injunction hearing in North Carolina

2018In effect, the harm alleged by the plaintiff must satisfy a standard of relative substantiality as well as irreparability.” Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C.

2017In effect, the harm alleged by the plaintiff must satisfy a standard of relative substantiality as well as irreparability.” Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C.

1958We have a right to assume the trial court dissolved the order in the exercise of a sound discretion. “. . . ‘whether the court will dissolve an injunction on hearing the answer only, or will order the bill to stand over for proofs, much must depend upon the sound discretion of the judge who is to decide the question.’ . . . ‘But it is also a well settled rule that when by the answer the plaintiff’s whole equity is denied, and the statement in the answer is credible and exhibits no attempt to evade the material charges in the complaint, ... an injunction . . . will be dissolved.’ ” Lance v. Cog

1958We have a right to assume the trial court dissolved the order in the exercise of a sound discretion. “. . . ‘whether the court will dissolve an injunction on hearing the answer only, or will order the bill to stand over for proofs, much must depend upon the sound discretion of the judge who is to decide the question.’ . . . ‘But it is also a well settled rule that when by the answer the plaintiff’s whole equity is denied, and the statement in the answer is credible and exhibits no attempt to evade the material charges in the complaint, ... an injunction . . . will be dissolved.’ ” Lance v. Cog

1967It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1967It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1967It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1967It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1967It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1967It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961Walker,' J., said in Cobb v. Clegg, 137 N.C. 153 : “In the case of special injunctions the rule is not to dissolve upon the coming in of the answer, even though it may deny the equity, but to continue the injunction to the hearing if there is probable cause for supposing that *720 the plaintiff will be able to maintain his primary equity and there is a reasonable apprehenison of irreparable loss unless it remains in force, or if in the opinion of the court it appears reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff’s right until the controversy between him and the defendant can be determined.

1924In Cobb v. Clegg, 137 N. C., 153 , Mr. Justice Walicer said: “In the case of special injunctions the rule is not to dissolve upon the coming in of the answer, even though it may deny the equity, but to continue the injunction to the hearing if there is probable cause for supposing that the plaintiff will be able to maintain his primary equity and there is a reasonable apprehension of irreparable loss unless it remains in force, or if in the opinion of the court it appears reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff’s right until the controversy between him and the defendant can be determined

1957Marshall v. Commissioners, 89 N.C. 103 .

1915Marshall v. Commissioners, 89 N. C., 103 .

1933In the present state of the record, which seems somewhat meager and might have been prepared more in conformity to the rules (Carter v. Bryant, 199 N. C., 704 , 155 S. E., 602 ), we think the court erred in doing more than continuing the injunction to the hearing.

1933In the present state of the record, which seems somewhat meager and might have been prepared more in conformity to the rules (Carter v. Bryant, 199 N. C., 704 , 155 S. E., 602 ), we think the court erred in doing more than continuing the injunction to the hearing.

1924In Hyatt v. DeHart, 140 N. C., 270, the Court said r “Ordinarily tbe findings of fact by the judge below are conclusive on appeal.

1924In Hyatt v. DeHart , 140 N.C. 270 , the Court *Page 131 said: "Ordinarily the findings of fact by the judge below are conclusive on appeal.

1910Parker v. Grammer, 62 N. C., 28 ; Jones v. Buxton, 121 N. C., 285 .

1902Jones v. Buxton, 121 N. C., 285 .

1894Whitaker v. Hill , 96 N.C. 2 , and the numerous cases that have affirmed that decision apply to this appeal.

1894Whitaker v. Hill, 96 N. C., 2 , and the numerous cases that have affirmed that decision apply to this appeal.

2018App. at 368 -71 , 555 S.E.2d at 639 -40 , and the preliminary injunction standard, see NovaCare Orthotics , 137 N.C.

2018MANLY Beasley, J., dissenting S.E.2d at 639-40, and the preliminary injunction standard, see NovaCare Orthotics, 137 N.C.

2018App. at 368 -71 , 555 S.E.2d at 639 -40 , and the preliminary injunction standard, see NovaCare Orthotics , 137 N.C.

2007All of these arguments go to the merits of “questions originally in controversy between the parties [,] [which] are no longer at issue[.]” Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147 , 250 S.E.2d at 912 .

2007All of these arguments go to the merits of “questions originally in controversy between the parties [,] [which] are no longer at issue[.]” Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147 , 250 S.E.2d at 912 .

2002DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Kirkhart, 148 N.C.

1992Industries, 308 N.C. at 402 , 302 S.E.2d at 760 .

1992Industries, 308 N.C. at 402 , 302 S.E.2d at 760 .

1974It held therefore that defendant’s participation in the injunction hearing waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. *156 Against the background of federal decisions we consider the effect of defendant’s general appearance under our Rule 12 and G.S. 1-75.7, Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94 , 176 S.E. 2d 161 (1970).

1974It held therefore that defendant’s participation in the injunction hearing waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. *156 Against the background of federal decisions we consider the effect of defendant’s general appearance under our Rule 12 and G.S. 1-75.7, Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94 , 176 S.E. 2d 161 (1970).

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1961It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a c

1958Arey v. Lemons, 232 N.C. 531 , 61 S.E. 2d 596 ; Oil Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 212 N.C. 642 , 194 S.E. 114 .

1958Arey v. Lemons, 232 N.C. 531 , 61 S.E. 2d 596 ; Oil Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 212 N.C. 642 , 194 S.E. 114 .

1958Arey v. Lemons, 232 N.C. 531 , 61 S.E. 2d 596 ; Oil Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 212 N.C. 642 , 194 S.E. 114 .

1958Arey v. Lemons, 232 N.C. 531 , 61 S.E. 2d 596 ; Oil Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 212 N.C. 642 , 194 S.E. 114 .

1957This Court also said in Jones v. Lassiter, 169 N.C. 750 , 86 S.E. 710 , 711: "It is true that, when the injunctive relief sought is not merely ancillary to the relief demanded, but is itself the principal relief sought, the courts will generally continue the injunction to the hearing, upon the making out of a prima facie case.

1957This Court also said in Jones v. Lassiter, 169 N.C. 750 , 86 S.E. 710 , 711: "It is true that, when the injunctive relief sought is not merely ancillary to the relief demanded, but is itself the principal relief sought, the courts will generally continue the injunction to the hearing, upon the making out of a prima facie case.

1953Even so, “whether the Court will dissolve an injunction on hearing the answer only or will order the bill to stand over for proofs, much must depend upon the sound discretion of the judge who is to decide the question.” James v. Lemly, 37 N.C. 278 ; McCorkle v. Brem, 76 N.C. 407 ; Cobb v. Clegg, supra. In Lewis v. Lumber Co., 99 N.C. 11 , 5 S.E. 19 , the defendant was engaged in the manufacture of lumber.

1953Even so, “whether the Court will dissolve an injunction on hearing the answer only or will order the bill to stand over for proofs, much must depend upon the sound discretion of the judge who is to decide the question.” James v. Lemly, 37 N.C. 278 ; McCorkle v. Brem, 76 N.C. 407 ; Cobb v. Clegg, supra. In Lewis v. Lumber Co., 99 N.C. 11 , 5 S.E. 19 , the defendant was engaged in the manufacture of lumber.