conflicting doctrine (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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conflicting doctrine in Georgia

7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Spencer v. Lamar County Board of Tax Assessorsgreen
gactapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See also Spencer, 202 Ga. App. at 743-744 (holding that OCGA § 9-11-17 (a), the CPA provision governing real parties in interest, applies to tax appeals under OCGA § 48-5- 311).

2014See also Spencer, 202 Ga. App. at 743-744 (holding that OCGA § 9-11-17 (a), the CPA provision governing real parties in interest, applies to tax appeals under OCGA § 48-5-311).

11
Peacock v. Peacockgreen
ga · 1943 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970
2 sentences

1970A common law marriage may be proved by circumstantial evi dence, including reputation in the community and the acts of the parties in holding themselves out as husband and wife, but, as stated in Peacock v. Peacock, 196 Ga. 441, 448 ( 26 SE2d 608 ) such facts do not establish the fact of marriage or a consensus but are "evidential of a previous agreement by which he and the plaintiff agreed to be husband and wife, or, as sometimes stated, the acts and conduct of the defendant would create only a presumption that they had entered into such an agreement by express words. . .

1970A common law marriage may be proved by circumstantial evi dence, including reputation in the community and the acts of the parties in holding themselves out as husband and wife, but, as stated in Peacock v. Peacock, 196 Ga. 441, 448 ( 26 SE2d 608 ) such facts do not establish the fact of marriage or a consensus but are "evidential of a previous agreement by which he and the plaintiff agreed to be husband and wife, or, as sometimes stated, the acts and conduct of the defendant would create only a presumption that they had entered into such an agreement by express words. . .

11
Watson v. Jonesgreen
scotus · 1872 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1950–1950
1 sentence

1950Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. 679, 723 (20 L. ed. 666). 4.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Bain v. Athens Foundry & Machine Worksgreen
ga · 1885 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1914–1914
1 sentence

1914D. 638 ), was held, in Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells , and again in Georgia Coal & Iron Co. v. Bradford, supra, to be mere obiter; and the case of Bain v. Athens Foundry and Machine Works, 75 Ga. 718 , was distinguished in Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells, supra, and was again declared not to be controlling, in Colley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 120 Ga. 258 ( 47 S. E. 932 ).

11

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc. green
gactapp · 1986
2 sentences

1991Center-West, 180 Ga. App. 674 ( 350 SE2d 259 )).

1991Center-West, 180 Ga. App. 674 ( 350 SE2d 259 )).

11991–1991
Fourth National Bank v. Grant neutral
gactapp · 1975
1 sentence

1976Bank v. Grant, 135 Ga. App. 798, 799 , supra. It is therefore abundantly clear that there was a conflicting claim to condemnation proceeds which were being held by the appellant as surrogate for the clerk of the superior court.

11976–1976
Addison v. Addison neutral
ga · 1938
2 sentences

1970A conflicting presumption is that "if, after the disability of the parties has been removed by lapse of time or otherwise, the cohabitation is continued, and the parties thereafter hold themselves out as man and wife, if the original illegal cohabitation was had in the absence of an attempted ceremonial marriage, a new and valid agreement of marriage will be presumed to have been entered upon, in the absence of anything appearing to the contrary.” Addison v. Addison, 186 Ga. 155 ( 197 SE 232 ).

1970A conflicting presumption is that "if, after the disability of the parties has been removed by lapse of time or otherwise, the cohabitation is continued, and the parties thereafter hold themselves out as man and wife, if the original illegal cohabitation was had in the absence of an attempted ceremonial marriage, a new and valid agreement of marriage will be presumed to have been entered upon, in the absence of anything appearing to the contrary.” Addison v. Addison, 186 Ga. 155 ( 197 SE 232 ).

11970–1970
New York Life Insurance v. Gamer green
scotus · 1938
1 sentence

1938Co. v. Gamer, supra, which was a suit to recover under the double-indemnity clause in a life-insurance contract, where the burden of proof to show accident was on the plaintiff, that “the evidence being sufficient to sustain a finding that the death was not due to. accident, there was no foundation of fact for the application of the presrimption; and the case stood for decision by the jury upon the evidence unaffected by the rule that from the fact of violent death, there being nothing to show the contrary, accidental death will be presumed.” It was held by the United States Circuit Court of A

11938–1938
Cooper v. Mullins green
ga · 1860
1 sentence

1914The conflicting doctrine laid down in Cooper v. Mullins, 30 Ga. 146 ( 76 Am.

11914–1914
Colley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co. green
ga · 1904
2 sentences

1914D. 638 ), was held, in Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells , and again in Georgia Coal & Iron Co. v. Bradford, supra, to be mere obiter; and the case of Bain v. Athens Foundry and Machine Works, 75 Ga. 718 , was distinguished in Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells, supra, and was again declared not to be controlling, in Colley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 120 Ga. 258 ( 47 S. E. 932 ).

1914D. 638 ), was held, in Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells , and again in Georgia Coal & Iron Co. v. Bradford, supra, to be mere obiter; and the case of Bain v. Athens Foundry and Machine Works, 75 Ga. 718 , was distinguished in Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells, supra, and was again declared not to be controlling, in Colley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 120 Ga. 258 ( 47 S. E. 932 ).

11914–1914

Where else courts name it

CA 38 (1870–2022) IL 24 (1895–2024) CT 12 (1948–2000) NY 11 (1861–2020) ND 9 (1998–2021) PA 9 (1956–2024) NJ 9 (1973–2026) OK 8 (1923–2025) KY 8 (1885–2025) MN 7 (1984–2016) GA 7 (1914–2014) TX 7 (1971–2025) CO 6 (1975–2014) KS 6 (1923–2026) NC 6 (1880–2026) WA 6 (1934–2025) OH 6 (1991–2020) AR 5 (1938–2018) DC 5 (1997–2016) NM 5 (1969–2025) IA 4 (1868–2016) MA 4 (1888–2013) MO 3 (1923–1958) ID 3 (1988–1992) AZ 3 (2009–2011) LA 3 (1973–1998) MI 3 (1959–2015) FL 2 (1977–2008) WV 2 (2012–2015) AK 2 (1983–1996) OR 2 (1929–1981) UT 2 (1989–1989) VT 2 (2007–2007) MD 2 (1905–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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