statute of frauds defense in Missouri

2021However, “Missouri law is clear that the statute of frauds defense is inapplicable if the agreement was capable of being performed within one year.” Bailey v. Hawthorn Bank, 382 S.W.3d 84, 98 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting Adams v. One Park Place Investors, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted).

2012The Bank’s argument is that statute of frauds, Section 432.010, barred Bailey’s claim because, inter alia, the “Loan Summary, which clearly contemplated a five year term, could not be completed in one year and was thus subject to the writing and signature requirement of Section 432.010.” But Missouri law is clear that the statute of frauds defense is inapplicable if the agreement was “capable of being performed within one year.” Adams v. One Park Place Investors, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Mo.App.

2013Norden v. Friedman, 756 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo. banc 1988).

1998Norden v. Friedman 756 S.W.2d 158,162 (Mo.banc 1988).

2021However, “Missouri law is clear that the statute of frauds defense is inapplicable if the agreement was capable of being performed within one year.” Bailey v. Hawthorn Bank, 382 S.W.3d 84, 98 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting Adams v. One Park Place Investors, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted).

2016Crest Construction claims before this Court, as it did before the trial court, that the alleged contract came within a statute of frauds exception because the oral contracts were partially performed.' While the trial court did not address this basis for Crest Construction’s statüte of frauds argument, because our review is de novo, we may affirm “on any ground supported by the summary judgment record, even if different than the one posited by the trial court.” Dilley v. Valentine, 401 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Mo.App.

2012See Piazza v. Combs, 226 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Mo.App.

2009Downey v. McKee, 218 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Mo.App. *716 W.D.2007).

1995“Because [Nissan] failed to present a Statute of Frauds defense to the trial court, [it] is precluded from now asserting this theory on appeal.” Meremonte v. Jedwski, 767 S.W.2d 124, 126 [3] (Mo.App.1989).

1989In Shaffer v. Hines, 573 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Mo. App.1978), this court held that a defendant did not waive the Statute of Frauds defense even though it was not interposed until the start of trial.

1989In Shaffer v. Hines, 573 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Mo. App.1978), this court held that a defendant did not waive the Statute of Frauds defense even though it was not interposed until the start of trial.

1989Wise v. Sands, 739 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Mo.App.1987).

1985Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo.App. 18, 23 (1892).

1984The type of statements made by Richard Knies and Alden Siegel during questioning are not unlike the questions and answers reported in Cargill Inc., Commodity Marketing Div. v. Hale, supra at 669.

1977The court in Salzman Sign Co., Inc. v. Beck, 10 N.Y.2d 63 , 217 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 , 176 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1961), cites the following as the policy behind its holding: “In modern times most commercial business is done between corporations, everyone in business knows that an individual stockholder or officer is not liable for his corporation’s engagements unless he signs individually, and where individual responsibility is demanded the nearly universal practice is that the officer signs twice — once as an officer and again as an individual.

1977The court in Salzman Sign Co., Inc. v. Beck, 10 N.Y.2d 63 , 217 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 , 176 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1961), cites the following as the policy behind its holding: “In modern times most commercial business is done between corporations, everyone in business knows that an individual stockholder or officer is not liable for his corporation’s engagements unless he signs individually, and where individual responsibility is demanded the nearly universal practice is that the officer signs twice — once as an officer and again as an individual.