injunction hearing in California

2026(See White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554 .) Mustaqeem asserts, as he did in the trial court, that immediate relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to his sidewalk vending business and statutory rights.

2023Plaintiffs respond that the trial court was not required to make express findings as to each element of the preliminary injunction test, that the trial court’s balance of harms analysis 16 shows that it did consider the appropriate legal standard, and that the trial court did not err by issuing the injunction.6 A. Relevant Legal Principals Regarding Preliminary Injunctions “[T]he question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to

2021(See White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554 , quoting IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73 , italics omitted [“‘The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause’”].) Here, the parties presented the court with a significant amount of evidence at the outset of the case.

2016(IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 70 ; City of Corona, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 299 .) Defendants argue that the balance of harms weighs in favor of denying the injunction, because ‘“[o]n the one hand the City offers a vague statute, which has never been challenged before, and no evidence of harm; on the other hand, the Collective offered real medical harm [sic | to approximately 2,300 Collective Members, and reliance on a statute that excludes collectives from enforcement.” Defendants also argue that an injunction would bar Weedland members “from being able to obtain medical marijuana as

2023(Connerly, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 .) While the case was pending, a final decision in another case held the statute unconstitutional, making it “for all purposes, invalid and unenforceable.” (Ibid.) Connerly held that, at that point, the plaintiff ceased to have taxpayer standing and could no longer pursue an injunction—not for lack of particularized injury to himself, but because he could not allege that defendants planned to waste public funds trying to enforce a statute that had already been declared void.

2023(Connerly, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 .) While the case was pending, a final decision in another case held the statute unconstitutional, making it “for all purposes, invalid and unenforceable.” (Ibid.) Connerly held that, at that point, the plaintiff ceased to have taxpayer standing and could no longer pursue an injunction—not for lack of particularized injury to himself, but because he could not allege that defendants planned to waste public funds trying to enforce a statute that had already been declared void.

2019United Grand has not provided a record cite for this injunction and so this claim is waived. ( Nwosu v. Uba , supra , 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 , 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 .) Finally, in its reply brief, United Grand argues that Judge Sotelo's statement that United Grand committed post-judgment misconduct by breaching the "the implied covenant of good faith" is contrary to settled law.

2019United Grand has not provided a record cite for this injunction and so this claim is waived. ( Nwosu v. Uba , supra , 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 , 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 .) Finally, in its reply brief, United Grand argues that Judge Sotelo's statement that United Grand committed post-judgment misconduct by breaching the "the implied covenant of good faith" is contrary to settled law.

2016This, too, was an abuse of discretion because “[d]ue process mandates adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sanctions.” (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 .) A trial court imposing sanctions “must keep in mind an 28 immutable principle that cuts across all areas of the law: sanctions may not be summarily imposed.

2016This, too, was an abuse of discretion because “[d]ue process mandates adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sanctions.” (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 .) A trial court imposing sanctions “must keep in mind an 28 immutable principle that cuts across all areas of the law: sanctions may not be summarily imposed.

2010Furthermore, J.V. asserts the injunction violation was not a gang-related crime under section 186.22, subdivision (d), requiring proof that the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. ( People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 , 927 P.2d 713 ].) In Lopez , the defendant was arrested for possessing open alcohol containers while in the company of gang members in violation of a gang injunction.

2010Furthermore, J.V. asserts the injunction violation was not a gang-related crime under section 186.22, subdivision (d), requiring proof that the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. ( People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 , 927 P.2d 713 ].) In Lopez , the defendant was arrested for possessing open alcohol containers while in the company of gang members in violation of a gang injunction.

2026Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , disapproved on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276 .) 23 information such as the names and addresses of each limited partner and therefore had established some probability of success on their fifth cause of action for violation of section 10.04 of the LPA, Plaintiffs had not specified the harm they faced from the refusal to provide the information and how that harm compared to the harm faced by Defendants if the injunction was issued, and therefore had failed to show the balance of harms favored granting a prel

2026Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , disapproved on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276 .) 23 information such as the names and addresses of each limited partner and therefore had established some probability of success on their fifth cause of action for violation of section 10.04 of the LPA, Plaintiffs had not specified the harm they faced from the refusal to provide the information and how that harm compared to the harm faced by Defendants if the injunction was issued, and therefore had failed to show the balance of harms favored granting a prel

2025(See McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 958–959.) As the trial court observed, but Coinbase persistently ignores, the only relief Khan seeks in this action is an injunction to bar Coinbase from continuing to operate its publicly available internet platform in a manner that violates consumer protection laws.

2025Rather than solely requiring the plaintiff to show irreparable, irreversible harm as the colloquial reference implies, the trial court “compares the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction is issued.” (Tulare Lake, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 396.) Indeed, “‘[i]rreparable harm’ does not mean ‘injury beyond the possibility of repair . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘“[T]he word ‘irreparable’ is a very unhappily chosen one, used in expressing the rule that an injunction may issue to prevent 30 wro

2024(Landmark, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 529 .) This is particularly true where the restraining order is addressed in an ex parte proceeding.

2024(Barrett, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 6 .) Although a judge in a preliminary hearing may weigh evidence, resolve conflicts, and assess credibility, the judge only decides “whether the factual showing is sufficient to establish probable cause,” not “‘whether [the] defendant committed the crime.’” (Ibid.) It is true that in Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Superior Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72 , this court stated in dicta that a section 170.6 motion is barred once a judge participates in a preliminary injunction hearing.1 (Id. at p. 80.) We reasoned that such hearing “invol

2024(Barrett, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 6 .) Although a judge in a preliminary hearing may weigh evidence, resolve conflicts, and assess credibility, the judge only decides “whether the factual showing is sufficient to establish probable cause,” not “‘whether [the] defendant committed the crime.’” (Ibid.) It is true that in Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Superior Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72 , this court stated in dicta that a section 170.6 motion is barred once a judge participates in a preliminary injunction hearing.1 (Id. at p. 80.) We reasoned that such hearing “invol

2023As Plaintiffs explain, further, “[r]ecognition of, and deference to, implied findings is derived from the principle that an appellate court must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s decision regarding the preliminary injunction.” (Smith, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 739 , italics added.) The fact that the trial court relied, to some extent, on its reasoning in ruling on the demurrer in ruling on the preliminary injunction motion is not in and of itself sufficient to establish an abuse of di

2023In support of their argument that the Wolfsons lack standing, the Gevorgians rely on Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248 , where the court rejected an effort by plaintiff homeowners to obtain an injunction to bar a neighboring resort from hosting loud outdoor events on its property.

2023(See McManus v. KPAL Broadcasting Corp. (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 558, 562 .) We disagree.

2022At the preliminary injunction hearing, the plaintiff complained that it had not filed opposition because it believed that only the relief granted by the temporary restraining order would be at issue at the hearing. ( Millennium, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 355–356.) The trial court rejected this argument and granted a preliminary injunction that exceeded the relief granted in the temporary restraining order.

2020(Id. at pp. 341–343.) The other two cases were heard and decided by a different judge, “who reached diametrically opposite conclusions and entered judgments to the effect that the plan was invalid.” (Camp, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 341 .) The validity of the general plan was presented in the second and third cases at a preliminary injunction hearing; preliminary injunctive relief was granted; and permanent injunctive relief was subsequently ordered without a trial on the basis of the preliminary injunction hearing.

2016(IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 70 ; City of Corona, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 299 .) Defendants argue that the balance of harms weighs in favor of denying the injunction, because ‘“[o]n the one hand the City offers a vague statute, which has never been challenged before, and no evidence of harm; on the other hand, the Collective offered real medical harm [sic | to approximately 2,300 Collective Members, and reliance on a statute that excludes collectives from enforcement.” Defendants also argue that an injunction would bar Weedland members “from being able to obtain medical marijuana as

2015(Howard, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 320 .) We review issues of law de novo, and we review factual findings for substantial evidence.