injunction hearing in Pennsylvania

2022M.B., 228 A.3d at 577 ; see also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 221, 224 (Pa. Super. 2018) (vacating and remanding to have trial court apply correct law when it improperly applied the preliminary injunction standard to lis pendens); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (vacating permanent injunction and remanding because trial court failed to hold the hearing required by law).

2022M.B., 228 A.3d at 577; see also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208 , 221, 224 (Pa. Super. 2018) (vacating and remanding to have trial court apply correct law when it improperly applied the preliminary injunction standard to lis pendens); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562 , 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (vacating permanent injunction and remanding because trial court failed to hold the hearing required by law).

2019It asserts that, before the preliminary injunction hearing, “no unit owner votes had ever been held regarding any maintenance, repairs, or replacements to the Common Elements.” Id. at 45 (emphasis omitted).

2018Warehime, supra. Indeed, that PLS established the other five prongs is confirmed by the trial court’s decision to grant PLS’s motion for a preliminary injunction based on its determination that the non-solicitation provision was a reasonable restraint on trade.

2025See Santoro, supra; Soja, supra; Naus, supra; see also Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. Warren, 950 A.2d 1137, 1148-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (determining that where the parties’ discussion on the record regarding the scope of the hearing did not memorialize an agreement between the parties to make the preliminary injunction hearing the final hearing on the merits, the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction). - 17 - J-A17042-25 Based on our review of the record, we discern no evidence of such a stipulation between the Hermans and the Mosses.

2011See id. at 32 (citing Santoro v. Morse, 781 A.2d 1220, 1229 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc)); see also Reply Brief for Appellee at 24.

2025See Santoro, supra; Soja, supra; Naus, supra; see also Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. Warren, 950 A.2d 1137, 1148-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (determining that where the parties’ discussion on the record regarding the scope of the hearing did not memorialize an agreement between the parties to make the preliminary injunction hearing the final hearing on the merits, the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction). - 17 - J-A17042-25 Based on our review of the record, we discern no evidence of such a stipulation between the Hermans and the Mosses.

2024See, e.g., Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. Warren, 950 A.2d 1137, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).7 In Big Bass, we observed: This Court has held that a court may not treat a hearing for a preliminary injunction as a final hearing and as a basis for a permanent injunction, unless the parties stipulate to the contrary . . . .

2022M.B., 228 A.3d at 577 ; see also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 221, 224 (Pa. Super. 2018) (vacating and remanding to have trial court apply correct law when it improperly applied the preliminary injunction standard to lis pendens); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (vacating permanent injunction and remanding because trial court failed to hold the hearing required by law).

2022M.B., 228 A.3d at 577; see also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208 , 221, 224 (Pa. Super. 2018) (vacating and remanding to have trial court apply correct law when it improperly applied the preliminary injunction standard to lis pendens); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562 , 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (vacating permanent injunction and remanding because trial court failed to hold the hearing required by law).

2004See id. (citing Public Opinion v. Chambersburg Area School District, 654 A.2d 284, 286-87 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995)).

2004See id. (citing Public Opinion v. Chambersburg Area School District, 654 A.2d 284, 286-87 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995)).

2000As to the other elements, the fact that they have been met seems self-evident, but each is briefly discussed below. (a) The Taxpayer Would Suffer “Irreparable Harm” Without the Preliminary Injunction The requirement that there be “irreparable harm” is made out by the undisputed violation of the pre-existing legislation. “[W]here the right invaded is secured by statute or contract, there is generally no question of the amount of damage, but simply of the right.” Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400 , 52 A.2d 317 (1947), quoting Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville

2000As to the other elements, the fact that they have been met seems self-evident, but each is briefly discussed below. (a) The Taxpayer Would Suffer “Irreparable Harm” Without the Preliminary Injunction The requirement that there be “irreparable harm” is made out by the undisputed violation of the pre-existing legislation. “[W]here the right invaded is secured by statute or contract, there is generally no question of the amount of damage, but simply of the right.” Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400 , 52 A.2d 317 (1947), quoting Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville

2025In considering the Mosses’ argument, we remain mindful that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and irreparable harm which might occur before the merits of the case can be heard and determined.” Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen’s - 10 - J-A17042-25 Club, 522 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1987).

2025See Santoro, supra; Soja, supra; Naus, supra; see also Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. Warren, 950 A.2d 1137, 1148-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (determining that where the parties’ discussion on the record regarding the scope of the hearing did not memorialize an agreement between the parties to make the preliminary injunction hearing the final hearing on the merits, the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction). - 17 - J-A17042-25 Based on our review of the record, we discern no evidence of such a stipulation between the Hermans and the Mosses.

2023Immediate and Irreparable Harm We next examined whether Petitioner demonstrated that “the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be compensated adequately by damages.” SEIU Healthcare, 104 A.3d at 502 .

2023Thus, “‘apparently reasonable grounds’ exist to support [the trial] court’s denial of injunctive relief[.]” SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, supra, 104 A.3d at 501 (quotation omitted).

2022M.B., 228 A.3d at 577 ; see also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 221, 224 (Pa. Super. 2018) (vacating and remanding to have trial court apply correct law when it improperly applied the preliminary injunction standard to lis pendens); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (vacating permanent injunction and remanding because trial court failed to hold the hearing required by law).

2022M.B., 228 A.3d at 577; see also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208 , 221, 224 (Pa. Super. 2018) (vacating and remanding to have trial court apply correct law when it improperly applied the preliminary injunction standard to lis pendens); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562 , 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (vacating permanent injunction and remanding because trial court failed to hold the hearing required by law).

2001Riverside School Board v. Kobeski, 146 Pa.Cmwlth. 106 , 604 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1992).

2001See: Riverside School Board v. Kobeski, supra, 604 A.2d at 1176 . ¶ 19 Nor is there merit to the argument of appellant that by finding that appellee was and remained a 50% shareholder of CTI, the court has attempted to convert the preliminary injunction hearing into a hearing on a permanent injunction.

2026However, “the error may be cured by the re-issuance of the preliminary injunction if the order includes the requirement of a bond.” Id.; see also Downs v. Smythe, 701 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa.Super. 1997) (stating the failure to include an amount for bond in a preliminary injunction order can -6- J-A28018-25 be cured by reissuing the preliminary injunction with a requirement that bond be posted in accordance with Rule 1531(b)).

2018See id.

2017Cooper v. Frankford Health Care System, Inc., 960 A.2d 134, 143 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quotation omitted). 6 Evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing cannot be considered at this stage.

2015Solid Waste Auth., 636 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1994). [Tjrial courts should require a bond which would cover damages that are reasonably foreseeable, rather than a bond that would cover all damages, because the nature of a preliminary injunction hearing makes a court’s primary duty the consideration of whether to grant an injunction; the amount of potential damages to the party whose conduct is sought to be enjoined is not the court’s primary concern.

2008That court held that negligent construction and maintenance claims concerning such issues as bolt tightness, cracked joint bars, welded rail, rail anchoring and defective tract conditions are covered by the FRSA regulations, because those regulations are "clearly intended to prevent negligent construction and maintenance.” Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd., 417 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1116-17 (D.N.D.2006). 20 .

2003Temple University, 690 A.2d at 718 (preliminary injunction appropriate only if all four essential prerequisites are proven). ¶ 27 Finally, AAA contends that the chancellor, in making his ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the injunction hearing, failed to consider the full record which the parties had stipulated would include the transcripts of numerous depositions and accompanying exhibits.