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7 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kimbrogreen2 sentences2001See State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 236 , 496 A.2d 498 (1985). 2001See State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 236 , 496 A.2d 498 (1985). | 1 | 2 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences1988Although it is unlikely that Connecticut would employ the Gates standard; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S. Ct. 2317 , 76 L. 1988Although it is unlikely that Connecticut would employ the Gates standard; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S. Ct. 2317 , 76 L. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2002Under the Gates test, a court must examine all of the evidence relating to the issue of probable cause and, on the basis of that evidence, make a commonsense, practical determination of whether probable cause existed." State v. Smith , 257 Conn. 216 , 223 , 777 A.2d 182 (2001). 2002Under the Gates test, a court must examine all of the evidence relating to the issue of probable cause and, on the basis of that evidence, make a commonsense, practical determination of whether probable cause existed." State v. Smith , 257 Conn. 216 , 223 , 777 A.2d 182 (2001). | 2 | 2002–2010 |
State v. James
green
2 sentences2002"The `totality of the circumstances' analysis . . . considers the reliability of the confidential informant and the informant's basis of knowledge as significant factors in determining whether a confidential informant's tip has furnished probable cause to justify a search or an arrest." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) State v. James , 261 Conn. 395 , 419 fn 27, 802 A.2d 820 (2002). 2002"The `totality of the circumstances' analysis . . . considers the reliability of the confidential informant and the informant's basis of knowledge as significant factors in determining whether a confidential informant's tip has furnished probable cause to justify a search or an arrest." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) State v. James , 261 Conn. 395 , 419 fn 27, 802 A.2d 820 (2002). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1991Our decision in this case is controlled by our Supreme Court’s recent rulings in State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557 , 594 A.2d 933 (1991), and State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991). 1991Our decision in this case is controlled by our Supreme Court’s recent rulings in State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557 , 594 A.2d 933 (1991), and State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Barton
green
2 sentences1991Our decision in this case is controlled by our Supreme Court’s recent rulings in State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557 , 594 A.2d 933 (1991), and State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991). 1991Our decision in this case is controlled by our Supreme Court’s recent rulings in State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557 , 594 A.2d 933 (1991), and State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences1986Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L. 1986Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1986Rather, the court there held that our state constitution requires us to apply the pre-Gates standard established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S. Ct. 1509 , 12 L. 1986Rather, the court there held that our state constitution requires us to apply the pre-Gates standard established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S. Ct. 1509 , 12 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1985We identify with the concern of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on remand when it said in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 , 370 n.7, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), “[w]e do not know whether the Supreme Court of the United States intended a lower definition of probable cause when, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), it used words such as ‘fair probability’ (id. at 238) and ‘substantial chance’ (id. at 244 n.13).” The Washington Supreme Court has rejected application of the Gates approach under the Washington state constitution calling the Gates standard “nebulous.” See State v. Jac 1985We identify with the concern of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on remand when it said in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 , 370 n.7, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), “[w]e do not know whether the Supreme Court of the United States intended a lower definition of probable cause when, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), it used words such as ‘fair probability’ (id. at 238) and ‘substantial chance’ (id. at 244 n.13).” The Washington Supreme Court has rejected application of the Gates approach under the Washington state constitution calling the Gates standard “nebulous.” See State v. Jac | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Upton
green
2 sentences1985We identify with the concern of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on remand when it said in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 , 370 n.7, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), “[w]e do not know whether the Supreme Court of the United States intended a lower definition of probable cause when, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), it used words such as ‘fair probability’ (id. at 238) and ‘substantial chance’ (id. at 244 n.13).” The Washington Supreme Court has rejected application of the Gates approach under the Washington state constitution calling the Gates standard “nebulous.” See State v. Jac 1985We identify with the concern of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on remand when it said in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 , 370 n.7, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), “[w]e do not know whether the Supreme Court of the United States intended a lower definition of probable cause when, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), it used words such as ‘fair probability’ (id. at 238) and ‘substantial chance’ (id. at 244 n.13).” The Washington Supreme Court has rejected application of the Gates approach under the Washington state constitution calling the Gates standard “nebulous.” See State v. Jac | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.