qualification rule in Texas

2013Id. at 832 .

2013Id. at 832 .

2008The supreme court has acknowledged a qualification to this principle, which it originally recognized in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. , 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983).

2008The supreme court has acknowledged a qualification to this principle, which it originally recognized in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.1983).

1987Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) (opinion on rehearing 1980).” In Jackson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), it was pointed out that a reputation witness’ testimony must be based on discussion with others concerning the defendant, or on hearing others discuss the defendant’s reputation, and not just on personal knowledge.

1984Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (opinion on rehearing 1980).

2019Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 120-22 ; Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 .

2018Id.

2013Although in Benchmark we were not construing the 2009 version, we expressly noted that this change in language reflected a “reduc[tion] in the affiant’s qualification requirement.” 316 S.W.3d at 45 n. 2.

2008Id. (“The City was not required to warn of leaks in the roof or repair them; it was required only to prevent the water that leaked 9 The supreme court has acknowledged a qualification to this principle, which it originally recognized in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983).

1987(Citations omitted) See Halbouty v. Railroad Commission, 163 Tex. 417 , 375 S.W.2d 364 , 374 (1962); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296 , 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).

1987Ex Parte Wilkinson, 641 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).

1987(Citations omitted) See Halbouty v. Railroad Commission, 163 Tex. 417 , 375 S.W.2d 364 , 374 (1962); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296 , 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).

1987(Citations omitted) See Halbouty v. Railroad Commission, 163 Tex. 417 , 375 S.W.2d 364 , 374 (1962); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296 , 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).

1979Attwood v. State, 509 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and authority there cited.

1962It is also held that such rule should be considered in connection with the law of capture, which is recognized as a property right, and both rules are subject to regulation under the police power of this State." Somewhat more positively we said in Eliff v. Texon Drilling Company (1948), 146 Tex. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 558 , 4 A.L.R.2d 191 , [2] that: "In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land. * * * The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be considered in connection with the law of capture and is

1962It is also held that such rule should be considered in connection with the law of capture, which is recognized as a property right, and both rules are subject to regulation under the police power of this State." Somewhat more positively we said in Eliff v. Texon Drilling Company (1948), 146 Tex. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 558 , 4 A.L.R.2d 191 , [2] that: "In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land. * * * The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be considered in connection with the law of capture and is

1940If the conditions upon which this apparent right of control is to be exercised, are not expressed on the face of the instrument, but remain in confidence between the owner and the depositary, the case cannot be distinguished in principle, from that of an agent who receives secret instructions qualifying or restricting in apparently absolute power.” In Russell v. American Bell Telephone Co., 180 Mass. 467 , 62 N.E. 751 , the distinction is clearly pointed out by Chief Justice Holmes, as follows: “The qualification of the rule, as not applying when the instrument is stolen, is not based upon the

1940If the conditions upon which this apparent right of control is to be exercised, are not expressed on the face of the instrument, but remain in confidence between the owner and the depositary, the case cannot be distinguished in principle, from that of an agent who receives secret instructions qualifying or restricting in apparently absolute power.” In Russell v. American Bell Telephone Co., 180 Mass. 467 , 62 N.E. 751 , the distinction is clearly pointed out by Chief Justice Holmes, as follows: “The qualification of the rule, as not applying when the instrument is stolen, is not based upon the

1936Phillips v. Ayres, 45 Tex. 601, 608 .

1936The charge upon this question should, in addition to stating the rule as laid down, also in appropriate language to apply to the particular facts of the case give the qualification of the rule ‘that the true and correct location of the land is ascertained by the application of all or any of these rules to the particular case, and, when they lead to contrary results or confusion, that rule must be adopted which is most consistent with the intention of the parties apparent upon the face of the patent, read in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.’ Stafford v. King, 30 Tex. [257],

1936The charge upon this question should, in addition to stating the rule as laid down, also in appropriate language to apply to the particular facts of the case give the qualification of the rule ‘that the true and correct location of the land is ascertained by the application of all or any of these rules to the particular case, and, when they lead to contrary results or confusion, that rule must be adopted which is most consistent with the intention of the parties apparent upon the face of the patent, read in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.’ Stafford v. King, 30 Tex. [257],

1935Girardeaux v. Perkins, supra; Paschall v. Loan Co., 19 Tex. Civ.

1935Girardeaux v. Perkins, supra; Paschall v. Loan Co., 19 Tex.Civ.App. 102 , 47 S.W. 98 .

1932A qualification to the rule declared in the foregoing excerpts may be found in some cases of which Supreme Lodge, Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Payne, 101 Tex. 449 , 108 S. W. 1100 , 16 L.