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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1959–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Klein v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017(See Klein, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 78 [3d par. “adds an additional immunity” beyond those in 1st par.].) But the consideration exception does not. 2017(See Klein, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 78 [third paragraph “adds an additional immunity” beyond those in first paragraph].) But the consideration exception does not. | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences2017(See Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 ] (Jackson).) The other possible meaning, which Jackson rejected, is that “said landowner” refers *573 back to the owner referenced in paragraphs 1 and 3, i.e., to an “owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory . . . .” (§ 846, 1st & 3d pars.; see also Hubbard, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 197 [§ 846 “immunize[s] owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession” (italics added)]; Or 2017(See Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 ] (Jackson).) The other possible meaning, which Jackson rejected, is that “said landowner” refers *573 back to the owner referenced in paragraphs 1 and 3, i.e., to an “owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory . . . .” (§ 846, 1st & 3d pars.; see also Hubbard, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 197 [§ 846 “immunize[s] owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession” (italics added)]; Or | 2 | 2 |
Hubbard v. Browngreen2 sentences2017(See Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 ] (Jackson).) The other possible meaning, which Jackson rejected, is that “said landowner” refers *573 back to the owner referenced in paragraphs 1 and 3, i.e., to an “owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory . . . .” (§ 846, 1st & 3d pars.; see also Hubbard, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 197 [§ 846 “immunize[s] owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession” (italics added)]; Or 2017(See Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 (Jackson).) The other possible meaning, which Jackson rejected, is that “said landowner” refers back to the owner referenced in paragraphs 1 and 3, i.e., to an “owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory. . . .” (See § 846, 1st and 3d paragraphs; see also Hubbard, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 197 [section 846 “immunize[s] owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession”], italics added; Ornelas, supra, | 2 | 2 |
Ornelas v. Randolphgreen2 sentences2017(See Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 ] (Jackson).) The other possible meaning, which Jackson rejected, is that “said landowner” refers *573 back to the owner referenced in paragraphs 1 and 3, i.e., to an “owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory . . . .” (§ 846, 1st & 3d pars.; see also Hubbard, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 197 [§ 846 “immunize[s] owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession” (italics added)]; Or 2017(See Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 (Jackson).) The other possible meaning, which Jackson rejected, is that “said landowner” refers back to the owner referenced in paragraphs 1 and 3, i.e., to an “owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory. . . .” (See § 846, 1st and 3d paragraphs; see also Hubbard, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 197 [section 846 “immunize[s] owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession”], italics added; Ornelas, supra, | 1 | 2 |
Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green1 sentence2017(See Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1160, fn. 5 .) 28 status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.” (§ 846, 3d par.) The express invitation provision of the fourth paragraph then clarifies that section 846 does not apply “to any persons who are expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon the premises by the landowner.” (Id., 4th par., item (c).) Thus, reading the statute as a whole, the invitation exception expressly limits one of the immunities conferred by the third paragraph. | 1 | 1 |
Kent v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991“This concern *204 [about the defects in the juvenile court system], however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations of law violation.” (Kent v. United States, supra, 383 U.S. 541, 556 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94 ].) In rejecting the claim that a minor is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. 528 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 647 ], the court said, 1991“This concern *204 [about the defects in the juvenile court system], however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations of law violation.” (Kent v. United States, supra, 383 U.S. 541, 556 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94 ].) In rejecting the claim that a minor is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. 528 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 647 ], the court said, | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences1974That sort of invitation flies in the face of Justice Cardozo’s warning against “gossamer possibilities of prejudice.” (Synder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 122 [ 78 L.Ed. 674, 686-687 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 90 A.L.R. 575 ].) Justice Cardozo amplified the warning: “Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. 1974That sort of invitation flies in the face of Justice Cardozo’s warning against “gossamer possibilities of prejudice.” (Synder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 122 [ 78 L.Ed. 674, 686-687 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 90 A.L.R. 575 ].) Justice Cardozo amplified the warning: “Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bradley
green
1 sentence2026“Failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90 .) An invitation by defense counsel to the sentencing court to dismiss an enhancement based on section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) would have been properly declined. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Delgadillo
green
1 sentence2024We agree with the parties that reversal is required.4 In reviewing the record of conviction, courts “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 .) However, when “the record . . . makes clear that [the defendant] was the actual killer and the only participant in the killing,” the defendant “is not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 ; see People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956 , 969, 973 [where record of 4 In light of the partie | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2024We agree with the parties that reversal is required.4 In reviewing the record of conviction, courts “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 .) However, when “the record . . . makes clear that [the defendant] was the actual killer and the only participant in the killing,” the defendant “is not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 ; see People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956 , 969, 973 [where record of 4 In light of the partie | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1991“This concern *204 [about the defects in the juvenile court system], however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations of law violation.” (Kent v. United States, supra, 383 U.S. 541, 556 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94 ].) In rejecting the claim that a minor is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. 528 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 647 ], the court said, 1991“This concern *204 [about the defects in the juvenile court system], however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations of law violation.” (Kent v. United States, supra, 383 U.S. 541, 556 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94 ].) In rejecting the claim that a minor is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. 528 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 647 ], the court said, | 1 | 1991–1991 |
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY v. Donovan
green
1 sentence1959Rather it bases ‘invitation’ on the fact that the occupier by his arrangement of the premises or other conduct has led the entrant to believe ‘that [the premises] were intended to be used by visitors’ for the purpose which this entrant was pursuing, ‘and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the owner [or possessor], but that it was in accordance with the intention and design with which the way or place was adapted and prepared. . . .’ Such arrangement or other conduct encourages people to enter the land with a sense of assurance that it has been prepared for their safety.” (2 Harper and | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.