statute of frauds defense in Michigan

2025In Jim-Bob, we held that “[a] factual question existed as to whether [the] defendants were estopped from raising the statute of frauds defense against [the] plaintiff because [the] plaintiff’s reliance on [a defendant’s] oral agreement to enter into a new lease was reasonable and justified.” Jim-Bob, 178 Mich App at 88 .

2025In Jim-Bob, we held that “[a] factual question existed as to whether [the] defendants were estopped from raising the statute of frauds defense against [the] plaintiff because [the] plaintiff’s reliance on [a defendant’s] oral agreement to enter into a new lease was reasonable and justified.” Jim-Bob, 178 Mich App at 88 .

2018Rather, this is a case in which the trial court found that the elements of promissory estoppel were satisfied, i.e. that a preponderance of the evidence existed that there was (1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, (3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature, and (4) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. -4- [Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173 ; 568 NW2d 365 (1997).] Defendants make no argu

2018Rather, this is a case in which the trial court found that the elements of promissory estoppel were satisfied, i.e. that a preponderance of the evidence existed that there was (1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, (3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature, and (4) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. -4- [Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173 ; 568 NW2d 365 (1997).] Defendants make no argu

2018Rather, this is a case in which the trial court found that the elements of promissory estoppel were satisfied, i.e. that a preponderance of the evidence existed that there was (1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, (3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature, and (4) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. -4- [Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173 ; 568 NW2d 365 (1997).] Defendants make no argu

2018Rather, this is a case in which the trial court found that the elements of promissory estoppel were satisfied, i.e. that a preponderance of the evidence existed that there was (1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, (3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature, and (4) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. -4- [Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173 ; 568 NW2d 365 (1997).] Defendants make no argu

2015Id.

2003“Estoppel questions should be *617 presented to the jury where factual issues exist regarding whether a party is estopped from raising the statute of frauds defense against a party who reasonably and justifiably relied on an oral agreement.” Id. at 527 . 1.

2002In Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 140-141 ; 602 NW2d 390 (1999), this Court, noting the general principles regarding the doctrine of equitable estoppel, stated: Equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action, but instead a doctrine that may assist a party by precluding the opposing party from asserting or denying the existence of a particular fact.

2002In Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 140-141 ; 602 NW2d 390 (1999), this Court, noting the general principles regarding the doctrine of equitable estoppel, stated: Equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action, but instead a doctrine that may assist a party by precluding the opposing party from asserting or denying the existence of a particular fact.

1991Adams-Riker, Inc v Nightingale, 383 A2d 1042, 1044 (RI, 1978) (the writing requirement is dispensed with when the party to be charged admits the agreement); Wemhoff v Investors Mgmt Corp of America, 528 A2d 1205, 1207 (DC App, 1987) (an in-court admission that the oral agreement exists, though not necessarily a complete statement of the essential terms of the contract, is adequate to bar the defense under statute); Trossbach v Trossbach, 185 Md 47, 55; 42 A2d 905 (1945) ("[a]dmissions of a party in testifying, though in form evidence, are in essence not mere evidence, but make evidence against

1991Adams-Riker, Inc v Nightingale, 383 A2d 1042, 1044 (RI, 1978) (the writing requirement is dispensed with when the party to be charged admits the agreement); Wemhoff v Investors Mgmt Corp of America, 528 A2d 1205, 1207 (DC App, 1987) (an in-court admission that the oral agreement exists, though not necessarily a complete statement of the essential terms of the contract, is adequate to bar the defense under statute); Trossbach v Trossbach, 185 Md 47, 55; 42 A2d 905 (1945) ("[a]dmissions of a party in testifying, though in form evidence, are in essence not mere evidence, but make evidence against

1985For example, see Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 79 Mich App 429 ; 262 NW2d 848 (1977), in which the statute of frauds defense was held not to be waived where the plaintiff failed to plead the contractual nature of his claim.

1985For example, see Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 79 Mich App 429 ; 262 NW2d 848 (1977), in which the statute of frauds defense was held not to be waived where the plaintiff failed to plead the contractual nature of his claim.

1982First, defendants cite certain cases in which a "clear and convincing” standard of proof was utilized, including Guzorek v Williams, 300 Mich 633 ; 2 NW2d 796 (1942), and Van Houten v Vorce, 259 Mich 545 ; 244 NW 157 (1932).

1982First, defendants cite certain cases in which a "clear and convincing” standard of proof was utilized, including Guzorek v Williams, 300 Mich 633 ; 2 NW2d 796 (1942), and Van Houten v Vorce, 259 Mich 545 ; 244 NW 157 (1932).

1982First, defendants cite certain cases in which a "clear and convincing” standard of proof was utilized, including Guzorek v Williams, 300 Mich 633 ; 2 NW2d 796 (1942), and Van Houten v Vorce, 259 Mich 545 ; 244 NW 157 (1932).

1982First, defendants cite certain cases in which a "clear and convincing” standard of proof was utilized, including Guzorek v Williams, 300 Mich 633 ; 2 NW2d 796 (1942), and Van Houten v Vorce, 259 Mich 545 ; 244 NW 157 (1932).

1977In Downing v Underwood, 216 Mich 401 ; 185 NW 777 (1921), the Supreme Court, in deciding that the statute of frauds defense was not properly raised, stated: "The plea was the general issue; there was no notice under it of the defense of the statute of frauds, nor was there any motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the contract claimed by plaintiff to have been made was void under the statute of frauds, nor was there any objection to testimony on the ground of the statute of frauds, nor was the statute of frauds mentioned in any request preferred by defendant.

1977In Downing v Underwood, 216 Mich 401 ; 185 NW 777 (1921), the Supreme Court, in deciding that the statute of frauds defense was not properly raised, stated: "The plea was the general issue; there was no notice under it of the defense of the statute of frauds, nor was there any motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the contract claimed by plaintiff to have been made was void under the statute of frauds, nor was there any objection to testimony on the ground of the statute of frauds, nor was the statute of frauds mentioned in any request preferred by defendant.

1974For examples of representative writings where, although considerably less definite than the agreement at bar, they have been found sufficient under the statute, see Goldberg v Mitchell, 318 Mich 281 ; 28 NW2d 118 (1947); Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959); Klymyshyn v Szarek, 29 Mich App 638 ; 185 NW2d 820 (1971). *154 In concluding this question, we would like to quote from a relatively recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which contains an extremely eloquent summary of the tendency toward liberalization of the statute of frauds rule and the reasons therefore: "What was

1974For examples of representative writings where, although considerably less definite than the agreement at bar, they have been found sufficient under the statute, see Goldberg v Mitchell, 318 Mich 281 ; 28 NW2d 118 (1947); Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959); Klymyshyn v Szarek, 29 Mich App 638 ; 185 NW2d 820 (1971). *154 In concluding this question, we would like to quote from a relatively recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which contains an extremely eloquent summary of the tendency toward liberalization of the statute of frauds rule and the reasons therefore: "What was

1974For examples of representative writings where, although considerably less definite than the agreement at bar, they have been found sufficient under the statute, see Goldberg v Mitchell, 318 Mich 281 ; 28 NW2d 118 (1947); Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959); Klymyshyn v Szarek, 29 Mich App 638 ; 185 NW2d 820 (1971). *154 In concluding this question, we would like to quote from a relatively recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which contains an extremely eloquent summary of the tendency toward liberalization of the statute of frauds rule and the reasons therefore: "What was

1974For examples of representative writings where, although considerably less definite than the agreement at bar, they have been found sufficient under the statute, see Goldberg v Mitchell, 318 Mich 281 ; 28 NW2d 118 (1947); Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959); Klymyshyn v Szarek, 29 Mich App 638 ; 185 NW2d 820 (1971). *154 In concluding this question, we would like to quote from a relatively recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which contains an extremely eloquent summary of the tendency toward liberalization of the statute of frauds rule and the reasons therefore: "What was

1974For examples of representative writings where, although considerably less definite than the agreement at bar, they have been found sufficient under the statute, see Goldberg v Mitchell, 318 Mich 281 ; 28 NW2d 118 (1947); Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959); Klymyshyn v Szarek, 29 Mich App 638 ; 185 NW2d 820 (1971). *154 In concluding this question, we would like to quote from a relatively recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which contains an extremely eloquent summary of the tendency toward liberalization of the statute of frauds rule and the reasons therefore: "What was

1974For examples of representative writings where, although considerably less definite than the agreement at bar, they have been found sufficient under the statute, see Goldberg v Mitchell, 318 Mich 281 ; 28 NW2d 118 (1947); Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959); Klymyshyn v Szarek, 29 Mich App 638 ; 185 NW2d 820 (1971). *154 In concluding this question, we would like to quote from a relatively recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which contains an extremely eloquent summary of the tendency toward liberalization of the statute of frauds rule and the reasons therefore: "What was

1973In Trisch v Fairman, 334 Mich 432 ; 54 NW2d 621 (1952), the Court held that the defense of the statute of frauds may not be first asserted on appeal, where the defense was not affirmatively pleaded, notwithstanding the fact that defendants’ objections to parol evidence of an oral agreement were overruled and plaintiffs failed to object in the trial court to defendants’ failure to plead the statute.

1973In Trisch v Fairman, 334 Mich 432 ; 54 NW2d 621 (1952), the Court held that the defense of the statute of frauds may not be first asserted on appeal, where the defense was not affirmatively pleaded, notwithstanding the fact that defendants’ objections to parol evidence of an oral agreement were overruled and plaintiffs failed to object in the trial court to defendants’ failure to plead the statute.

1969In that respect it differs from the statute of frauds which is designed to provide protection from imposition in certain kinds of transactions. ¥e recognize that not infrequently in cases where a statute of frauds defense has been interposed courts have concluded that enforcement of the claim will not cause imposition and have allowed recovery by finding part performance taking the case out of the statute or invoking a restitutionary remedy; Vanderhoef v. Parlcer Brothers Company, Limited (1934), 267 Mich 672, 681 .