qualification rule in Wisconsin

1996They have also read out of § 607(a), the plain language that defines a "dependent child" as a "needy" child "who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment... of the parent who is the principal earner ...." We agree with the court in Skidgel, 994 F.2d at 940-41 , that "it is not at all clear that Congress has addressed the precise issue; presented; namely, the application of these distinct statutory provisions to the particular situation of families composed of both § 606(a) and § 607(a) children." It is clear, however, that in adding the family filing rule to

1980In Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis.2d 538 , 128 N.W.2d 34 (1964), this court stated: “. . . the Steffen Case also recognizes an important qualification to the rule therein stated to the effect that retroactivity is not necessarily fatal to a remedial statute; and that qualification is that the retroactive application must not disturb vested rights.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 545 . *447 Retrospective application of sec. 893.155, Stats., as amended, would have the effect of destroying or terminating Betty Hunter’s vested property right in her accrued cause of action for negligence ag

1980In Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis.2d 538 , 128 N.W.2d 34 (1964), this court stated: “. . . the Steffen Case also recognizes an important qualification to the rule therein stated to the effect that retroactivity is not necessarily fatal to a remedial statute; and that qualification is that the retroactive application must not disturb vested rights.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 545 . *447 Retrospective application of sec. 893.155, Stats., as amended, would have the effect of destroying or terminating Betty Hunter’s vested property right in her accrued cause of action for negligence ag

1976Sutherland states, sec. 47.22, p. 118: “A final qualification on the doctrine is that the general words are not restricted in meaning to objects ejusdem generis if there is a clear manifestation of a contrary intent or purport.” In United States v. Baranski (7th Cir. 1973), 484 F.2d 556 , the court of appeals declined to apply ejusdem, generis to a statute knowingly hindering or interfering or attempting to interfere with government property “by force or violence or otherwise.” (Emphasis sup *333 plied.) The court concluded, after studying the statutory history, that the phrase “or otherwise”

1930If, however, he gives a bare license or permission to cross his premises, the licensee takes the risk of accidents in using the premises in the condition in which they are.” Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co. 159 Wis. 83 , 149 N. W. 760 , is a similar case and follows the Klix Case.

1930If, however, he gives a bare license or permission to cross his premises, the licensee takes the risk of accidents in using the premises in the condition in which they are.” Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co. 159 Wis. 83 , 149 N. W. 760 , is a similar case and follows the Klix Case.

1896The qualification of this rule in Gorman v. Havird, 141 U. S. 206 , applies only to cases where the plaintiff’s demand is clearly frivolous.

1881"When, however, the owner is directly apprised of the ignorance of the buyer, and of his purpose to act in such ignorance, he cannot claim the benefit of this principle, because good faith then requires him to speak.” This last rule was held in Markham v. O'Connor, 52 Ga., 183 , and is, perhaps, a qualification of the rule stated in cases cited from the supreme court of the United States and of Pennsylvania, and is more strictly in accord with the decisions of this court also above cited.