injunction hearing in Colorado

2025Litinsky v. Querard, 683 P.2d 816, 819 (Colo. App. 1984); see also Governor’s Ranch Pro.

1990See Litinsky v. Querard, supra. Accordingly, although evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunction that would be admissible at a trial on the merits becomes part of the record, C.R.C.P. 65(a)(2), absent a stipulation that the preliminary injunction hearing would also determine the merits of a permanent injunction or that the plaintiffs have no further evidence to present, preliminary injunction findings are not conclusive.

2025Co. v. Vill. of Gambell , 480 U.S. 531 , 546 n.12 (1987); and then quoting Rathke v. MacFarlane , 648 P.2d 648, 653-54 (Colo. 1982)). ¶22 Although this "likelihood standard" itself is hardly pervasive, it has friends.

2010Rathke, 648 P.2d at 654 .

2025Ctr., Ltd. v. Mercy of Colo. Inc., 793 P.2d 648, 651 (Colo. App. 1990)(noting a party during a preliminary injunction hearing does not have “the incentive to develop [its] case as thoroughly as during trial”).

1992In Governor’s Ranch Professional Center, Ltd. v. Mercy of Colorado Inc., 793 P.2d 648 , (Colo.App.1990), this court ruled that the trial court had misapplied the law of the case doctrine by relying upon its factual findings from a preliminary injunction hearing to dispose of the action on the merits.

2011Phoeniz Capital, Inc. v. Dowell, 176 P.3d 835, 839 (Colo.App.2007). "[Flindings made by a trial court after a preliminary injunction hearing are not determinative of the ultimate merits of the case." Id. (citing Carroll v. Stancato, 144 Colo. 18, 19-20 , 354 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1960)).

2011Phoeniz Capital, Inc. v. Dowell, 176 P.3d 835, 839 (Colo.App.2007). "[Flindings made by a trial court after a preliminary injunction hearing are not determinative of the ultimate merits of the case." Id. (citing Carroll v. Stancato, 144 Colo. 18, 19-20 , 354 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1960)).

2026Shrull v. Rapasardi, 517 P.2d 860, 862 (Colo. App. 1973); see also Osborn & Caywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. App. 1983) (“[T]he dimension of the access right to maintain the ditch is that which is reasonably necessary.”). ¶ 72 In support of his argument that the ditch has been widened, in addition to submitting an affidavit, Dauwe referenced exhibits submitted to the court before the preliminary injunction hearing.

2026Activities Ass'n , 140 P.3d 249, 253 ( Colo.App. 2006 ) ) ) , rev'd on other grounds sub nom. , Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.

2026Activities Ass'n, 140 P.3d 249, 253 (Colo.App. 2006))), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.

2026Shrull v. Rapasardi, 517 P.2d 860, 862 (Colo. App. 1973); see also Osborn & Caywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. App. 1983) (“[T]he dimension of the access right to maintain the ditch is that which is reasonably necessary.”). ¶ 72 In support of his argument that the ditch has been widened, in addition to submitting an affidavit, Dauwe referenced exhibits submitted to the court before the preliminary injunction hearing.

2026Comm’rs, 2015 COA 84 , ¶ 12 n.4, 411 P.3d 158 , 161 n.4; see also CRE 201(b) (the contents of a webpage on a specific date and time are not subject to reasonable dispute); CRE 902(5) (a public authority’s publications are self-authenticating). 5 requesting only that the trial court enjoin the election in their closing argument at the preliminary injunction hearing. ¶ 13 Though “when a party fails to assert an argument in the trial court but raises it for the first time on appeal, the assertion is deemed waived,” O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Colo. App. 2010), that is not what

2026Id. at ¶ 37 , 370 P.3d at 282 . ¶54 The trial court considered the testimony and evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing to determine that CHC differentiated between transgender and cisgender patients.

2026Petitioners Failed to Establish any Evidence of Discriminatory Intent ¶83 Even accepting the majority's construction of the medical service at issue here, petitioners ' CADA claims fail on intent, which the majority leaves largely unaddressed. ¶84 Petitioners argued at the preliminary injunction hearing that the phrase "because of" only requires a court to review "but-for" causation and that it is "irrelevant whether or not the hospital's decision is based on animus," citing Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. , 2015 COA 115 , ¶ 37 , 370 P.3d 272, 282 ( " CADA requires no such showing of 'anim

2025In this way, it is like the first element of the preliminary injunction analysis, under which "the plaintiff must show a likelihood," or "a reasonable probability[,] of success on the merits." Dallman v. Ritter , 225 P.3d 610, 621 (Colo. 2010) (first quoting Amoco Prod.

2024A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶ 10 “A prescriptive easement is a nonexclusive right to use the land of another for a specified purpose — usually, but not always, ingress and egress — after adverse use of the land for that purpose for the period specified by law.” LR Smith Invs., LLC v. Butler, 2014 2 The trial court considered evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing in addition to the evidence presented at trial as permitted by C.R.C.P. 65(a)(2). 4 COA 170 , ¶ 14; see Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 387-88 (Colo. 1985).

2024“An easement by prescription is established when the prescriptive use is: 1) open or notorious, 2) continued without effective interruption for the prescriptive period, and 3) the use was either a) adverse or b) pursuant to an attempted, but ineffective grant.” Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 950 (Colo. 2002); accord Lo Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo.

2021Appellate Attorney Fees ¶ 23 Bluebird requests attorney fees and costs under C.A.R. 38 , arguing Mr. Johnson’s appeal is frivolous and “primarily com prised of non-appealable issues that have been recycled from count less, repetitive filings.” Bluebird also says Mr. Johnson falsely stated that he (1) “preserved issues” and (2) “raised arguments at t he time of the preliminary injunction hearing.” ¶ 24 A self-represented party shall not be assessed attorney fees except upon a finding that the “party clearly knew or r easonably should have known” that his appeal was “substantially frivolous, sub

2013See Graham v. Hoyl, 157 Colo. 338, 340-41 , 402 P.2d 604, 605-06 (1965); Leek v. City of Golden, 870 P.2d 580, 585 (Colo.App.1993); Litinsky v. Querard, 683 P.2d 816, 819 (Colo.App.1984).

2013See Graham v. Hoyl, 157 Colo. 338, 340-41 , 402 P.2d 604, 605-06 (1965); Leek v. City of Golden, 870 P.2d 580, 585 (Colo.App.1993); Litinsky v. Querard, 683 P.2d 816, 819 (Colo.App.1984).

2013See Graham v. Hoyl, 157 Colo. 338, 340-41 , 402 P.2d 604, 605-06 (1965); Leek v. City of Golden, 870 P.2d 580, 585 (Colo.App.1993); Litinsky v. Querard, 683 P.2d 816, 819 (Colo.App.1984).

2011Phoeniz Capital, Inc. v. Dowell, 176 P.3d 835, 839 (Colo.App.2007). "[Flindings made by a trial court after a preliminary injunction hearing are not determinative of the ultimate merits of the case." Id. (citing Carroll v. Stancato, 144 Colo. 18, 19-20 , 354 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1960)).

2011Phoeniz Capital, Inc. v. Dowell, 176 P.3d 835, 839 (Colo.App.2007). "[Flindings made by a trial court after a preliminary injunction hearing are not determinative of the ultimate merits of the case." Id. (citing Carroll v. Stancato, 144 Colo. 18, 19-20 , 354 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1960)).

2004See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F.Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D.Ill.1997)(given importance of NCAA’s function to benefit student-athletes, and NCAA’s role in determining eligibility of student-athletes, court assumed student-athlete was likely to succeed in proving third-party beneficiary standing vis-a-vis the contract between the NCAA and its members); see also NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So.2d 1081, 1083 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996).

2004See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F.Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D.Ill.1997)(given importance of NCAA’s function to benefit student-athletes, and NCAA’s role in determining eligibility of student-athletes, court assumed student-athlete was likely to succeed in proving third-party beneficiary standing vis-a-vis the contract between the NCAA and its members); see also NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So.2d 1081, 1083 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996).

2004See Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., supra, 30 P.3d at 796 (because a reasonable probability of success on the merits had not been met, entry of the preliminary injunction was error).

1990Wilcox v. United States, supra; United States v. Cen-Card Agency, 724 F.Supp. 313 (D.N.J.1989); Consumers Union v. New Regina Corp., 664 F.Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y.1987); see also Papa Ginos's of America, Inc. v. Plaza at Latham Associates, 524 N.Y.S.2d 536 , 135 A.D.2d 74 (App.Div.1988); Ladner v. Plaza del Prado Condominium Ass'n, 423 So.2d 927 (Fla.App.1982); Amfac Financial Corp. v. Pok Sung Shin, 2 Haw.App. 428 , 633 P.2d 1125 (1981); Thompson v. *651 Barnes, 294 Minn. 528 , 200 N.W.2d 921 (1972).

1990Wilcox v. United States, supra; United States v. Cen-Card Agency, 724 F.Supp. 313 (D.N.J.1989); Consumers Union v. New Regina Corp., 664 F.Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y.1987); see also Papa Ginos's of America, Inc. v. Plaza at Latham Associates, 524 N.Y.S.2d 536 , 135 A.D.2d 74 (App.Div.1988); Ladner v. Plaza del Prado Condominium Ass'n, 423 So.2d 927 (Fla.App.1982); Amfac Financial Corp. v. Pok Sung Shin, 2 Haw.App. 428 , 633 P.2d 1125 (1981); Thompson v. *651 Barnes, 294 Minn. 528 , 200 N.W.2d 921 (1972).