neighborhood bar in California

1972(Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. at p. 417 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 644].) It is thus apparent that Mooney’s informant could as likely have obtained the information from an “offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar,” as from personal observations or some other reliable source. 7 (Id.) “In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the

1972(Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. at p. 417 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 644].) It is thus apparent that Mooney’s informant could as likely have obtained the information from an “offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar,” as from personal observations or some other reliable source. 7 (Id.) “In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the

2022“Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 988 ; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2 .) “Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 774 .) As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569 : “Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 20 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corri

2022“Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 988 ; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2 .) “Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 774 .) As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569 : “Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 20 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corri

2022“Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 988 ; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2 .) “Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 774 .) As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569 : “Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 20 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corri

2022“Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 988 ; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2 .) “Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 774 .) As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569 : “Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 20 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corri

2022“Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 988 ; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2 .) “Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 774 .) As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569 : “Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 20 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corri

1983The “reasonableness” of Crowson’s expectation of privacy, however, is ultimately a matter of common sense and practical judgment. “[T]he expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 361 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 588 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ] (Harlan, J., cone.).) Here, Crowson had just been arrested at a neighborhood bar—a most extreme interference with the “right to be left alone”—and remained in the custody of the police on the way to jail.

1983The “reasonableness” of Crowson’s expectation of privacy, however, is ultimately a matter of common sense and practical judgment. “[T]he expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 361 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 588 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ] (Harlan, J., cone.).) Here, Crowson had just been arrested at a neighborhood bar—a most extreme interference with the “right to be left alone”—and remained in the custody of the police on the way to jail.

1981Moreover, the psychiatric portrait of appellant's mental and emotional condition at the time of the killing might well have been undermined by such a defense. (9) And, finally, as this court said in People v. Russell (1980) 101 Cal. App.3d 665, 668 [ 161 Cal. Rptr. 735 ], rejecting an incompetency claim, counsel are not to be faulted for failing to anticipate subsequent Supreme Court decisions, prescience being no more required of competent counsel than omniscience.

1981Moreover, the psychiatric portrait of appellant's mental and emotional condition at the time of the killing might well have been undermined by such a defense. (9) And, finally, as this court said in People v. Russell (1980) 101 Cal. App.3d 665, 668 [ 161 Cal. Rptr. 735 ], rejecting an incompetency claim, counsel are not to be faulted for failing to anticipate subsequent Supreme Court decisions, prescience being no more required of competent counsel than omniscience.

1972(Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. at p. 417 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 644].) It is thus apparent that Mooney’s informant could as likely have obtained the information from an “offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar,” as from personal observations or some other reliable source. 7 (Id.) “In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the

1972(Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. at p. 417 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 644].) It is thus apparent that Mooney’s informant could as likely have obtained the information from an “offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar,” as from personal observations or some other reliable source. 7 (Id.) “In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the