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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.green2 sentences2021In Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 86 (Carmona), the Court of Appeal found a lack of mutuality in an arbitration clause between car wash companies 13 and employees where “only the employees initialed next to the clause, and only they signed the agreement.” Citing our Supreme Court’s decision in Armendariz, Carmona noted that “‘the lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the agreements does not provide as by what it does.’” ( Carmona, supra, at p. 86 , citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 120 (A 2021In Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 86 (Carmona), the Court of Appeal found a lack of mutuality in an arbitration clause between car wash companies 13 and employees where “only the employees initialed next to the clause, and only they signed the agreement.” Citing our Supreme Court’s decision in Armendariz, Carmona noted that “‘the lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the agreements does not provide as by what it does.’” ( Carmona, supra, at p. 86 , citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 120 (A | 2 | 2 |
Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash CA2/8green2 sentences2021In Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 86 (Carmona), the Court of Appeal found a lack of mutuality in an arbitration clause between car wash companies 13 and employees where “only the employees initialed next to the clause, and only they signed the agreement.” Citing our Supreme Court’s decision in Armendariz, Carmona noted that “‘the lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the agreements does not provide as by what it does.’” ( Carmona, supra, at p. 86 , citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 120 (A 2021In Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 86 (Carmona), the Court of Appeal found a lack of mutuality in an arbitration clause between car wash companies 13 and employees where “only the employees initialed next to the clause, and only they signed the agreement.” Citing our Supreme Court’s decision in Armendariz, Carmona noted that “‘the lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the agreements does not provide as by what it does.’” ( Carmona, supra, at p. 86 , citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 120 (A | 2 | 2 |
Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melogreen2 sentences2021(See Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 201, 212 [noting, in finding that PAGA waiver demonstrated substantive unconscionability, that the “question in determining unconscionability . . . does not involve comparing the terms of the arbitration clause with the nonarbitration claims” being pursued].) Second, there is a lack of mutuality given that none of the Version One agreements were signed by any of the real parties in interest. 2021(See Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 201, 212 [noting, in finding that PAGA waiver demonstrated substantive unconscionability, that the “question in determining unconscionability . . . does not involve comparing the terms of the arbitration clause with the nonarbitration claims” being pursued].) Second, there is a lack of mutuality given that none of the Version One agreements were signed by any of the real parties in interest. | 2 | 2 |
Trivedi v. CUREXO TECHNOLOGY CORP.green2 sentences2012(Cf. Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387, 393 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 804 ] [employment arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable because it was prepared by the employer, mandatory, and no copy of the applicable arbitration rules was provided].) Substantive unconscionability depends on the terms of the arbitration clause itself. 2012(Cf. Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387, 393 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 804 ] [employment arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable because it was prepared by the employer, mandatory, and no copy of the applicable arbitration rules was provided].) Substantive unconscionability depends on the terms of the arbitration clause itself. | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. SAN DIEGO ASSN. OF REALTORSgreen2 sentences2000(See Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 3 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 534 ].) Rogers and Peinado agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration, leaving Rogers no recourse to a judicial remedy against Peinado. 2000(See Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 3 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 534 ].) Rogers and Peinado agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration, leaving Rogers no recourse to a judicial remedy against Peinado. | 1 | 1 |
Ora Lee Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, William Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Companygreen2 sentences1997Cir. 1965) 350 F.2d 445, 450 [ 121 App.D.C. 315 , 18 A.L.R.3d 1297 ].) *1543 VI. 1997Cir. 1965) 350 F.2d 445, 450 [ 121 App.D.C. 315 , 18 A.L.R.3d 1297 ].) *1543 VI. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012In this case, the issue of whether the clause in question is substantively unconscionable has already been addressed by the California Supreme Court in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 ] (Little). 2012In this case, the issue of whether the clause in question is substantively unconscionable has already been addressed by the California Supreme Court in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 ] (Little). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000"We agree a contract can provide a `margin of safety' that provides the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable. [Citation.] However, unless the `business realities' that create the special need for such an advantage are explained in the contract itself, which is not the case here, it must be factually established." ( Stirlen, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 .) The Stirlen court found no "business reality" to justify the lack of mutuality, concluding that the terms of the 2000"We agree a contract can provide a `margin of safety' that provides the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable. [Citation.] However, unless the `business realities' that create the special need for such an advantage are explained in the contract itself, which is not the case here, it must be factually established." ( Stirlen, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 .) The Stirlen court found no "business reality" to justify the lack of mutuality, concluding that the terms of the | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000"We agree a contract can provide a `margin of safety' that provides the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable. [Citation.] However, unless the `business realities' that create the special need for such an advantage are explained in the contract itself, which is not the case here, it must be factually established." ( Stirlen, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 .) The Stirlen court found no "business reality" to justify the lack of mutuality, concluding that the terms of the 2000"We agree a contract can provide a `margin of safety' that provides the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable. [Citation.] However, unless the `business realities' that create the special need for such an advantage are explained in the contract itself, which is not the case here, it must be factually established." ( Stirlen, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 .) The Stirlen court found no "business reality" to justify the lack of mutuality, concluding that the terms of the | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 463 v. Texoma Natural Gas Co.
green
1 sentence1946Co. v. Oil Workers, 58 F.Supp. 132 , 134 et seq. (affirmed in 146 F.2d 62 ; certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, 324 U.S. 872 , 67 S.Ct. 1017 , 89 L.Ed. 1426 ).) In view of the foregoing rule it was unnecessary for plaintiff to allege in its complaint compliance or an attempt to comply with the terms of the arbitration clause in the contract prior to instituting the instant suit. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 463
green
1 sentence1946Co. v. Oil Workers, 58 F.Supp. 132 , 134 et seq. (affirmed in 146 F.2d 62 ; certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, 324 U.S. 872 , 67 S.Ct. 1017 , 89 L.Ed. 1426 ).) In view of the foregoing rule it was unnecessary for plaintiff to allege in its complaint compliance or an attempt to comply with the terms of the arbitration clause in the contract prior to instituting the instant suit. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Kennedy v. Emerald Coal & Coke Co.
green
1 sentence1946Co. v. Oil Workers, 58 F.Supp. 132 , 134 et seq. (affirmed in 146 F.2d 62 ; certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, 324 U.S. 872 , 67 S.Ct. 1017 , 89 L.Ed. 1426 ).) In view of the foregoing rule it was unnecessary for plaintiff to allege in its complaint compliance or an attempt to comply with the terms of the arbitration clause in the contract prior to instituting the instant suit. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Great Lakes Transit Corp. v. Marceau
green
1 sentence1946Co. v. Oil Workers, 58 F.Supp. 132 , 134 et seq. (affirmed in 146 F.2d 62 ; certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, 324 U.S. 872 , 67 S.Ct. 1017 , 89 L.Ed. 1426 ).) In view of the foregoing rule it was unnecessary for plaintiff to allege in its complaint compliance or an attempt to comply with the terms of the arbitration clause in the contract prior to instituting the instant suit. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.