10 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ashby v. Ashbygreen2 sentences2022See Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App 254, ¶ 11 , 191 P.3d 35 , aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , 227 P.3d 246 ; see also Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , ¶ 7 n.4 (noting that our analysis on this “was correct”). 2022See Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App 254, ¶ 11 , 191 P.3d 35 , aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , 227 P.3d 246 ; see also Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , ¶ 7 n.4 (noting that our analysis on this “was correct”). | 2 | 2 |
Ashby v. Ashbygreen2 sentences2022See Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App 254, ¶ 11 , 191 P.3d 35 , aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , 227 P.3d 246 ; see also Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , ¶ 7 n.4 (noting that our analysis on this “was correct”). 2022See Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App 254, ¶ 11 , 191 P.3d 35 , aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , 227 P.3d 246 ; see also Ashby, 2010 UT 7 , ¶ 7 n.4 (noting that our analysis on this “was correct”). | 2 | 2 |
Terry v. Bacongreen2 sentences2022See Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App 432, ¶ 15 , 269 P.3d 188 (holding that clients waived the attorney-client privilege by claiming “that they did not authorize former counsel to enter into the settlement agreement”). ¶54 As discussed above, the Trust’s statute of frauds defense was premised on its assertion that it had never authorized its prior counsel in writing to agree to the Management Provision. 2022See Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App 432, ¶ 15 , 269 P.3d 188 (holding that clients waived the attorney-client privilege by claiming “that they did not authorize former counsel to enter into the settlement agreement”). ¶54 As discussed above, the Trust’s statute of frauds defense was premised on its assertion that it had never authorized its prior counsel in writing to agree to the Management Provision. | 1 | 1 |
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.green1 sentence2019But the rule does not justify the trial court’s decision insofar as it was based on grounds and theories that were neither tried nor raised, see Combe v. Warren’s Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984) (“Although Rule 54(c)[] permits relief on grounds not pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried.”), and which ignored the statute of frauds defense. | 1 | 1 |
MacRis v. Sculptured Software, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc. , 2001 UT 43 , ¶ 21, 24 P.3d 984 (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal's lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, since the agent was aware of the relevant facts earlier); Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. , 99 Utah 214 , 104 P.2d 619 , 622-24 (1940) (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal would not be allowed to assert a statute of frauds defense). 2018See Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc. , 2001 UT 43 , ¶ 21, 24 P.3d 984 (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal's lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, since the agent was aware of the relevant facts earlier); Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. , 99 Utah 214 , 104 P.2d 619 , 622-24 (1940) (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal would not be allowed to assert a statute of frauds defense). | 1 | 1 |
City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouthgreen1 sentence2012P. 12(h) ("A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply. ..."); City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) (declining to consider a Statute of Frauds defense when the party failed to raise it at trial). «[ 54 The Hales did not raise the Statute of Frauds until their objection to Big H's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and their motion for new trial-well after having answered Big H's counterclaims without pleading the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense, and more than five years into the cas | 1 | 1 |
Bentley v. Pottergreen1 sentence2009However, "Itlhe statute of frauds is a defense that can be waived by a failure to plead it as an affirmative defense, admitting its existence in the pleadings[,] or admitting at trial the existence and all essential terms of the contract." Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted). {19 LD III has waived the statute of frauds defense because it admitted in multiple instances that a settlement agreement had been reached with Defendants. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parks v. Zions First National Bank
green
2 sentences2009"In this situation, [section] 44 provides that the intended trust may be imposed, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds violation, under the guise of a constructive trust, upon the condition that the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relationship to the transferor." Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). 2009"In this situation, [section] 44 provides that the intended trust may be imposed, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds violation, under the guise of a constructive trust, upon the condition that the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relationship to the transferor." Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Small v. Small
green
1 sentence2024He further argued the court should not apply the statute of frauds for the following reasons: (1) Trisha waived the statute of frauds defense because she did not raise it in a responsive pleading to his counterclaim, 20230487-CA 3 2024 UT App 173 Small v. Small (2) Trisha acknowledged the existence of an agreement, and (3) the appraisal was partial performance of the agreement. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Fritsche v. Deer Valley Ridge
green
2 sentences2022As noted, the crux of the Trust’s claim is that its prior counsel was not authorized in writing to agree that the Trust could no longer (continued…) 20200411-CA 13 2022 UT App 11 Fritsche v. Deer Valley Ridge ¶43 In the Trust’s opposition to the motion to enforce—which is where the Trust first raised the statute of frauds defense—the Trust alleged that Trust Counsel “was never given written authority to enter into” the Management Provision. 2022New Counsel also argued that Trust Counsel did not act “in good faith” and “was actually self- dealing” because settling the matter would have allowed Trust Counsel to avoid a ruling on the rule 11 motion. 20200411-CA 5 2022 UT App 11 Fritsche v. Deer Valley Ridge ¶17 When arguments concluded, the district court ruled “that the emails between the parties in this case do constitute a binding settlement agreement between the parties.” The court further held that it was “of no legal consequence” that the parties failed to sign the Draft Agreement because “[i]f a written agreement is intended to m | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co.
green
1 sentence2022And the burden of production is a “‘party’s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling.’” Id. (quoting Burden of Production, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). ¶42 In light of this, we have previously recognized that a party who raises a statute of frauds defense bears the burden of proof on that defense. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Doe v. Maret
green
2 sentences2022A party waives the attorney- client privilege “by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case.” Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, ¶ 9 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91 , ¶¶ 20–21, 173 P.3d 848 . 2022A party waives the attorney- client privilege “by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case.” Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, ¶ 9 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91 , ¶¶ 20–21, 173 P.3d 848 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Munson v. Chamberlain
green
2 sentences2022A party waives the attorney- client privilege “by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case.” Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, ¶ 9 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91 , ¶¶ 20–21, 173 P.3d 848 . 2022A party waives the attorney- client privilege “by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case.” Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, ¶ 9 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91 , ¶¶ 20–21, 173 P.3d 848 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Coleman v. Stuart
green
1 sentence2019And while Coleman asserts that “concepts of partners and equity are intertwined throughout the pleadings, pre-trial motions, testimony and (continued…) 20180182-CA 13 2019 UT App 165 Coleman v. Stuart II. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018See Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc. , 2001 UT 43 , ¶ 21, 24 P.3d 984 (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal's lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, since the agent was aware of the relevant facts earlier); Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. , 99 Utah 214 , 104 P.2d 619 , 622-24 (1940) (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal would not be allowed to assert a statute of frauds defense). 2018See Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc. , 2001 UT 43 , ¶ 21, 24 P.3d 984 (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal's lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, since the agent was aware of the relevant facts earlier); Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. , 99 Utah 214 , 104 P.2d 619 , 622-24 (1940) (imputing knowledge from agent to principal to determine that the principal would not be allowed to assert a statute of frauds defense). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bangerter v. Poulton
green
1 sentence1983Bangerter v. Poulton, Utah, 663 P.2d 100 (1983) and cases there cited. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.