injunction hearing in Georgia

1901And we hold that, even as between the same parties, -the right of applying to the chancellor for an order granting an injunction may be renewed, and only by the decree of the court, on a full and final hearing, as between parties and privies, does the decision become a final adjudication, estopping other and unnecessary litigation.” In Blizzard v. Nosworthy, 50 Ga. 514 , it was held that the refusal of an injunction does not bar the complainant from making a second application, when he presents new and additional matter discovered since the hearing.

1901And we hold that, even as between the same parties, -the right of applying to the chancellor for an order granting an injunction may be renewed, and only by the decree of the court, on a full and final hearing, as between parties and privies, does the decision become a final adjudication, estopping other and unnecessary litigation.” In Blizzard v. Nosworthy, 50 Ga. 514 , it was held that the refusal of an injunction does not bar the complainant from making a second application, when he presents new and additional matter discovered since the hearing.

1949Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 (4, 5) ( 41 S. E. 585 ); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152 ( 8 S. E. 2d, 786 ); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); 12 Am.

1949Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 (4, 5) ( 41 S. E. 585 ); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152 ( 8 S. E. 2d, 786 ); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); 12 Am.

1949Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills , 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S.E.2d 861 ); Carroll v. Celanese Corporation of America (No. 16,582), 205 Ga. 493 (3); 12 Am.

1949Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); Carroll v. Celanese Corporation of America (No. 16,582), 205 Ga. 493 (3); 12 Am.

2019But in that case “[b]ecause Parland [did] not provide[] us with the transcript of the injunction hearing, we assume[d] that the testimony and evidence presented at that hearing support[ed] the trial court’s determination of irreparable harm.” Id. at 592 (1) (c) (footnotes omitted). 11 “Consistent with [Georgia’s] firm policy to protect the right of free speech, we apply the general rule that equity will not enjoin libel and slander,” Cohen, supra, 269 Ga. at 185 , and reverse the grant of the interlocutory injunction.

2008And “ ‘where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties.’ ” Id. 16 264 Ga. 339 ( 444 SE2d 799 ) (1994). 17 Id. at 341 . 18 Specifically, the trial court stated that “neither side is entitled to a jury trial.

2008And “ ‘where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties.’ ” Id. 16 264 Ga. 339 ( 444 SE2d 799 ) (1994). 17 Id. at 341 . 18 Specifically, the trial court stated that “neither side is entitled to a jury trial.

2008And “ ‘where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties.’ ” Id. 16 264 Ga. 339 ( 444 SE2d 799 ) (1994). 17 Id. at 341 . 18 Specifically, the trial court stated that “neither side is entitled to a jury trial.

2008"The constitution of this state guarantees to all persons due process of law and unfettered access to the courts of this state. [Cit.] These fundamental constitutional rights require that every party to a lawsuit ... be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, i.e., to have his day in court. [Cits.]" [Cit.] **574 Morrow v. Vineville United Methodist Church, 227 Ga.App. 313 , 316(1), 489 S.E.2d 310 (1997).

2008"The constitution of this state guarantees to all persons due process of law and unfettered access to the courts of this state. [Cit.] These fundamental constitutional rights require that every party to a lawsuit ... be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, i.e., to have his day in court. [Cits.]" [Cit.] **574 Morrow v. Vineville United Methodist Church, 227 Ga.App. 313 , 316(1), 489 S.E.2d 310 (1997).

1991The trial court did not enter an order consolidating the hearing on the injunction and on the merits, and is not permitted to consolidate the hearing on the injunction with the hearing on the merits over the objection of one of the parties. 4 Gwinnett County v. Vaccaro, 259 Ga. 61, 62 ( 376 SE2d 680 ) (1989); Ga. Kraft Co. v. Rhodes, 257 Ga. 469 (1) ( 360 SE2d 595 ) (1987).

1991The trial court did not enter an order consolidating the hearing on the injunction and on the merits, and is not permitted to consolidate the hearing on the injunction with the hearing on the merits over the objection of one of the parties. 4 Gwinnett County v. Vaccaro, 259 Ga. 61, 62 ( 376 SE2d 680 ) (1989); Ga. Kraft Co. v. Rhodes, 257 Ga. 469 (1) ( 360 SE2d 595 ) (1987).

1977Based on the record we do have, we must presume that any evidence the judge considered at the hearing supported his ruling that the "plaintiff has not shown any ground or legal basis for any grant of such injunction.” See Pennsylvania Poorboy v. Robbins Restaurant, 238 Ga. 539 (1977).

1949Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 (4, 5) ( 41 S. E. 585 ); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152 ( 8 S. E. 2d, 786 ); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); 12 Am.

1949Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 (4, 5) ( 41 S. E. 585 ); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152 ( 8 S. E. 2d, 786 ); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); 12 Am.

1949Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 (4, 5) ( 41 S. E. 585 ); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152 ( 8 S. E. 2d, 786 ); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); 12 Am.

1949Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 (4, 5) ( 41 S. E. 585 ); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152 ( 8 S. E. 2d, 786 ); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 ( 39 S. E. 2d, 861 ); 12 Am.

1936In a case analogous to- that at bar, the plaintiff alleging that summons of garnishment had been sued out and that his employer for whom he had worked for many years threatened to discharge him on account of the garnishment proceedings, that additional garnishments were threatened, and that there was “no legal right to a judgment against him,” this court affirmed the refusal of an injunction, saying: “The grounds alleged do not afford equitable jurisdiction to enjoin legal proceedings.” Straub v. First Mutual Building & Loan Association, 178 Ga. 672 ( 173 S. E. 714 ).

1936In a case analogous to- that at bar, the plaintiff alleging that summons of garnishment had been sued out and that his employer for whom he had worked for many years threatened to discharge him on account of the garnishment proceedings, that additional garnishments were threatened, and that there was “no legal right to a judgment against him,” this court affirmed the refusal of an injunction, saying: “The grounds alleged do not afford equitable jurisdiction to enjoin legal proceedings.” Straub v. First Mutual Building & Loan Association, 178 Ga. 672 ( 173 S. E. 714 ).

1927Under the decision and ruling made in the ease of City Council of Augusta v. Sanders, 164 Ga. 235 ( 138 S. E. 234 ), the court did not err in granting the injunction to which exception is taken in this case.

1927Under the decision and ruling made in the ease of City Council of Augusta v. Sanders, 164 Ga. 235 ( 138 S. E. 234 ), the court did not err in granting the injunction to which exception is taken in this case.

1877In the case of a motion to dissolve, an injunction this rule is well settled. 3 Kelly, 435 . 8 Ga., 197 ; 15 Ib., 533; 19 Ib., 277; 24 Ib., 636 ; 30 Ib., 931.

1877In 33 Ga., 138 , it is true that the court rule that an affidavit by one of the parties, in language like this, is sufficient; but the party making the affidavit there was an active participant in the main transaction, and knew many facts as his own act and deed.