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43 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1960–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” (alterations in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004))). 2021Moreover, to the extent that an out-of-court statement is offered for some evidentiary purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, even if the out-of-court statement falls within the definition of “testimonial” statement, it is not objectionable under the Confrontation Clause because “the one who bears ‘witness against’ the accused is not the out-of-court declarant but the one who testifies that the statement was made, and it satisfies the Confrontation Clause that the accused is able to confront and cross-examine him.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576-577 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n | 6 | 19 |
Texas State Employees Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Texas Workforce Commissiongreen2 sentences2015Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding that violation of Article I, section 19 does not give rise to an action for damages without addressing sovereign immunity); Tex. State Employees’ Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 16 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff’s claim was not subject to sovereign immunity doctrine because plaintiff sought only equitable relief as opposed to monetary damages). 2015Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding that violation of Article I, section 19 does not give rise to an action for damages without addressing sovereign immunity); Tex. State Employees’ Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 16 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff’s claim was not subject to sovereign immunity doctrine because plaintiff sought only equitable relief as opposed to monetary damages). | 4 | 4 |
Steele v. City of Houstongreen2 sentences2015Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1980) (takings clause of Texas Constitution expressly authorizes award of damages for violation; therefore, the clause provides a waiver of immunity for claims for damages); Tex. A. & M. 2015Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1980) (takings clause of Texas Constitution expressly authorizes award of damages for violation; therefore, the clause provides a waiver of immunity for claims for damages); Tex. A. & M. | 4 | 4 |
Tennessee v. Streetgreen2 sentences2021Moreover, to the extent that an out-of-court statement is offered for some evidentiary purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, even if the out-of-court statement falls within the definition of “testimonial” statement, it is not objectionable under the Confrontation Clause because “the one who bears ‘witness against’ the accused is not the out-of-court declarant but the one who testifies that the statement was made, and it satisfies the Confrontation Clause that the accused is able to confront and cross-examine him.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576-577 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n 2006See Tennessee v. Street , 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; see also California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970). | 3 | 3 |
Texas a & M University System v. Luxemburggreen2 sentences2015Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding that violation of Article I, section 19 does not give rise to an action for damages without addressing sovereign immunity); Tex. State Employees’ Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 16 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff’s claim was not subject to sovereign immunity doctrine because plaintiff sought only equitable relief as opposed to monetary damages). 2015Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding that violation of Article I, section 19 does not give rise to an action for damages without addressing sovereign immunity); Tex. State Employees’ Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 16 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff’s claim was not subject to sovereign immunity doctrine because plaintiff sought only equitable relief as opposed to monetary damages). | 3 | 3 |
California v. Greengreen2 sentences2011Crawford cites California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 , 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970) on the point, which opinion states, “none of our decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause requires excluding the out-of-court statements of a witness who is available and testifying at trial.” 399 U.S. at 161 . 2011Crawford cites California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 , 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970) on the point, which opinion states, “none of our decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause requires excluding the out-of-court statements of a witness who is available and testifying at trial.” 399 U.S. at 161 . | 2 | 6 |
Crawford v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004); Crawford v. State, 139 S.W.3d 462 , 464-65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (concluding that Confrontation Clause did not bar outcry witness’s testimony concerning out-of- court statement by child declarant because complainant testified at trial and therefore defendant had opportunity to cross-examine complainant); see also Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding, i 2015The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; see Crawford v. State, 139 S.W.3d 462 , 464–65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding that Crawford v. Washington was inapplicable because “appellant had the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the testifying complainant who was the declarant of the extrajudicial testimonial statement about which he complains”). | 1 | 2 |
Reyna v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Eustis v. Stategreen1 sentence2019The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004); Crawford v. State, 139 S.W.3d 462 , 464-65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (concluding that Confrontation Clause did not bar outcry witness’s testimony concerning out-of- court statement by child declarant because complainant testified at trial and therefore defendant had opportunity to cross-examine complainant); see also Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding, i | 1 | 1 |
Austin v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). 2015See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Howell v. Hilton Hotels Corp.green1 sentence2004Howell v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 84 S.W.3d 708, 715 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) The Validity of the “As Is” Clause In issue one, the Bynums argue that the “as is” clause, and the other like clauses in the Prudential rider or earnest money contract that purport to disclaim warranties cannot be used to bar their claims against Prudential and the McNamaras because the clauses (1) are inconspicuous boilerplate terms entered into by parties of greatly disproportionate sophistication; (2) are the product of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of information; (3) cannot be used | 1 | 1 |
Rich and Hahn v. Graybar Elec. Co.green1 sentence2004Howell v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 84 S.W.2d 708, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) The Validity of the “As Is” Clause In issue one, the Bynums argue that the “as is” clause, and the other like clauses in the Prudential rider or earnest money contract that purport to disclaim warranties cannot be used to bar their claims against Prudential and the McNamaras because the clauses (1) are inconspicuous boiler-plate terms entered into by parties of greatly disproportionate sophistication; (2) are the product of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of information; (3) cannot be u | 1 | 1 |
Giller Industries, Inc. v. Hartleygreen1 sentence1993Lodewijk relies on Giller Indus., Inc. v. Hartley, 644 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Gibbs v. General Motors Corporationgreen1 sentence1991Gibbs v. General Motors Corp. 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
in Re Whataburger Restaurants Llc
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett
green
1 sentence2023The “provided, however” clause states that it applies “when Operator and Non-operator have agreed upon the drilling of any well on the leased acreage.” (Emphasis added.) Matrix argues that the past tense used in the clause indicates that the exception applies only after the parties “have agreed.” Talisman directs us to Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005), and argues that the clause does not bar “early” expenditures but places upon Talisman the risk that it might bear all costs for early expenditures if other working interest owners do not later consent. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Langham v. State
green
1 sentence2021Moreover, to the extent that an out-of-court statement is offered for some evidentiary purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, even if the out-of-court statement falls within the definition of “testimonial” statement, it is not objectionable under the Confrontation Clause because “the one who bears ‘witness against’ the accused is not the out-of-court declarant but the one who testifies that the statement was made, and it satisfies the Confrontation Clause that the accused is able to confront and cross-examine him.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576-577 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wall v. State
green
1 sentence2020Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 , 743 n.48 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury
green
2 sentences2015Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Income Tax > Page 3 498 U.S. 358 , *; 111 S. Ct. 818 , **; 112 L. Ed. 2d 884 , ***; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 842 Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Franchise Tax > Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > General Overview Commerce Clause > General Overview Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Personal Property Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Sales Tax > General Tax > General Overview Overview [HN7] Business activity is broadly defined as a transfer [HN10] The Court will sustain a tax against Commerce of legal or equitable title to or rental of property, whether Claus 2015Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Income Tax > Page 3 498 U.S. 358 , *; 111 S. Ct. 818 , **; 112 L. Ed. 2d 884 , ***; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 842 Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Franchise Tax > Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > General Overview Commerce Clause > General Overview Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Personal Property Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Sales Tax > General Tax > General Overview Overview [HN7] Business activity is broadly defined as a transfer [HN10] The Court will sustain a tax against Commerce of legal or equitable title to or rental of property, whether Claus | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stringer v. State
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2001This test recognizes that rigid adherence to the Clause’s standard for admissibility “might in an exceptional case exclude a statement of an unavailable witness that is incontestably probative, competent, and rehable, yet nevertheless outside of any firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Id., 527 U.S. at 136 , 119 S.Ct at 1900 . 2001This test recognizes that rigid adherence to the Clause’s standard for admissibility “might in an exceptional case exclude a statement of an unavailable witness that is incontestably probative, competent, and rehable, yet nevertheless outside of any firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Id., 527 U.S. at 136 , 119 S.Ct at 1900 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Green International, Inc. v. Solis
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Ball
green
1 sentence1995United States v. Ball, supra . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United States v. Tateo
green
2 sentences1995United States v. Ball, supra. The justification for this rule was explained in United States v. Toteo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 , 12 L.Ed.2d 448 , 84 S.Ct. 1587 [1589] (1964), as follows: While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to ex *255 plain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice. 1995United States v. Ball, supra. The justification for this rule was explained in United States v. Toteo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 , 12 L.Ed.2d 448 , 84 S.Ct. 1587 [1589] (1964), as follows: While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to ex *255 plain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Supreme Court of NH v. Piper
green
1 sentence1985Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states." The clause requires analysis of whether a particular activity is a "privilege" under the clause, whether there is a substantial reason for discriminatory treatment of nonresidents, and whether the degree or method of discrimination bears a close relationship to its reason. 105 S.Ct. at 1278 -79 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
green
1 sentence1984Art. 5069-7.07(4) provides that no retail installment contract shall: (4) Provide for a waiver of the buyer’s rights of action against the seller or holder or other person acting therefor for any illegal act committed in the collection of payments under the contract or agreement or in the repossession of a motor vehicle[.] On May 6, 1981, the Texas Supreme Court in Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.1981) ruled on conflicting holdings by the Courts of Appeals on whether the clause was a violation of the Texas Consumer Credit Code. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer
green
2 sentences1964"We answer the first certified question as follows: The clause of exception and reservation contained in the deed excepts and reserves as a matter of law a fee simple title in the grantors in and to an undivided one-half interest in all oil and gas in and under the land conveyed by the deed, and such provision is not so ambiguous, or so lacking in definiteness, that its meaning requires proof or explanation." 136 S.W.2d p. 805, 127 A.L.R. 1217 . 1964“We answer the first certified question as follows: The clause of exception and reservation contained in the deed excepts and reserves as a matter of law a fee simple title in the grantors in and to an undivided one-half interest in all oil and gas in and under the land conveyed by the deed, and such provision is not so ambiguous, or so lacking in definiteness, that its meaning requires proof or explanation.” 136 S.W.2d p. 805, 127 A.L.R. 1217 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Jordan v. Crudgington
green
2 sentences1960In view of this clause the rule of construction employed by this Court in Jordan v. Crudgington, 149 Texas 237 , 231 S.W. 2d 641 , will be applied here. 1960In view of this clause the rule of construction employed by this Court in Jordan v. Crudgington, 149 Texas 237 , 231 S.W. 2d 641 , will be applied here. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.