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7 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 2003–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hawngreen1 sentence2025Sufficiency of Evidence {¶ 79} “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, [he or] she is arguing that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Matthews, 2018-Ohio-2424, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471 (2d Dist. 2000). “‘An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defend | 1 | 1 |
State v. Matthewsgreen1 sentence2025Sufficiency of Evidence {¶ 79} “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, [he or] she is arguing that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Matthews, 2018-Ohio-2424, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471 (2d Dist. 2000). “‘An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defend | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hipshergreen2 sentences2024State v. Hipsher, 2023-Ohio-3750, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). "[T]his court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence . . . [but we] 'independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.'" Id. quoting State v. Runyon, 2011-Ohio-263 , ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). {¶ 18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, -4- Butler CA2024-03-040 Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. 2024State v. Hipsher, 2023-Ohio-3750, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). "[T]his court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence . . . [but we] 'independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.'" Id. quoting State v. Runyon, 2011-Ohio-263 , ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). {¶ 18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, -4- Butler CA2024-03-040 Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Braucher
green
1 sentence2025Id. {¶ 48} The trial court overruled Hayes’ motion to suppress, reasoning that the trooper had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop and to search the vehicle. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. LaRosa (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2024State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346 , 2021-Ohio-4060 , 179 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 16 . 2024State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346 , 2021-Ohio-4060 , 179 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 16 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Madrigal
green
2 sentences2020State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391 , 2000-Ohio- 448, 721 N.E.2d 52 . {¶ 14} Based on the record as it presently exists, we overrule appellant's sole assignment of error. 2020State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391 , 2000-Ohio- 448, 721 N.E.2d 52 . {¶ 14} Based on the record as it presently exists, we overrule appellant's sole assignment of error. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Butler No. CA2014-09-191, 2015-Ohio-1486 , 2015 WL 1774358 , ¶ 12, quoting Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc. , 49 Ohio St.3d 173 , 175, 551 N.E.2d 962 (1990). {¶ 12} Carrigan testified that she believed bamboo qualifies as an invasive and noxious weed, and one of Carrigan's landscapers testified, over Hayes's objection, that bamboo can overpower plants. 2017Butler No. CA2014-09-191, 2015-Ohio-1486 , 2015 WL 1774358 , ¶ 12, quoting Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc. , 49 Ohio St.3d 173 , 175, 551 N.E.2d 962 (1990). {¶ 12} Carrigan testified that she believed bamboo qualifies as an invasive and noxious weed, and one of Carrigan's landscapers testified, over Hayes's objection, that bamboo can overpower plants. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wooten v. Knisley
green
2 sentences2017Moreover, a violation of R.C. 901.51 requires a violator to have acted recklessly, meaning that the violator "disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature." See R.C. 2901.22(C) (defining when a person acts recklessly for criminal statutory purposes); Wooten v. Knisley , 79 Ohio St.3d 282 , 290, 680 N.E.2d 1245 (1997). {¶ 18} Hayes's theory at trial with regard to his dying bamboo was that Carrigan put down weed killer on the property line, knowing that the downward slope of the property woul 2017Moreover, a violation of R.C. 901.51 requires a violator to have acted recklessly, meaning that the violator "disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature." See R.C. 2901.22(C) (defining when a person acts recklessly for criminal statutory purposes); Wooten v. Knisley , 79 Ohio St.3d 282 , 290, 680 N.E.2d 1245 (1997). {¶ 18} Hayes's theory at trial with regard to his dying bamboo was that Carrigan put down weed killer on the property line, knowing that the downward slope of the property woul | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sorrell v. Estate of Datko
green
2 sentences2003Sorrell v. Estate of Datko , 147 Ohio App.3d 319 , 2001-Ohio-3460 , 770 N.E.2d 608 , at ¶ 24. 2003Sorrell v. Estate of Datko , 147 Ohio App.3d 319 , 2001-Ohio-3460 , 770 N.E.2d 608 , at ¶ 24. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Dresher v. Burt
green
2 sentences2003If the moving party satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc ., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 145 , 1997-Ohio-219 , 677 N.E.2d 308 , citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 , 295 , 662 N.E.2d 264 . {¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Whitt argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Hayes' motion 2003If the moving party satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc ., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 145 , 1997-Ohio-219 , 677 N.E.2d 308 , citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 , 295 , 662 N.E.2d 264 . {¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Whitt argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Hayes' motion | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003If the moving party satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc ., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 145 , 1997-Ohio-219 , 677 N.E.2d 308 , citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 , 295 , 662 N.E.2d 264 . {¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Whitt argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Hayes' motion 2003If the moving party satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc ., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 145 , 1997-Ohio-219 , 677 N.E.2d 308 , citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 , 295 , 662 N.E.2d 264 . {¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Whitt argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Hayes' motion | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003If the moving party satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc ., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 145 , 1997-Ohio-219 , 677 N.E.2d 308 , citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 , 295 , 662 N.E.2d 264 . {¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Whitt argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Hayes' motion | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.