Clause bar in Michigan

2022In People v Sardy (On Remand), 318 Mich App 558 ; 899 NW2d 107 (2017), this Court observed: In Crawford [v Washington, 541 US 36 , 59 n 9; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004)], the United States Supreme Court noted that when a declarant appears at trial for cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause does not place any restraints on the use of a prior testimonial statement, and that the Clause does not bar the admission of a prior testimony statement “so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” The language in this footnote has been construed “to mean that even a

2022In People v Sardy (On Remand), 318 Mich App 558 ; 899 NW2d 107 (2017), this Court observed: In Crawford [v Washington, 541 US 36 , 59 n 9; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004)], the United States Supreme Court noted that when a declarant appears at trial for cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause does not place any restraints on the use of a prior testimonial statement, and that the Clause does not bar the admission of a prior testimony statement “so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” The language in this footnote has been construed “to mean that even a

2022“The Confrontation Clause provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]’ ” Id. at 227 , quoting US Const, Am VI (alterations in original). “[W]hen a declarant appears at trial for cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause does not place any constraints on the use of a prior testimonial statement, and . . . the Clause does not bar the admission of a prior testimonial statement ‘so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.’ ” People v Sardy (On Remand), 318 Mich App 558 , 563; 8

2019While it is indisputable that a defendant has a right to confront witnesses, in accordance with MRE 611(a), a trial court has a commensurate obligation to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” [People v Willis, 322 Mich App 579, 591 ; 914 NW2d 384 (2018), quoting MRE 611(a) (quotation marks omitted).] It is generally accepted

2019While it is indisputable that a defendant has a right to confront witnesses, in accordance with MRE 611(a), a trial court has a commensurate obligation to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” [People v Willis, 322 Mich App 579, 591 ; 914 NW2d 384 (2018), quoting MRE 611(a) (quotation marks omitted).] It is generally accepted

2019While it is indisputable that a defendant has a right to confront witnesses, in accordance with MRE 611(a), a trial court has a commensurate obligation to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” [People v Willis, 322 Mich App 579, 591 ; 914 NW2d 384 (2018), quoting MRE 611(a) (quotation marks omitted).] It is generally accepted

2019While it is indisputable that a defendant has a right to confront witnesses, in accordance with MRE 611(a), a trial court has a commensurate obligation to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” [People v Willis, 322 Mich App 579, 591 ; 914 NW2d 384 (2018), quoting MRE 611(a) (quotation marks omitted).] It is generally accepted

2017State v Toohey, 816 NW2d 120, 128 (SD, 2012), citing State v Biggs, 333 SW3d 472, 477-478 (Mo, 2011); State v Holliday, 745 NW2d 556, 567-568 (Minn, 2008); State v Legere, 157 NH 746, 754-755; 958 A2d 969 (2008); State v Pierre, 277 Conn 42, 80-83; 890 A2d 474 (2006); State v Gorman, 854 A2d 1164, 1177 (Me, 2004).

2000Essentially, the district court must determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement establish its reliability sufficient enough to justify foregoing the rigors of in-court testimony (e.g., live testimony under oath, cross-examination) that ordinarily guarantee trustworthiness.” [Citations omitted.] [Welch, supra, pp 467-468 .] Recently, in Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116, 136 ; 119 S Ct 1887 ; 144 L Ed 2d 117 (1999), the Supreme Court stated: The residual “trustworthiness” test credits the axiom that a rigid application of the [Confrontation] Clause’s standard for a

2000Essentially, the district court must determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement establish its reliability sufficient enough to justify foregoing the rigors of in-court testimony (e.g., live testimony under oath, cross-examination) that ordinarily guarantee trustworthiness.” [Citations omitted.] [Welch, supra, pp 467-468 .] Recently, in Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116, 136 ; 119 S Ct 1887 ; 144 L Ed 2d 117 (1999), the Supreme Court stated: The residual “trustworthiness” test credits the axiom that a rigid application of the [Confrontation] Clause’s standard for a

2000Essentially, the district court must determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement establish its reliability sufficient enough to justify foregoing the rigors of in-court testimony (e.g., live testimony under oath, cross-examination) that ordinarily guarantee trustworthiness.” [Citations omitted.] [Welch, supra, pp 467-468 .] Recently, in Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116, 136 ; 119 S Ct 1887 ; 144 L Ed 2d 117 (1999), the Supreme Court stated: The residual “trustworthiness” test credits the axiom that a rigid application of the [Confrontation] Clause’s standard for a

1935They say the clause at bar is within the principle of County of Oakland v. Central West Casualty Co., 266 Mich. 438 (which involved a subrogation clause), becausé it amounts to “a refunding or canceling of a portion of the initial liability as a condition for the payment of the remainder.” There is an essential difference between a pro rata and subrogation clause.

1903“The general rule is well expressed by Earl, J., in Slocovich v. Insurance Company, 108 N. Y. 56 ( 14 N. E. 802 ): “ ‘Where there is an. insurance against a loss by fire, and it is proved or admitted that the property insured has been destroyed by fire, the loss is brought literally and exactly within the terms of the policy.

1903“The general rule is well expressed by Earl, J., in Slocovich v. Insurance Company, 108 N. Y. 56 ( 14 N. E. 802 ): “ ‘Where there is an. insurance against a loss by fire, and it is proved or admitted that the property insured has been destroyed by fire, the loss is brought literally and exactly within the terms of the policy.