specifically defendant in Illinois

2021Specifically defendant sought to cite People v. Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192 , a case which was decided while defendant’s petition was pending, to argue that defendant’s plea was involuntary because it was based on the threat of a now-unconstitutional sentence; that is, the possibility of 60 years’ imprisonment without consideration of the attendant circumstances of defendant’s youth as required by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and our supreme court’s decisions in People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 and People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 . ¶

2021Specifically defendant sought to cite People v. Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192 , a case which was decided while defendant’s petition was pending, to argue that defendant’s plea was involuntary because it was based on the threat of a now-unconstitutional sentence; that is, the possibility of 60 years’ imprisonment without consideration of the attendant circumstances of defendant’s youth as required by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and our supreme court’s decisions in People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 and People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 . ¶

2008The State initially argues that the requirement of a corpus delicti is inconsistent with the constitutionally-based standard of review for sufficiency of evidence as articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-18 , 61 L.

2008The State initially argues that the requirement of a corpus delicti is inconsistent with the constitutionally-based standard of review for sufficiency of evidence as articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-18 , 61 L.

2007Specifically defendant contends that the Probate Act in existence at the time of Waughop provided: “ ‘All demands not exhibited within two years *** shall be forever barred, unless the creditors shall find other estate of the deceased not inventoried or accounted for by the executor or administrator, in which case their claims shall be paid pro rata out of such subsequently discovered estate.’ ” Waughop, 165 Ill. at 126-27 , quoting Rev.

1979App. 3d 91, 102 , 385 N.E.2d 804, 811 .) In the process of reaching this decision, the court accepted plaintiff’s contention that most “single buildings” are single-family homes.

1979In reversing the trial court and upholding the constitutionality of the rules in issue, the court specifically stated that rule 951(b)(2) “is based on rational distinctions and directly aids in achieving the goals of the Act, the reduction and elimination of water pollution.” ( 68 Ill.

1978Specifically defendant refers to the Supreme Court’s quotation of Braden v. United States, 270 F. 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1920), which states in part: “If twelve articles were all taken at the same time and place, we do not think it would be competent to charge the thief with twelve different larcenies.” ( 71 Ill. 2d 132, 135 .) From this dicta defendant contends that since both the taking of the money and the taking of the credit card and driver’s license occurred in a single incident, the defendant is subject to only one conviction for armed robbery.

1978Specifically defendant refers to the Supreme Court's quotation of Braden v. United States, 270 F. 441, 444 (8th Cir.1920), which states in part: *702 "If twelve articles were all taken at the same time and place, we do not think it would be competent to charge the thief with twelve different larcenies." ( 71 Ill.2d 132, 135 .) From this dicta defendant contends that since both the taking of the money and the taking of the credit card and driver's license occurred in a single incident, the defendant is subject to only one conviction for armed robbery.

1966The defendant’s contention is based primarily upon Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 , 100 L.