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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2023A majority of this Court later held in People v Bell, 473 Mich 275 (2005), that no peremptory challenges had been improperly denied in that case and concluded that the Court need not address whether a denial of a peremptory challenge was subject to automatic reversal. 2021REMEDY A plurality of this Court, in People v Bell, “recogniz[ed] the distinction between a Batson error and a denial of a peremptory challenge.” 73 Namely, “[a] Batson error occurs when a juror is actually dismissed on the basis of race or gender.” 74 “In contrast, a denial of a peremptory challenge on other grounds amounts to the denial of a statutory or court- rule-based right to exclude a certain number of jurors.” 75 The Bell plurality concluded that “[a]n improper denial of such a peremptory challenge is not of constitutional dimension.” 76 73 People v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 293 ; 702 NW2d | 4 | 4 |
Rivera v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2021Note that Michigan’s standard in this regard appears less onerous than the Illinois standard upheld in Rivera, which required a court to consider whether it was “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [the defendant] guilty absent the error.” Rivera, 556 US at 155 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 42 a system to review the erroneous denial of the statutory right to remove a particular juror peremptorily, and this Court is obliged to “implement” that design. 92 Nonetheless, defendant argues that the denial of a peremptory challenge under these circumstances 2021Note that Michigan’s standard in this regard appears less onerous than the Illinois standard upheld in Rivera, which required a court to consider whether it was “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [the defendant] guilty absent the error.” Rivera, 556 US at 155 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 42 a system to review the erroneous denial of the statutory right to remove a particular juror peremptorily, and this Court is obliged to “implement” that design. 92 Nonetheless, defendant argues that the denial of a peremptory challenge under these circumstances | 2 | 2 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2023We reconsider this question today. 3 2 Justice ZAHRA cites People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008), in support of his argument that due process does not require automatic reversal for the denial of a peremptory challenge because errors relating to challenges for cause are reviewed for actual prejudice. 2023We reconsider this question today. 3 2 Justice ZAHRA cites People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008), in support of his argument that due process does not require automatic reversal for the denial of a peremptory challenge because errors relating to challenges for cause are reviewed for actual prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carinesgreen2 sentences2005See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 16 Under Carines , a nonconstitutional error does not require automatic reversal. 2005See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 16 Under Carines , a nonconstitutional error does not require automatic reversal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Schmitz
red
2 sentences2016Had we concluded, however, as do our dissenting colleagues, that defendant’s peremptory challenges had been improperly denied, we would have applied a harmless error standard to the error, because People v Miller, 411 Mich 321 , 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521 , 586 NW2d 766 (1998), are no longer binding, in light of our current harmless error jurisprudence, to the extent that they hold that a violation of the right to a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal. 2016Had we concluded, however, as do our dissenting colleagues, that defendant’s peremptory challenges had been improperly denied, we would have applied a harmless error standard to the error, because People v Miller, 411 Mich 321 , 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521 , 586 NW2d 766 (1998), are no longer binding, in light of our current harmless error jurisprudence, to the extent that they hold that a violation of the right to a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal. | 3 | 2005–2016 |
People v. Miller
green
2 sentences2016Had we concluded, however, as do our dissenting colleagues, that defendant’s peremptory challenges had been improperly denied, we would have applied a harmless error standard to the error, because People v Miller, 411 Mich 321 , 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521 , 586 NW2d 766 (1998), are no longer binding, in light of our current harmless error jurisprudence, to the extent that they hold that a violation of the right to a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal. 2016Had we concluded, however, as do our dissenting colleagues, that defendant’s peremptory challenges had been improperly denied, we would have applied a harmless error standard to the error, because People v Miller, 411 Mich 321 , 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521 , 586 NW2d 766 (1998), are no longer binding, in light of our current harmless error jurisprudence, to the extent that they hold that a violation of the right to a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal. | 3 | 2005–2016 |
Georgia v. McCollum
green
2 sentences2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.”[80] In reaching this holding, Rivera first iterated that “[t]his Court has ‘long recognized’ that ‘peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.’ ” 81 Indeed, “[s]tates may withhold peremptory challenges ‘altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’ ” 82 But “[w]hen States provide 77 Rivera v Illinois, 556 US 148 ; 129 S Ct 1446 ; 173 L Ed 2d 320 (2009). 78 Id. at 156 . 79 Id., 2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.”[80] In reaching this holding, Rivera first iterated that “[t]his Court has ‘long recognized’ that ‘peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.’ ” 81 Indeed, “[s]tates may withhold peremptory challenges ‘altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’ ” 82 But “[w]hen States provide 77 Rivera v Illinois, 556 US 148 ; 129 S Ct 1446 ; 173 L Ed 2d 320 (2009). 78 Id. at 156 . 79 Id., | 2 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Martinez-Salazar
green
2 sentences2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.”[80] In reaching this holding, Rivera first iterated that “[t]his Court has ‘long recognized’ that ‘peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.’ ” 81 Indeed, “[s]tates may withhold peremptory challenges ‘altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’ ” 82 But “[w]hen States provide 77 Rivera v Illinois, 556 US 148 ; 129 S Ct 1446 ; 173 L Ed 2d 320 (2009). 78 Id. at 156 . 79 Id., 2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.”[80] In reaching this holding, Rivera first iterated that “[t]his Court has ‘long recognized’ that ‘peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.’ ” 81 Indeed, “[s]tates may withhold peremptory challenges ‘altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’ ” 82 But “[w]hen States provide 77 Rivera v Illinois, 556 US 148 ; 129 S Ct 1446 ; 173 L Ed 2d 320 (2009). 78 Id. at 156 . 79 Id., | 2 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Richard Annigoni
red
2 sentences2005In a case directly on point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the problem in these words: “To subject the denial of a peremptory challenge to harmless-error analysis would require appellate courts to do the impossible: to reconstruct what went on in jury deliberations through nothing more than post-trial hearings and sheer speculation.” Annigoni, supra at 1145 . 2005In a case directly on point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the problem in these words: "To subject the denial of a peremptory challenge to harmless-error analysis would require appellate courts to do the impossible: to reconstruct what went on in jury deliberations through nothing more than post-trial hearings and sheer speculation." Annigoni, supra at 1145 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Vreen
yellow
2 sentences2005State v Vreen, 143 Wash 2d 923; 26 P3d 236 (2001). 2005State v. Vreen, 143 Wash.2d 923 , 26 P.3d 236 (2001). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2023See People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). 16 Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 7 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US 286, 294-295 ; 137 S Ct 1899 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (emphasis added). 18 Batson, 476 US 79 . 19 For all the discussion in the majority opinion about dicta, it is hard not to notice that the majority opinion’s analysis is mostly based on a partially concurring opinion issued by our former colleague in Kabongo. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2023See People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). 16 Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 7 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US 286, 294-295 ; 137 S Ct 1899 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (emphasis added). 18 Batson, 476 US 79 . 19 For all the discussion in the majority opinion about dicta, it is hard not to notice that the majority opinion’s analysis is mostly based on a partially concurring opinion issued by our former colleague in Kabongo. 2023See People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). 16 Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 7 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US 286, 294-295 ; 137 S Ct 1899 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (emphasis added). 18 Batson, 476 US 79 . 19 For all the discussion in the majority opinion about dicta, it is hard not to notice that the majority opinion’s analysis is mostly based on a partially concurring opinion issued by our former colleague in Kabongo. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rice v. Collins
green
2 sentences2023The value and harm in any given case is anecdotal. 32 30 Ante at 13-14, quoting Kabongo, 507 Mich at 155-156 (opinion by MCCORMACK, C.J.). 31 Deconstruct and Superstruct, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 1578 n 63 (second alteration in original), quoting Rice v Collins, 546 US 333, 343 ; 126 S Ct 969 ; 163 L Ed 2d 824 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 32 In one preeminent study of actual peremptory-challenge usage in criminal trials, prospective jurors who were removed by peremptory challenge were then formed into shadow juries to observe the trials from which they had been excused. 2023The value and harm in any given case is anecdotal. 32 30 Ante at 13-14, quoting Kabongo, 507 Mich at 155-156 (opinion by MCCORMACK, C.J.). 31 Deconstruct and Superstruct, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 1578 n 63 (second alteration in original), quoting Rice v Collins, 546 US 333, 343 ; 126 S Ct 969 ; 163 L Ed 2d 824 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 32 In one preeminent study of actual peremptory-challenge usage in criminal trials, prospective jurors who were removed by peremptory challenge were then formed into shadow juries to observe the trials from which they had been excused. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Weaver v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2023See People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). 16 Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 7 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US 286, 294-295 ; 137 S Ct 1899 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (emphasis added). 18 Batson, 476 US 79 . 19 For all the discussion in the majority opinion about dicta, it is hard not to notice that the majority opinion’s analysis is mostly based on a partially concurring opinion issued by our former colleague in Kabongo. 2023See People v Miller, 482 Mich 540 ; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). 16 Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 7 ; 119 S Ct 1827 ; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US 286, 294-295 ; 137 S Ct 1899 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (emphasis added). 18 Batson, 476 US 79 . 19 For all the discussion in the majority opinion about dicta, it is hard not to notice that the majority opinion’s analysis is mostly based on a partially concurring opinion issued by our former colleague in Kabongo. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.