consequence presumption (Massachusetts) · Go Syfert
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consequence presumption in Massachusetts

7 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Baggs v. Hirschfieldgreen
mass · 1935 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1941–1960
2 sentences

1960See Baggs v. Hirschfield, supra, page 4; Kralik v. LeClair, supra, page 326; Deignan v. Lubarsky, supra, page 664; Friese v. Bos ton Consol.

1941A consequence of the violation of any statute imposing a criminal liability is that such violation is evidence of negligence of the violator “as to all consequences that the statute was intended to prevent.” Baggs v. Hirschfield, 293 Mass. 1, 3 .

12
Commonwealth v. Holmgrengreen
mass · 1995 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. at 228 , requiring that, if a sentence is suspended, the only sentence which can be imposed upon the revocation of probation is the one which was suspended.

11
Commonwealth v. Lucegreen
mass · 1987 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995Unlike Benoit in which the defendant lodged a forceful and specific objection to the admissibility of the highly prejudicial hearsay, the defendant in this case stated that he had no objection to the use of Furtado’s prior inconsistent statement, with the consequence that the claim is not now available to the defendant. 2 See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 387 Mass 191, 213 (1982) (A defendant “is not permitted to raise an issue before the trial court on a specific ground, and then to present that issue to this court on a different ground”); Commonwealth v. Luce, 399 Mass. 479, 482 (1987) (where there

11
Commonwealth v. Comtoisgreen
mass · 1987 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995Unlike Benoit in which the defendant lodged a forceful and specific objection to the admissibility of the highly prejudicial hearsay, the defendant in this case stated that he had no objection to the use of Furtado’s prior inconsistent statement, with the consequence that the claim is not now available to the defendant. 2 See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 387 Mass 191, 213 (1982) (A defendant “is not permitted to raise an issue before the trial court on a specific ground, and then to present that issue to this court on a different ground”); Commonwealth v. Luce, 399 Mass. 479, 482 (1987) (where there

11
Commonwealth v. Bohannongreen
mass · 1978 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
1 sentence

1979Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 93 (1978), and cases cited.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Commonwealth v. Dotson green
mass · 2012
2 sentences

2015“The consequence of this presumption is to ‘preserve, even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made criminal by [a] statute repealed in whole or in part.’ ” Bradley, supra, quoting Dotson, supra. The presumption of prospective application governs “unless [its] observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the lawmaking body or repugnant to the context of the same statute.” Galvin, supra, quoting G.

2013The consequence of this presumption is to “preserve, even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made criminal by the statute repealed in whole or in part.” Dotson, supra at 99-100 , quoting Nassar, supra. This presumption of prospective application, however, is not absolute because the preamble to G.

22013–2015
Commonwealth v. Galvin green
mass · 2013
1 sentence

2015“The consequence of this presumption is to ‘preserve, even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made criminal by [a] statute repealed in whole or in part.’ ” Bradley, supra, quoting Dotson, supra. The presumption of prospective application governs “unless [its] observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the lawmaking body or repugnant to the context of the same statute.” Galvin, supra, quoting G.

12015–2015
Commonwealth v. Bradley green
mass · 2013
1 sentence

2015“The consequence of this presumption is to ‘preserve, even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made criminal by [a] statute repealed in whole or in part.’ ” Bradley, supra, quoting Dotson, supra. The presumption of prospective application governs “unless [its] observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the lawmaking body or repugnant to the context of the same statute.” Galvin, supra, quoting G.

12015–2015
Nassar v. Commonwealth green
mass · 1961
1 sentence

2013The consequence of this presumption is to “preserve, even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made criminal by the statute repealed in whole or in part.” Dotson, supra at 99-100 , quoting Nassar, supra. This presumption of prospective application, however, is not absolute because the preamble to G.

12013–2013
Kralik v. LeClair green
mass · 1943
1 sentence

1960See Baggs v. Hirschfield, supra, page 4; Kralik v. LeClair, supra, page 326; Deignan v. Lubarsky, supra, page 664; Friese v. Bos ton Consol.

11960–1960
Deignan v. Lubarsky green
mass · 1945
1 sentence

1960See Baggs v. Hirschfield, supra, page 4; Kralik v. LeClair, supra, page 326; Deignan v. Lubarsky, supra, page 664; Friese v. Bos ton Consol.

11960–1960

Where else courts name it

CA 46 (1867–2023) PA 33 (1887–2024) NY 31 (1879–2023) TX 26 (1936–2024) IL 22 (1887–2026) FL 16 (1973–2014) OR 15 (1883–2023) IN 12 (1902–2021) NM 11 (1977–2022) OH 10 (1897–2007) MD 9 (1914–1994) MI 8 (1883–2025) NJ 8 (1975–2025) TN 8 (1998–2018) MA 7 (1941–2015) MN 7 (1959–2024) WI 6 (1971–2026) IA 6 (1871–2021) KY 6 (1916–1994) NC 6 (1900–2008) GA 6 (1877–1998) MO 6 (1970–2016) LA 6 (1931–2007) CT 5 (1961–2018) UT 5 (1987–2024) WY 5 (1962–2020) OK 4 (1982–1988) WA 4 (1980–2015) NE 3 (1977–2006) MS 3 (1848–2005) SD 3 (1992–2007) ID 3 (1955–2017) CO 3 (1988–2020) AR 3 (1907–1933) VT 2 (2017–2017) AL 2 (1847–1976) AZ 2 (1982–2010) MT 2 (1913–2010) DC 2 (1986–2015) NV 2 (2015–2015) RI 2 (1994–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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