18 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1835–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spring Hill Developers, Inc. v. Arthurgreen2 sentences2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-3016 | July 24, 2025 Page 13 of 20 A party seeking to defeat a defendant’s Statute of Frauds defense based upon promissory estoppel must establish the following elements: “1) a promise by the promissor; 2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely thereon; 3) which induces reasonable reliance by the promisee; 4) of a definite and substantial nature; and 5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Spring Hill Developers, Inc. v. Arthur, 879 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing First Nat. 2010A party seeking to defeat a defendant's Statute of Frauds defense based upon promissory estoppel must establish the following elements: "1) a promise by the promissor; 2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely thereon; 3) which induces reasonable reliance by the promisee; 4) of a definite and substantial nature; and 5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Spring Hill Developers, Inc. v. Arthur, 879 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (citing First Nat. | 3 | 3 |
Schuler v. Grafgreen2 sentences2017See id. 1097-1105 (concluding that the trial court properly applied the Statute of Frauds to bar Spring Hill and Brinkworth’s complaint, rejecting the arguments that the equitable doctrines of promissory estoppel and part performance were applicable, and affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Arthurs). [31] We also observe that, to the extent Scales asserts that his designated evidence conflicts with Levels’s designated evidence as to whether a verbal agreement existed and that the trial court should have granted his motion to order third party discovery because 2016See Schuler, 862 N.E.2d at 714 (holding that the parties’ agreement furnished the means of identification of the property; that, once so identified, the trial court could admit parol evidence to complete the legal description of the property; that there was testimony the parties walked the property and agreed on the boundaries; and that the parties’ description was sufficiently definite to meet the statute’s requirements); Blake, 180 Ind. App. at 181 , 387 N.E.2d at 1340 (stating “it is not necessary that the contract by itself be sufficient to identify the land, but only that it furnishes the | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Krause (In Re Krause)green2 sentences1994See, e.g., In re Krause, 114 B.R. 582, 593-94 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1988) 10 ("Whether ... the agreement satisfies the threshold statute of frauds requirement ... is a question of law for the court. 1994See, e.g., In re Krause, 114 B.R. 582, 593-94 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 1988) [10] ("Whether ... the agreement satisfies the threshold statute of frauds requirement ... is a question of law for the court. | 2 | 2 |
Kreiger v. Hartiggreen2 sentences1994The factual issue of whether there was a meeting of the minds as to whether there was an underlying contractual intent to create a security agreement is a question of fact."); In re Ace Lumber Supply, Inc., 105 B.R. 964, 968-69 (quoting from White & Summers); Kreiger v. Hartig, 11 Wash.App. 898 , 527 P.2d 483, 486 (1974) ("Whether a writing is or is not a security agreement is a question of fact. 1994The factual issue of whether there was a meeting of the minds as to whether there was an underlying contractual intent to create a security agreement is a question of fact."); In re Ace Lumber Supply, Inc., 105 B.R. 964, 968-69 (quoting from White & Summers); Kreiger v. Hartig, 11 Wash.App. 898 , 527 P.2d 483, 486 (1974) ("Whether a writing is or is not a security agreement is a question of fact. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Ace Lumber Supply, Inc.green2 sentences1994The factual issue of whether there was a meeting of the minds as to whether there was an underlying contractual intent to create a security agreement is a question of fact."); In re Ace Lumber Supply, Inc., 105 B.R. 964, 968-69 (quoting from White & Summers); Kreiger v. Hartig, 11 Wash.App. 898 , 527 P.2d 483, 486 (1974) ("Whether a writing is or is not a security agreement is a question of fact. 1994The factual issue of whether there was a meeting of the minds as to whether there was an underlying contractual intent to create a security agreement is a question of fact."); In re Ace Lumber Supply, Inc., 105 B.R. 964, 968-69 (quoting from White & Summers); Kreiger v. Hartig, 11 Wash. App. 898 , 527 P.2d 483, 486 (1974) ("Whether a writing is or is not a security agreement is a question of fact. | 2 | 2 |
Fox Development, Inc. v. Englandgreen1 sentence2017See id. 1097-1105 (concluding that the trial court properly applied the Statute of Frauds to bar Spring Hill and Brinkworth’s complaint, rejecting the arguments that the equitable doctrines of promissory estoppel and part performance were applicable, and affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Arthurs). [31] We also observe that, to the extent Scales asserts that his designated evidence conflicts with Levels’s designated evidence as to whether a verbal agreement existed and that the trial court should have granted his motion to order third party discovery because | 1 | 1 |
Larry J. Jernas and R & R Horse Haven, Inc. v. Kevin J. Gumzgreen1 sentence2017See id. 1097-1105 (concluding that the trial court properly applied the Statute of Frauds to bar Spring Hill and Brinkworth’s complaint, rejecting the arguments that the equitable doctrines of promissory estoppel and part performance were applicable, and affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Arthurs). [31] We also observe that, to the extent Scales asserts that his designated evidence conflicts with Levels’s designated evidence as to whether a verbal agreement existed and that the trial court should have granted his motion to order third party discovery because | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2017See id. 1097-1105 (concluding that the trial court properly applied the Statute of Frauds to bar Spring Hill and Brinkworth’s complaint, rejecting the arguments that the equitable doctrines of promissory estoppel and part performance were applicable, and affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Arthurs). [31] We also observe that, to the extent Scales asserts that his designated evidence conflicts with Levels’s designated evidence as to whether a verbal agreement existed and that the trial court should have granted his motion to order third party discovery because | 1 | 1 |
Blake v. Hosfordgreen2 sentences2016See Schuler, 862 N.E.2d at 714 (holding that the parties’ agreement furnished the means of identification of the property; that, once so identified, the trial court could admit parol evidence to complete the legal description of the property; that there was testimony the parties walked the property and agreed on the boundaries; and that the parties’ description was sufficiently definite to meet the statute’s requirements); Blake, 180 Ind. App. at 181 , 387 N.E.2d at 1340 (stating “it is not necessary that the contract by itself be sufficient to identify the land, but only that it furnishes the 2016See Schuler, 862 N.E.2d at 714 (holding that the parties’ agreement furnished the means of identification of the property; that, once so identified, the trial court could admit parol evidence to complete the legal description of the property; that there was testimony the parties walked the property and agreed on the boundaries; and that the parties’ description was sufficiently definite to meet the statute’s requirements); Blake, 180 Ind. App. at 181 , 387 N.E.2d at 1340 (stating “it is not necessary that the contract by itself be sufficient to identify the land, but only that it furnishes the | 1 | 1 |
Cloud Corporation v. Hasbro, Inc.green1 sentence2012Cir. 2005) (holding that emails, like telegrams, may be sufficient to satisfy writing requirement of the statute of frauds); Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 295-96 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that emails from the defendant’s agent to the plaintiff, in combination with an additional document, satisfied the statute of frauds requirement of written contract). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hrezo v. City of Lawrenceburg
green
2 sentences2020Hrezo v. City of Lawrenceburg, 934 N.E.2d at 1231 . [24] We have previously stated that the fifth element creates a high hurdle for the party seeking to establish promissory estoppel. 2017Id. at 1231 (citing Spring Hill Developers, Inc. v. Arthur, 879 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted)). [21] We have observed that the fifth element creates a high bar for the party seeking to establish promissory estoppel. | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Lawshe v. Glen Park Lbr. Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2016“It is axiomatic that such a defense cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Id. [19] Here, Son does not direct us to any portion of the record showing that he argued to the trial court that the Purchase Agreement was unenforceable because it violated the Statute of Frauds. 5 In fact, he sought to introduce the 5 Son notes that Husband raised the Statute of Frauds defense in his motion to correct error, but that does not preserve the issue for Son. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Keliher v. Cure
green
1 sentence2012The Buyers’ reliance on Keliher v. Cure, 534 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), is misplaced. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Uebelhack Equipment, Inc. v. Garrett Bros.
green
1 sentence2001Uebelhack, 408 N.E.2d at 140 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Pioneer Lumber & Supply Co. v. First-Merchants National Bank
green
2 sentences1981Pioneer Lmbr. & Supply v. First-Merchants Nat’l Bk. (1976), 169 Ind. App. 406 , 349 N.E.2d 219 . 1981Pioneer Lmbr. & Supply v. First-Merchants Nat’l Bk. (1976), 169 Ind. App. 406 , 349 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Brewster v. . Wooster
green
1 sentence1976Cannon v. *413 Castleman (1905), 164 Ind. 343 , 73 N.E. 689 ; Jackson v. Stanfield (1894), 137 Ind. 592 , 36 N.E. 345 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Jackson v. Stanfield
green
1 sentence1976Cannon v. *413 Castleman (1905), 164 Ind. 343 , 73 N.E. 689 ; Jackson v. Stanfield (1894), 137 Ind. 592 , 36 N.E. 345 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Cannon v. Castleman
neutral
2 sentences1976Cannon v. *413 Castleman (1905), 164 Ind. 343 , 73 N.E. 689 ; Jackson v. Stanfield (1894), 137 Ind. 592 , 36 N.E. 345 . 1976Cannon v. *413 Castleman (1905), 164 Ind. 343 , 73 N.E. 689 ; Jackson v. Stanfield (1894), 137 Ind. 592 , 36 N.E. 345 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Cline v. Rodabaugh
neutral
2 sentences1955(Our emphasis.) While it is true that the case of Johnston v. Clancy, supra, would not alter the rule that the question of the allowance of interest under the circumstances shown by the record in this case is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, Cline v. Rodabaugh (1933), 97 Ind. App. 258 , 179 N. E. 6 ; Maris v. Masters (1903), 31 Ind. App. 235 , 67 N. E. 699 , it would appear that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow interest to the appellants, and whether the amount allowed consisted of principal or interest, it is subject to review by this 1955(Our emphasis.) While it is true that the case of Johnston v. Clancy, supra, would not alter the rule that the question of the allowance of interest under the circumstances shown by the record in this case is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, Cline v. Rodabaugh (1933), 97 Ind. App. 258 , 179 N. E. 6 ; Maris v. Masters (1903), 31 Ind. App. 235 , 67 N. E. 699 , it would appear that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow interest to the appellants, and whether the amount allowed consisted of principal or interest, it is subject to review by this | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Johnston v. Glancy
neutral
1 sentence1955In Johnston v. Glancy and Others (1835), 4 Blackf. 94 , the Supreme Court held that “When the specific execution of a parol contract cannot be decreed, by reason *595 of the vendor’s pleading the statute of frauds in bar of such decree, it is the duty of the Court to decree compensation to the complainant, to the amount of the purchase-money by him paid and interest thereon . . . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Maris v. Masters
green
1 sentence1955(Our emphasis.) While it is true that the case of Johnston v. Clancy, supra, would not alter the rule that the question of the allowance of interest under the circumstances shown by the record in this case is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, Cline v. Rodabaugh (1933), 97 Ind. App. 258 , 179 N. E. 6 ; Maris v. Masters (1903), 31 Ind. App. 235 , 67 N. E. 699 , it would appear that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow interest to the appellants, and whether the amount allowed consisted of principal or interest, it is subject to review by this | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Harrold v. Fuenfstueck
neutral
1 sentence1955(Our emphasis.) While it is true that the case of Johnston v. Clancy, supra, would not alter the rule that the question of the allowance of interest under the circumstances shown by the record in this case is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, Cline v. Rodabaugh (1933), 97 Ind. App. 258 , 179 N. E. 6 ; Maris v. Masters (1903), 31 Ind. App. 235 , 67 N. E. 699 , it would appear that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow interest to the appellants, and whether the amount allowed consisted of principal or interest, it is subject to review by this | 1 | 1955–1955 |
O'Brien v. Knotts
neutral
2 sentences1947O’Brien v. Knotts (1905), 165 Ind. 308 , 75 N. E. 594 ; Bastin v. Crawford (1914), 180 Ind. 697 , 103 N. E. 792 . *154 *153 The second paragraph of complaint is for the most part in the same language as the first with an added *154 rhetorical paragraph stating that the appellant executed and delivered .to the appellees a written memorandum of the agreement and'making the memorandum an exhibit. 1947O’Brien v. Knotts (1905), 165 Ind. 308 , 75 N. E. 594 ; Bastin v. Crawford (1914), 180 Ind. 697 , 103 N. E. 792 . *154 *153 The second paragraph of complaint is for the most part in the same language as the first with an added *154 rhetorical paragraph stating that the appellant executed and delivered .to the appellees a written memorandum of the agreement and'making the memorandum an exhibit. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Bastian v. Crawford
neutral
2 sentences1947O’Brien v. Knotts (1905), 165 Ind. 308 , 75 N. E. 594 ; Bastin v. Crawford (1914), 180 Ind. 697 , 103 N. E. 792 . *154 *153 The second paragraph of complaint is for the most part in the same language as the first with an added *154 rhetorical paragraph stating that the appellant executed and delivered .to the appellees a written memorandum of the agreement and'making the memorandum an exhibit. 1947O’Brien v. Knotts (1905), 165 Ind. 308 , 75 N. E. 594 ; Bastin v. Crawford (1914), 180 Ind. 697 , 103 N. E. 792 . *154 *153 The second paragraph of complaint is for the most part in the same language as the first with an added *154 rhetorical paragraph stating that the appellant executed and delivered .to the appellees a written memorandum of the agreement and'making the memorandum an exhibit. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Damschroeder v. Thias
neutral
1 sentence1890The court, in that case, after stating the facts, say: “ This being so, I am of opinion that ‘ it is not honest to keep the land.’ If so, this is a case in which, in my opinion, the statute of frauds does not apply.” In Damschroeder v. Thias, 51 Mo. 100 , it is held that where one acquires title to land by fraud, and by fraud induces the owner to convey to him or acknowledge his title, a court of equity will declare him a trustee for the owner, and thlt he can not, in such case, invoke the statute of frauds and claim that agreements by which the title was obtained were verbal, and, therefore, | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Arnold v. Cord
green
1 sentence1881In the case of Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177 , it was held that “ ‘ A person agreeing verbally to bid in land for another at sheriff’s sale, shall be bound and decreed to hold in trust, though he took the title in his own name, and plead the statute of frauds in bar.’ Denton v. McKenzie, 1 Desaussure, 289.” “‘Where A. agrees with B. to purchase property at sheriff’s sale for B., and he purchases the property, but takes an absolute conveyance to himself and refuses to convey to B., the latter, not being privy to the conveyance, is not bound by it and may prove the trust by parol.’ Strong v. Glasg | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Taylor v. Conner
green
1 sentence1861The following propositions, supported by authority, meet and settle the case: “ A person agreeing verbally to bid in land for another at sheriff’s sale, shall be bound and decreed to hold in trust, though he took the title in his own name, and plead the Statute of Frauds in bar.” Denton v. McKenzie, 1 Desaussure, 289. “ The purchaser of real estate under a void judicial sale must, in a proceeding to recover back the purchase money with interest, account for rents and profits received by him while in possession of the premises.” Taylor v. Conner, 7 Ind. 115 . | 1 | 1861–1861 |
Kelly's heirs v. Bradford
neutral
1 sentence1835R. 273.—King v. Bardeau, 6 id. 38.—Kelly v. Bradford, 3 Bibb, 317.—Phillips v. Thompson, 1 Johns. | 1 | 1835–1835 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.