 584 (1937); Caples v. Klugman, 202 Pa.Super. 517 , 198 A.2d 342 (1964); Stokes Estate, 167 Pa.Super. 128 , 74 A.2d 517 (1950); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 329 A.2d 335 (1974) (collecting cases).

1981See McFadden v. Pennzoil Co., 326 Pa. 277 , 191 A. 584 (1937); Caples v. Klugman, 202 Pa.Super. 517 , 198 A.2d 342 (1964); Stokes Estate, 167 Pa.Super. 128 , 74 A.2d 517 (1950); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 329 A.2d 335 (1974) (collecting cases).

1981See McFadden v. Pennzoil Co., 326 Pa. 277 , 191 A. 584 (1937); Caples v. Klugman, 202 Pa.Super. 517 , 198 A.2d 342 (1964); Stokes Estate, 167 Pa.Super. 128 , 74 A.2d 517 (1950); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 329 A.2d 335 (1974) (collecting cases).

1981It said: “Accordingly, although Rule 302(d) is silent as to the procedure to be followed after a sanction has been imposed, we believe that the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas would vacate an order imposing a sanction if the noncomplying party, by timely petition, offered a reasonable excuse for its failure to file a brief within the prescrt’s refusal to excuse noncompliance constituted an abuse of discretion, its decision would be reversed on appeal.” Id., 287 Pa.Super. 319 , 430 A.2d 305 .

1981It said: “Accordingly, although Rule 302(d) is silent as to the procedure to be followed after a sanction has been imposed, we believe that the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas would vacate an order imposing a sanction if the noncomplying party, by timely petition, offered a reasonable excuse for its failure to file a brief within the prescrt’s refusal to excuse noncompliance constituted an abuse of discretion, its decision would be reversed on appeal.” Id., 287 Pa.Super. 319 , 430 A.2d 305 .

1977We find the reasoning of the companion cases of Hess v. Westerwick, 366 Pa. 90 , 76 A. 2d 745 (1950), and Ross Appeal, 366 Pa. 100 , 76 A. 2d 749 (1950), to be the basis for the above amendment and, therefore, illustrative to its intent.

1977We find the reasoning of the companion cases of Hess v. Westerwick, 366 Pa. 90 , 76 A. 2d 745 (1950), and Ross Appeal, 366 Pa. 100 , 76 A. 2d 749 (1950), to be the basis for the above amendment and, therefore, illustrative to its intent.

1977We find the reasoning of the companion cases of Hess v. Westerwick, 366 Pa. 90 , 76 A. 2d 745 (1950), and Ross Appeal, 366 Pa. 100 , 76 A. 2d 749 (1950), to be the basis for the above amendment and, therefore, illustrative to its intent.

1977We find the reasoning of the companion cases of Hess v. Westerwick, 366 Pa. 90 , 76 A. 2d 745 (1950), and Ross Appeal, 366 Pa. 100 , 76 A. 2d 749 (1950), to be the basis for the above amendment and, therefore, illustrative to its intent.

1964In Whelan v. Mack, 190 Superior Ct. 40, 151 A. 2d 797 (1959), the Superior Court affirmed the order of the lower court making a rule to open a default judgment absolute.

1957“In Shinn v. Stemler, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 129 , which was an appeal by defendant from the order of the court making the rule absolute for citation for the possession of real estate, the court said at p. 130: ‘The question presented is whether that appeal nevertheless acted as a supersedeas.

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1950We have no power to overrule the board of adjustment in the exercise of this discretionary power, unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, or clearly in violation of positive law: Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98 ; or, as it is sometimes stated, unless there is a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion”: Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 157 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 117 ; Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 117 ; Berman et al. v. Exley et al., 355 Pa. 415 ; Elkins Park Improvement Association Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 325 ; Overbrook Farms Club v. Philadelphia Zon

1941Notice to the sheriff seems to be sufficient and that was given in this case: Lamberton National Bank v. Kineston, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 365 .

1933Co., 51 Pa. Superior Ct. 474, 479 , we said: “Ordinarily the wishes of the local agent in such matters ought not to affect the actions of the insured because the latter would have no right to assume that a mere local agent had any authority to deal with such matters. ’ ’ The making of such a waiver was not within the apparent scope of the duties of a local agent who was authorized to issue and countersign policies of insurance, and there was not a scintilla of evidence as to any course of conduct by the local agents, Lawrence & Sterling, from which such authority could be inferred.

1927It grounded its opinion on the case of O’Neil v. Insurance Co., 166 Pa. 72 , in which it is held that the legislature cannot delegate its power and that it alone must exercise legislative power; that the “law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and that nothing must be submitted to the judgment of the electors, or other appointees, except an option to become or not to become subject to its requirements and penalties.” The O’Neil case concerns the making of a standard fire insurance policy by the Insurance Commissioner of the

1912In Kennedy’s Petition, 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 482 , we held, reversing the court below, that the rule should have been made absolute, and remitted the record with direction to enter siich order and to give judgment against the respondent unless, within thirty days from the making of the rule absolute, she should have brought her action.