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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Scottgreen2 sentences2009Among other things, "absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim." Martin v. Scott , 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (labeling such claim "frivolous"); Pichardo v. Kinker , 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that inmate's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had no arguable basis in law because "administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest"). 2009Among other things, “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (labeling such claim “frivolous”); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that inmate’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had no arguable basis in law because “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest”). | 5 | 5 |
Pichardo v. Kinkergreen2 sentences2009Among other things, "absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim." Martin v. Scott , 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (labeling such claim "frivolous"); Pichardo v. Kinker , 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that inmate's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had no arguable basis in law because "administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest"). 2009Among other things, “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (labeling such claim “frivolous”); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that inmate’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had no arguable basis in law because “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest”). | 2 | 2 |
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwangergreen1 sentence2007See Hoffmann-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 438, 445 . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Pattersonred1 sentence1998In light of that liberty interest, the role of the State to extend and enforce the guarantees of due process is inherent and "[o]nce the State established the baseline of how it customarily treats the prison population, whether by statute, administrative rule, or simply unwritten policy or practice, any substantial deviation from that line in a particular case will impact a liberty interest." Patterson, 740 S.W.2d at 772 (internal quotations and citations omitted). *954 In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 , 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465 , 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981), the Supreme Co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meachum v. Fano
red
1 sentence2015Unlike any, must be found in statutes or other rules defining the probation, pardon and commutation decisions have not obligations of the authority charged with exercising traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are clemency. rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.9 Cf. Meachum v. Fano, supra, at 225 , 96 S.Ct., at 2538. [3] A decision whether to commute a long-term sentence generally depends not simply on objective factfinding, but *466 B also on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior by those entrusted with the decision. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Herrera v. Collins
green
2 sentences1998Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), concerning the role of the executive clemency in providing a forum for testing claims of “actual innocence,” this Court has the power, duty and responsibility to assure that due process and due course requirements are met. 1998Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), concerning the role of the executive clemency in providing a forum for testing claims of “actual innocence,” this Court has the power, duty and responsibility to assure that due process and due course requirements are met. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat
green
2 sentences1998In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 , 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465 , 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the liberty interest in clemency review as a ground for a constitutional claim “must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency.” In our clemency scheme: The Executive Department is constitutionally required to adopt and follow rules that comport with due process and due course of law. 1998In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 , 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465 , 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the liberty interest in clemency review as a ground for a constitutional claim “must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency.” In our clemency scheme: The Executive Department is constitutionally required to adopt and follow rules that comport with due process and due course of law. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.