denial of a peremptory challenge in California

2009The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (§ 170.3, subd. (d); see Zilog, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1315 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 ] (Zilog).) The Courts of Appeal have reached varying conclusions regarding the appropriate standard of review of the denial of a peremptory challenge.

2009The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (§ 170.3, subd. (d); see Zilog, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1315 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 ] (Zilog).) The Courts of Appeal have reached varying conclusions regarding the appropriate standard of review of the denial of a peremptory challenge.

1989(People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ].) Since the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause compels the defense to use a peremptory challenge, a similar analysis applies to denial of a challenge for cause.

1989(People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ].) Since the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause compels the defense to use a peremptory challenge, a similar analysis applies to denial of a challenge for cause.

2020(Grant v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 518, 523 ; see also Zilog, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1315 .) Petitioners argue that the independent standard of review applies in instances, such as this case, where “proper application of the disqualification statute turns on undisputed facts.” (Pickett v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 887, 892 (Pickett), citing Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 882 .) However, the central dispute here is a factual one—whether LaFace raised a claim regarding self-checkout workstations as part of the first lawsuit

2020(Grant v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 518, 523 ; see also Zilog, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1315 .) Petitioners argue that the independent standard of review applies in instances, such as this case, where “proper application of the disqualification statute turns on undisputed facts.” (Pickett v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 887, 892 (Pickett), citing Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 882 .) However, the central dispute here is a factual one—whether LaFace raised a claim regarding self-checkout workstations as part of the first lawsuit

2009In Zilog, for instance, the court reviewed the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion and noted that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to section 170.6.” (Zilog, at p. 1315; see also Jonathon M. v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 ] [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Other courts have observed that, “[i]n deciding a section 170.6 motion, the trial court has no discretion” so it is “appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under

2009In Zilog, for instance, the court reviewed the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion and noted that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to section 170.6.” (Zilog, at p. 1315; see also Jonathon M. v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 ] [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Other courts have observed that, “[i]n deciding a section 170.6 motion, the trial court has no discretion” so it is “appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under

2009In Zilog, for instance, the court reviewed the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion and noted that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to section 170.6.” (Zilog, at p. 1315; see also Jonathon M. v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 ] [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Other courts have observed that, “[i]n deciding a section 170.6 motion, the trial court has no discretion” so it is “appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under

2009In Zilog, for instance, the court reviewed the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion and noted that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to section 170.6.” (Zilog, at p. 1315; see also Jonathon M. v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 ] [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Other courts have observed that, “[i]n deciding a section 170.6 motion, the trial court has no discretion” so it is “appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under

2009In Zilog, for instance, the court reviewed the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion and noted that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to section 170.6.” (Zilog, at p. 1315; see also Jonathon M. v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 ] [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Other courts have observed that, “[i]n deciding a section 170.6 motion, the trial court has no discretion” so it is “appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under

2009In Zilog, for instance, the court reviewed the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion and noted that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to section 170.6.” (Zilog, at p. 1315; see also Jonathon M. v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 ] [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Other courts have observed that, “[i]n deciding a section 170.6 motion, the trial court has no discretion” so it is “appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under

2002(McClenny v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 684 .) McClenny cited with approval a case that applied the continuation of proceedings rule “and held that the presentation in the supplementary proceeding of ‘matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues involved in the [original] action’ stamped the supplementary proceeding as a continuation of the original action.” (McClenny v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 684 , fn. omitted.) Citing that language, Andrews v. Joint Clerks etc. Committee (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 285, 295-299 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 646 ], upheld the denial of a per

2002(McClenny v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 684 .) McClenny cited with approval a case that applied the continuation of proceedings rule “and held that the presentation in the supplementary proceeding of ‘matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues involved in the [original] action’ stamped the supplementary proceeding as a continuation of the original action.” (McClenny v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 684 , fn. omitted.) Citing that language, Andrews v. Joint Clerks etc. Committee (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 285, 295-299 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 646 ], upheld the denial of a per

1988As we explained in People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ], “California courts have consistently held that ‘the failure to grant a defendant the prescribed number of peremptory challenges when the record reflects his desire to excuse a juror before whom he was tried is reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 654 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 669 P.2d 1 ] [reversible error where defendant entitled to 26 challenges and court only permitted 10; after exercising all permitted challenges, counsel stated di

1988As we explained in People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ], “California courts have consistently held that ‘the failure to grant a defendant the prescribed number of peremptory challenges when the record reflects his desire to excuse a juror before whom he was tried is reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 654 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 669 P.2d 1 ] [reversible error where defendant entitled to 26 challenges and court only permitted 10; after exercising all permitted challenges, counsel stated di

1988(Kimbley v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 148 ].) As stated in Kimbley , “It has long been the rule in California that exhaustion of peremptory challenges is a ‘condition precedent’ to an appeal based on the composition of the jury. [Citation].” Although our courts have never considered whether an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause is, in effect, the denial of a peremptory challenge, in other cases involving the denial of peremptory challenges, we have found a potential effect on the selection of the jury only where the defense used all of

1988(Kimbley v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 148 ].) As stated in Kimbley , “It has long been the rule in California that exhaustion of peremptory challenges is a ‘condition precedent’ to an appeal based on the composition of the jury. [Citation].” Although our courts have never considered whether an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause is, in effect, the denial of a peremptory challenge, in other cases involving the denial of peremptory challenges, we have found a potential effect on the selection of the jury only where the defense used all of

1988As we explained in People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ], “California courts have consistently held that ‘the failure to grant a defendant the prescribed number of peremptory challenges when the record reflects his desire to excuse a juror before whom he was tried is reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 654 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 669 P.2d 1 ] [reversible error where defendant entitled to 26 challenges and court only permitted 10; after exercising all permitted challenges, counsel stated di

1988As we explained in People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ], “California courts have consistently held that ‘the failure to grant a defendant the prescribed number of peremptory challenges when the record reflects his desire to excuse a juror before whom he was tried is reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 654 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 669 P.2d 1 ] [reversible error where defendant entitled to 26 challenges and court only permitted 10; after exercising all permitted challenges, counsel stated di

1988As we explained in People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ], “California courts have consistently held that ‘the failure to grant a defendant the prescribed number of peremptory challenges when the record reflects his desire to excuse a juror before whom he was tried is reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 654 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 669 P.2d 1 ] [reversible error where defendant entitled to 26 challenges and court only permitted 10; after exercising all permitted challenges, counsel stated di

1988As we explained in People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ], “California courts have consistently held that ‘the failure to grant a defendant the prescribed number of peremptory challenges when the record reflects his desire to excuse a juror before whom he was tried is reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 654 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 669 P.2d 1 ] [reversible error where defendant entitled to 26 challenges and court only permitted 10; after exercising all permitted challenges, counsel stated di