statute of frauds defense in Minnesota

2016See Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141, 146-47 , 23 N.W.2d 362, 366 (1946) (noting that partial performance in reliance on an oral contract may take a contract out of the statute of frauds).

2016See Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141, 146-47 , 23 N.W.2d 362, 366 (1946) (noting that partial performance in reliance on an oral contract may take a contract out of the statute of frauds).

2015See Burke v. Fine, 236 Minn. 52 , 55- 56, 51 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1952) (describing these alternative bases for removing an agreement from the statute of frauds); Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 376 , 29 N.W. 135, 137 (1886) (noting that principles of equitable estoppel preclude a party from asserting a statute-of-frauds defense if the party against whom the defense will be asserted detrimentally relied on an agreement by performing enough of the agreement to cause “an unjust and unconscientious injury and loss” if the agreement is disregarded).

2015See Burke v. Fine, 236 Minn. 52 , 55- 56, 51 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1952) (describing these alternative bases for removing an agreement from the statute of frauds); Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 376 , 29 N.W. 135, 137 (1886) (noting that principles of equitable estoppel preclude a party from asserting a statute-of-frauds defense if the party against whom the defense will be asserted detrimentally relied on an agreement by performing enough of the agreement to cause “an unjust and unconscientious injury and loss” if the agreement is disregarded).

2015See Burke v. Fine, 236 Minn. 52 , 55- 56, 51 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1952) (describing these alternative bases for removing an agreement from the statute of frauds); Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 376 , 29 N.W. 135, 137 (1886) (noting that principles of equitable estoppel preclude a party from asserting a statute-of-frauds defense if the party against whom the defense will be asserted detrimentally relied on an agreement by performing enough of the agreement to cause “an unjust and unconscientious injury and loss” if the agreement is disregarded).

2015Thus, because the agreement does not express consideration and does include an integration clause stating that it “contain[s] the entire understanding between *257 and among the parties,” it cannot be enforced, and, as the district court concluded, JAB’s action for breach cannot be maintained. 2 One reason for the statute-of-frauds requirement that consideration be in writing is to “guard[] against leaving the proof of a contract which is to run beyond a year dependent on the memory and truthfulness of witnesses and the parties.” Beach v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Minn.App.1988) (quotatio

2015JAB relies on Beach for the proposition that “[a] court will not blindly apply technicalities if they lead to a conclusion repugnant to common sense.” Id. at 714 .

2014See Gibson Cnty., 643 N.E.2d at 319-20 (stating that most courts hold that whether a financing statement may serve as a security agreement is treated as a question of law, and that even where it is treated as a mixed question of law and fact, the statute-of-frauds inquiry is treated as a question of law).

2014See Gibson Cnty., 643 N.E.2d at 319-20 (stating that most courts hold that whether a financing statement may serve as a security agreement is treated as a question of law, and that even where it is treated as a mixed question of law and fact, the statute-of-frauds inquiry is treated as a question of law).