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25 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. Stanleygreen2 sentences2011“However, in custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed.” Id. (citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 36. 2005E.W.T., however, counters that this Court has made clear in several prior decisions that the Albyight factors need not be expressly addressed if the reviewing court can deduce from the record that the chancellor considered the factors when rendering the decision. ¶ 8. “[I]n custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed.” Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 587 (¶ 8) (Miss.2002) (citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 ( | 10 | 10 |
Hensarling v. Hensarlinggreen2 sentences2012DISCUSSION If 22. “[I]n custody cases, [appellate courts] are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed.” Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 587 (¶ 8) (Miss.2002) (citations omitted). 2011“However, in custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed.” Id. (citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 36. | 8 | 11 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2005However, in custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed." Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 586-87 (¶ 8) (Miss.2002); Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997); Williams v. Williams, 656 So.2d 325, 330 (Miss.1995). ¶ 29. 2005E.W.T., however, counters that this Court has made clear in several prior decisions that the Albyight factors need not be expressly addressed if the reviewing court can deduce from the record that the chancellor considered the factors when rendering the decision. ¶ 8. “[I]n custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed.” Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 587 (¶ 8) (Miss.2002) (citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 ( | 7 | 7 |
Kdf v. Jlhgreen2 sentences2009K.D.F. v. J.L.E., 933 So.2d 971, 980 (Miss.2006) (quoting Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 586-87 (Miss.2002)). ¶ 39. 2009K.D.F. v. J.L.H., 933 So.2d 971, 980 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 586-87 (Miss.2002)). ¶ 39. | 3 | 3 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence2021However, on appeal, this Court limits its inquiry “to those facts ‘contained strictly in the record, and not upon mere assertions in the briefs.’” Ross v. State, 16 So. 3d 47, 60 (¶35) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ward v. State, 935 So. 2d 1047, 1057 (¶29) 8 (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Funderburk v. Funderburkgreen1 sentence2017Funderburk v. Funderburk, 909 So.2d 1241, 1243 (¶¶ 4-5) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Love v. Lovegreen1 sentence2014Love, 74 So.3d at 936 (¶ 35) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Winters v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2004Winters v. Wright, 869 So.2d 357, 364 (¶ 15) (Miss.2003) (citing Yazoo & M.V.R. | 1 | 1 |
Early-Gary, Inc. v. Waltersgreen1 sentence1986Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, 294 So.2d 181, 185 (Miss. 1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bush v. Mullen
green
1 sentence1989The limits of that privilege were delineated in Bush v. Mullen, 478 So.2d 313 (Miss. 1985). [The privilege] is restricted both as to scope of and motivation for the communication. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Hooks v. McCall
green
2 sentences1989In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1973), this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice no cause of action lies." Id. at 927 . 1989In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1973), this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice no cause of action lies." Id. at 927 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Wood v. Mississippi Power Co.
green
2 sentences1986Thus, an agent who has no privilege of his own to enter a particular tract of land may do so upon his principal's business if his principal is privileged to have an agent so enter * * *." 245 Miss. at 117-18 , 146 So.2d 546 . 1986Thus, an agent who has no privilege of his own to enter a particular tract of land may do so upon his principal's business if his principal is privileged to have an agent so enter * * *." 245 Miss. at 117-18 , 146 So.2d 546 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Allison v. State
green
1 sentence1984One who puts his character in issue is supposed to be prepared to defend it by showing such habits as to generally impress the community or particular persons who knew him favorably. 274 So.2d at 682-83 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1977In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States in reference to the "plain view" doctrine said: The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. 1977In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States in reference to the "plain view" doctrine said: The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.