injunction standard in Montana

2024When the government opposes a preliminary injunction, these two factors “merge into one inquiry.” Porretti v. Dzurenda, 11 F.4th 1037 , 1047 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). ¶40 The State asserts these factors weigh in its favor because it “has the constitutional concern that the laws be faithfully executed” and to impose conditions on the payment of Medicaid services so as “to help ensure that the services are high quality.” At this stage, these concerns have not been shown to be “narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling intere

2024When the government opposes a preliminary injunction, these two factors “merge into one inquiry.” Porretti v. Dzurenda, 11 F.4th 1037 , 1047 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). ¶35 The State asserts the Providers cannot meet either prong of the test because they are not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.

2024The District Court therefore abused its discretion when it entered a preliminary injunction based on the “possibility” of harm that MAID presented in support of its claim to irreparable injury.3 ¶20 Regarding the final two factors in the preliminary injunction test—the balance of equities and the public interest—the court concluded without analysis that “[i]f the preliminary injunction is issued, little harm is done to the State.” Because it already had determined that injury to MAID “would be irreparable,” the District Court found “[t]he balance of equities tips in favor of issuing a prelimin

2024The District Court therefore abused its discretion when it entered a preliminary injunction based on the “possibility” of harm that MAID presented in support of its claim to irreparable injury.3 ¶20 Regarding the final two factors in the preliminary injunction test—the balance of equities and the public interest—the court concluded without analysis that “[i]f the preliminary injunction is issued, little harm is done to the State.” Because it already had determined that injury to MAID “would be irreparable,” the District Court found “[t]he balance of equities tips in favor of issuing a prelimin

2024Likelihood of Success on the Merits ¶18 The first prong of the preliminary injunction test is whether “the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits[.]” Section 27-19-201(1)(a), MCA. “[L]ikelihood of success does not require the applicant to establish entitlement to final judgment, relief at all events on final hearing, relief at a trial on the merits, or evidence sufficient to prevail at trial.” Planned Parenthood of Mont., 2022 MT 157, ¶ 30 (cleaned up, collecting cases).

2024At the preliminary injunction hearing, Plaintiffs argue, the State conceded that it had a full opportunity to be heard despite the District Court’s refusal to hear oral testimony. 24 ¶42 The District Court correctly stated at the scheduling conference, “[W]e don’t have a trial before the trial with a preliminary injunction, even under the federal standard.” As we held in Planned Parenthood, a district court is not obligated to hear live testimony at the preliminary injunction stage of proceedings simply because the parties present conflicting testimony; rather, resolution of conflicting testim

2026See Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc., 2024 MT 246, ¶ 30 , 418 Mont. 378 , 557 P.3d 1240 (remanding for application of “the applicable preliminary injunction standard”).

2026See Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc., 2024 MT 246, ¶ 30 , 418 Mont. 378 , 557 P.3d 1240 (remanding for application of “the applicable preliminary injunction standard”).

2024In the Ninth Circuit it is not an abuse of discretion for a federal district court to refuse to hear oral testimony at a preliminary injunction hearing as long as “the parties have a full opportunity to submit written testimony and to argue the matter.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). ¶44 The State’s Ninth Circuit authority, Gila Valley, does not provide otherwise.

2024Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442. ¶41 In response, Plaintiffs insist that the decision to permit oral testimony at a preliminary injunction hearing was within the District Court’s discretion.

2024Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442. ¶45 The State’s exchange with the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing confirms that the State had a full opportunity to be heard.

2024See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013). 9 Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203 , 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming serious questions test in a footnote).

2024In Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated, 599 U.S. 1089 , 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010), the court rejected that requirements could be “conditionally redefined as other requirements are more fully satisfied so that ‘grant[ing] or deny[ing] a preliminary injunction depends upon a ‘flexible interplay’ among all the factors considered.’”2 (Internal citation omitted.) Rather, the Winter requirements “must be satisfied as articulated.” Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347 . ¶19 The Tenth Circuit took a more circuitous route to tightening its standard,

2024In Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated, 599 U.S. 1089 , 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010), the court rejected that requirements could be “conditionally redefined as other requirements are more fully satisfied so that ‘grant[ing] or deny[ing] a preliminary injunction depends upon a ‘flexible interplay’ among all the factors considered.’”2 (Internal citation omitted.) Rather, the Winter requirements “must be satisfied as articulated.” Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347 . ¶19 The Tenth Circuit took a more circuitous route to tightening its standard,

2024Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175, 1188 (7th Cir. 2023).

2024As such, the Providers have met all four prongs of the preliminary injunction test and the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting their request for a preliminary injunction. 24 ¶38 The final argument by the State is a two-paragraph assertion that the District Court’s injunction was too broad as it relates to HB 575 because the “District Court could have simply enjoined the ultrasound requirement and the purported limitation on the practice of abortion to the exclusion of APRNs in light of this Court’s decision in Weems II, but it instead enjoined HB 575 in its entir

2024California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci.

2024As such, the Providers have met all four prongs of the preliminary injunction test and the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting their request for a preliminary injunction. 4 Under the federal preliminary injunction test, “in cases where a plaintiff alleges a constitutional injury, it is no surprise that ‘our caselaw clearly favors granting preliminary injunctions to a plaintiff . . . who is likely to succeed on the merits of his [constitutional] claim.’” Baird, 81 F.4th at 1042 (quoting Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009)). 33 CONCLU

2024Servs., 944 F.3d 773 , 789 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)); Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 2024 MT 228, ¶ 16 , 418 Mont. 253 , __P.3d __. ¶29 In summary, in accordance with Winter, the legislature’s directive, and the plain language of the statute, the preliminary injunction standard sets forth a conjunctive test that requires an applicant to make a sufficient showing as to each of the four factors.

2024As such, the Providers have met all four prongs of the preliminary injunction test and the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting their request for a preliminary injunction. 24 ¶38 The final argument by the State is a two-paragraph assertion that the District Court’s injunction was too broad as it relates to HB 575 because the “District Court could have simply enjoined the ultrasound requirement and the purported limitation on the practice of abortion to the exclusion of APRNs in light of this Court’s decision in Weems II, but it instead enjoined HB 575 in its entir

2024As such, the Providers have met all four prongs of the preliminary injunction test and the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting their request for a preliminary injunction. 24 ¶38 The final argument by the State is a two-paragraph assertion that the District Court’s injunction was too broad as it relates to HB 575 because the “District Court could have simply enjoined the ultrasound requirement and the purported limitation on the practice of abortion to the exclusion of APRNs in light of this Court’s decision in Weems II, but it instead enjoined HB 575 in its entir

2024See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013). 9 Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203 , 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming serious questions test in a footnote).

2024California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci.

2024The purpose of a preliminary injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp., 144 S. Ct. at 1576 (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 , 101 S. Ct. 1830, 1834 (1981)).

2024The purpose of a preliminary injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp., 144 S. Ct. at 1576 (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 , 101 S. Ct. 1830, 1834 (1981)).

2024In Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated, 599 U.S. 1089 , 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010), the court rejected that requirements could be “conditionally redefined as other requirements are more fully satisfied so that ‘grant[ing] or deny[ing] a preliminary injunction depends upon a ‘flexible interplay’ among all the factors considered.’”2 (Internal citation omitted.) Rather, the Winter requirements “must be satisfied as articulated.” Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347 . ¶19 The Tenth Circuit took a more circuitous route to tightening its standard,

2024See Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797 , 801 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding it “unclear . . . why [it] matters” that a party did not present live testimony at preliminary injunction hearing, noting that “[i]t has long been true that parties can present evidence at the preliminary-injunction stage with declarations or affidavits”); Transcon.