limits principle in West Virginia

2023Growth is insured in that the limits of the principle are not fixed authoritatively once for all but are discovered gradually by a process of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise which bring out its practical workings and prove how far it may be made to do justice in its actual operation. 162 W.

1979Growth is insured in that the limits of the principle are not fixed authoritatively once for all but are discovered gradually by a process of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise which bring out its practical workings and prove how far it may be made to do justice in its actual operation.’ ” [ 253 S.E.2d at 675 ] 15 We acknowledge that in any legal system permitting recovery of damages, the amount actually recovered ultimately depends on the financial solvency of the defendant.

1989If the limits of such claim are clearly defined by improvements upon the lot and by a slight barrier or ridge extending all the way around the same, and so maintained for the period of ten years, clearly indicating the extent and nature of the claim, it will be sufficient to confer the right by adverse possession.” See also Brunton v. Roberts, 265 Ky. 569 , 97 S.W.2d 413 (1936); Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144 (Okla.1959); Forest Home Cemetery Ass’n v. Dardanella Fin.

1989If the limits of such claim are clearly defined by improvements upon the lot and by a slight barrier or ridge extending all the way around the same, and so maintained for the period of ten years, clearly indicating the extent and nature of the claim, it will be sufficient to confer the right by adverse possession.” See also Brunton v. Roberts, 265 Ky. 569 , 97 S.W.2d 413 (1936); Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144 (Okla.1959); Forest Home Cemetery Ass’n v. Dardanella Fin.

1989If the limits of such claim are clearly defined by improvements upon the lot and by a slight barrier or ridge extending all the way around the same, and so maintained for the period of ten years, clearly indicating the extent and nature of the claim, it will be sufficient to confer the right by adverse possession.” See also Brunton v. Roberts, 265 Ky. 569 , 97 S.W.2d 413 (1936); Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144 (Okla.1959); Forest Home Cemetery Ass’n v. Dardanella Fin.

1989R.Civ.P., is: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]” 3 .The quotation from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119 , 52 S.Ct. at 464 , 76 L.Ed. at 1008 , referred to in Moore’s, is: "There is nee

1989R.Civ.P., is: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]” 3 .The quotation from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119 , 52 S.Ct. at 464 , 76 L.Ed. at 1008 , referred to in Moore’s, is: "There is nee

1989Corp., 329 N.W.2d 885 (S.D.1983); 3 Am.

1989We recognized the tort of outrageous conduct in Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673 , 289 5.E.2d 692 (1982), and stated in Syllabus Point 6: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” We patterned our rule on that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, and commented on the limits of that rule: “[T]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

1989We recognized the tort of outrageous conduct in Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673 , 289 5.E.2d 692 (1982), and stated in Syllabus Point 6: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” We patterned our rule on that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, and commented on the limits of that rule: “[T]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

1979To create, however, as does the pure comparative negligence rule, a system where plaintiffs decision to sue may depend not on the degree to which he is free from fault but on his financial ability to withstand the countersuit, is to emphasize unduly the damage aspect and to obscure the relative fault of the parties. 16 E.g., Kidd v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 156 W.

1976In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 , 2 L.Ed.2d 848 , 78 S.Ct. 819 (1958), the Supreme Court of the United States succinctly circumscribed the limits of the defense of entrapment: “Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was ‘the product of the creative activity’ of law-enforcement officials. [Citation omitted.] To determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” We are of the opinion that the evidence in this ease was such as to warrant the giving of instructions on the appell

1976In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 , 2 L.Ed.2d 848 , 78 S.Ct. 819 (1958), the Supreme Court of the United States succinctly circumscribed the limits of the defense of entrapment: “Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was ‘the product of the creative activity’ of law-enforcement officials. [Citation omitted.] To determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” We are of the opinion that the evidence in this ease was such as to warrant the giving of instructions on the appell

1912In Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 , the Court went beyond this and applied the principle of exclusion, saying: “In this court the doctrine is well settled that in actions of tort the jury, in addition to the sum awarded by way of compensation for the plaintiff’s injury, may award exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages, sometimes called ‘smart money,’ if the defendant has acted wantonly or oppresiVely or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations.