qualification rule in Oregon

2017Stricklin v. Flavel, 180 Or App 360, 369 , 43 P3d 1116 (2002).

2017Stricklin v. Flavel, 180 Or App 360, 369 , 43 P3d 1116 (2002).

1977Plaintiff offered evidence that, as a result, it was unable for a period of two weeks to ship castings worth approximately $25,000 to Pratt & Whitney and that it then had difficulty in maintaining its shipping schedules of such titanium castings because it did not have welders who were "able to complete the weld repair cycle in a satisfactory manner.” It appears, however, that Rem was then able to train two welders who "shortly thereafter were able to pass the qualification test of Pratt & Whitney.” Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to their concern over Rem’s continued ability to compete wi

1977Plaintiff offered evidence that, as a result, it was unable for a period of two weeks to ship castings worth approximately $25,000 to Pratt & Whitney and that it then had difficulty in maintaining its shipping schedules of such titanium castings because it did not have welders who were "able to complete the weld repair cycle in a satisfactory manner.” It appears, however, that Rem was then able to train two welders who "shortly thereafter were able to pass the qualification test of Pratt & Whitney.” Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to their concern over Rem’s continued ability to compete wi

1977Plaintiff offered evidence that, as a result, it was unable for a period of two weeks to ship castings worth approximately $25,000 to Pratt & Whitney and that it then had difficulty in maintaining its shipping schedules of such titanium castings because it did not have welders who were "able to complete the weld repair cycle in a satisfactory manner.” It appears, however, that Rem was then able to train two welders who "shortly thereafter were able to pass the qualification test of Pratt & Whitney.” Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to their concern over Rem’s continued ability to compete wi

1977Plaintiff offered evidence that, as a result, it was unable for a period of two weeks to ship castings worth approximately $25,000 to Pratt & Whitney and that it then had difficulty in maintaining its shipping schedules of such titanium castings because it did not have welders who were "able to complete the weld repair cycle in a satisfactory manner.” It appears, however, that Rem was then able to train two welders who "shortly thereafter were able to pass the qualification test of Pratt & Whitney.” Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to their concern over Rem’s continued ability to compete wi

1977Plaintiff offered evidence that, as a result, it was unable for a period of two weeks to ship castings worth approximately $25,000 to Pratt & Whitney and that it then had difficulty in maintaining its shipping schedules of such titanium castings because it did not have welders who were "able to complete the weld repair cycle in a satisfactory manner.” It appears, however, that Rem was then able to train two welders who "shortly thereafter were able to pass the qualification test of Pratt & Whitney.” Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to their concern over Rem’s continued ability to compete wi

1977Plaintiff offered evidence that, as a result, it was unable for a period of two weeks to ship castings worth approximately $25,000 to Pratt & Whitney and that it then had difficulty in maintaining its shipping schedules of such titanium castings because it did not have welders who were "able to complete the weld repair cycle in a satisfactory manner.” It appears, however, that Rem was then able to train two welders who "shortly thereafter were able to pass the qualification test of Pratt & Whitney.” Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to their concern over Rem’s continued ability to compete wi

1962In California, Traynor, J., stated a qualification of the rule this way: “Although it is error to receive in evidence gruesome photographs of a homicide victim designed primarily to arouse the passions of the jury * * * [citations], such photographs are admissible when they are relevant to the issues before the court and their probative value is not outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the defendant * * *" People v. Cheary, 48 Cal2d 301, 312, 309 P2d 431 .

1962In California, Traynor, J., stated a qualification of the rule this way: "Although it is error to receive in evidence gruesome photographs of a homicide victim designed primarily to arouse the passions of the jury * * * [citations], such photographs are admissible when they are relevant to the issues before the court and their probative value is not outweighed by the danger *274 of prejudice to the defendant * * *." People v. Cheary, 48 Cal2d 301, 312, 309 P2d 431 .

1962Montana Coal & Iron Co. v. Hoskins, 88 Or 523 , 172 P 118 (1918); Coffin v. Hutchinson, 22 Or 554 , 30 P 424 (1892).

1962In State v. Kristich, 226 Or 240, 246 , 359 P2d 1106 (1961), we indicated that the rule of relevancy is probably not absolute, i.e., that the probative value of the evidence should outweigh its prejudicial effect.

1962In State v. Kristich, 226 Or 240, 246 , 359 P2d 1106 (1961), we indicated that the rule of relevancy is probably not absolute, i.e., that the probative value of the evidence should outweigh its prejudicial effect.

1962The court recognized the qualification on the rule applied: “The evidence may be undisputed, but it is a question for the jury if, as stated in Koontz v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 20 Or 21 ( 23 Pac 820 ), and cited with approval in Graham v. Coos Bay R. & N. Co., 71 Or 393 ( 139 Pac 337 ), men of reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from the facts proved.” ( 114 Or at p. 690 ). ⑤ Occasionally our cases state without qualification that when there is no conflict in the evidence there is nothing to submit to the jury.

1962The court recognized the qualification on the rule applied: “The evidence may be undisputed, but it is a question for the jury if, as stated in Koontz v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 20 Or 21 ( 23 Pac 820 ), and cited with approval in Graham v. Coos Bay R. & N. Co., 71 Or 393 ( 139 Pac 337 ), men of reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from the facts proved.” ( 114 Or at p. 690 ). ⑤ Occasionally our cases state without qualification that when there is no conflict in the evidence there is nothing to submit to the jury.

1962Montana Coal & Iron Co. v. Hoskins, 88 Or 523 , 172 P 118 (1918); Coffin v. Hutchinson, 22 Or 554 , 30 P 424 (1892).

1962Montana Coal & Iron Co. v. Hoskins, 88 Or 523 , 172 P 118 (1918); Coffin v. Hutchinson, 22 Or 554 , 30 P 424 (1892).

1962The court recognized the qualification on the rule applied: “The evidence may be undisputed, but it is a question for the jury if, as stated in Koontz v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 20 Or 21 ( 23 Pac 820 ), and cited with approval in Graham v. Coos Bay R. & N. Co., 71 Or 393 ( 139 Pac 337 ), men of reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from the facts proved.” ( 114 Or at p. 690 ). ⑤ Occasionally our cases state without qualification that when there is no conflict in the evidence there is nothing to submit to the jury.

1962Montana Coal & Iron Co. v. Hoskins, 88 Or 523 , 172 P 118 (1918); Coffin v. Hutchinson, 22 Or 554 , 30 P 424 (1892).

1962The court recognized the qualification on the rule applied: “The evidence may be undisputed, but it is a question for the jury if, as stated in Koontz v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 20 Or 21 ( 23 Pac 820 ), and cited with approval in Graham v. Coos Bay R. & N. Co., 71 Or 393 ( 139 Pac 337 ), men of reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from the facts proved.” ( 114 Or at p. 690 ). ⑤ Occasionally our cases state without qualification that when there is no conflict in the evidence there is nothing to submit to the jury.

1958This court has recognized a qualification of the rule in Marshall v. Olson, 102 Or 502, 512 , 202 P 736 , where it was held that a motorist might be excused for turning otherwise than as the law prescribes in order to avoid an accident.

1958This court has recognized a qualification of the rule in Marshall v. Olson, 102 Or 502, 512 , 202 P 736 , where it was held that a motorist might be excused for turning otherwise than as the law prescribes in order to avoid an accident.

1938Of course, the rule is subject to the qualification that the separate entity may be disregarded in exceptional situations where it otherwise would present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of public or private rights.” The two cases last above cited are again mentioned here as authority for the qualification of the rule. *432 In Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Company, 287 U. S. 415 , 77 L.

1938Of course, the rule is subject to the qualification that the separate entity may be disregarded in exceptional situations where it otherwise would present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of public or private rights.” The two cases last above cited are again mentioned here as authority for the qualification of the rule. *432 In Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Company, 287 U. S. 415 , 77 L.

1908The more modern rule is that when there is no relation of trust or confidence existing between the parties to a compromise and settlement, which would impose upon one an obligation to give full information, and no artifice for a fraudulent purpose is employed which would lull the other to repose, he cannot proceed blindly, omitting all inquiry and investigation, and then complain that the former did not volunteer to give the information which he possessed: 8 Cyc. 525; Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55 ; Graham v. Meyer, 99 N. Y. 611 (1 N. E. 143); Cleveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318 (10 Su

1908The more modern rule is that when there is no relation of trust or confidence existing between the parties to a compromise and settlement, which would impose upon one an obligation to give full information, and no artifice for a fraudulent purpose is employed which would lull the other to repose, he cannot proceed blindly, omitting all inquiry and investigation, and then complain that the former did not volunteer to give the information which he possessed: 8 Cyc. 525; Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55 ; Graham v. Meyer, 99 N. Y. 611 (1 N. E. 143); Cleveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318 (10 Su

1908The more modern rule is that when there is no relation of trust or confidence existing between the parties to a compromise and settlement, which would impose upon one an obligation to give full information, and no artifice for a fraudulent purpose is employed which would lull the other to repose, he cannot proceed blindly, omitting all inquiry and investigation, and then complain that the former did not volunteer to give the information which he possessed: 8 Cyc. 525; Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55 ; Graham v. Meyer, 99 N. Y. 611 (1 N. E. 143); Cleveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318 (10 Su

1908The more modern rule is that when there is no relation of trust or confidence existing between the parties to a compromise and settlement, which would impose upon one an obligation to give full information, and no artifice for a fraudulent purpose is employed which would lull the other to repose, he cannot proceed blindly, omitting all inquiry and investigation, and then complain that the former did not volunteer to give the information which he possessed: 8 Cyc. 525; Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55 ; Graham v. Meyer, 99 N. Y. 611 (1 N. E. 143); Cleveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318 (10 Su

1908The more modern rule is that when there is no relation of trust or confidence existing between the parties to a compromise and settlement, which would impose upon one an obligation to give full information, and no artifice for a fraudulent purpose is employed which would lull the other to repose, he cannot proceed blindly, omitting all inquiry and investigation, and then complain that the former did not volunteer to give the information which he possessed: 8 Cyc. 525; Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55 ; Graham v. Meyer, 99 N. Y. 611 (1 N. E. 143); Cleveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318 (10 Su