limits rule in Missouri

1969In so doing, 401 S.W.2d at page 168 , the court acknowledged it did not have “a feeling of complete assurance as to the limits of the doctrine of curative admissibility * * * See, also, Sigman v. Kopp, Mo. Sup., 378 S.W.2d 544 , where the term, “evidence of the same caliber” was used to describe the quality of curative evidence sanctioned.

1969Missouri courts candidly admit a lack of assurance in comprehending the limits of the doctrine (Jefferson v. Biggar, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 933, 937 ; Young v. Dueringer, Mo.App., 401 S.W.2d 165, 168 ), and it will require a writer more perspicacious than the one at hand to avoid perplexity after scrutinizing the cases which clutch at or flirt with the tenet.

1969In so doing, 401 S.W.2d at page 168 , the court acknowledged it did not have “a feeling of complete assurance as to the limits of the doctrine of curative admissibility * * * See, also, Sigman v. Kopp, Mo. Sup., 378 S.W.2d 544 , where the term, “evidence of the same caliber” was used to describe the quality of curative evidence sanctioned.

1967Louis Court of Appeals so aptly said in Young, supra, 401 S.W.2d at loc.cit. 168: “While we do not have a feeling of complete assurance as to the limits of the doctrine of curative admissibility, we do feel constrained here by the rationale employed by the Supreme Court in Sigman v. Kopp,. supra [Mo., 378 S.W.2d 544 ].” The question which we now consider is-whether the statements of the two witnesses to the officer that the lights were not working were substantially prejudicial to- *938 the plaintiff.

2006The main inquiry in a strict liability case “is whether the product — because of the way it is designed— creates an unreasonable risk of danger to the consumer or user when put to normal use.” Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. banc 1986). “[T]he focal point of the litigational process is the condition or character of the product and not the character of the defendant’s conduct — thereby excising the concept of reasonable care, the limits test of liability in negligence law, from Missouri’s rule of strict tort liability.” Id. (citing Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 608 ;

1986In Blevins , we took care to stress that under a theory of strict tort liability, the focal point of the litigational process is the condition or character of the product and not the character of the defendant's conduct— thereby excising the concept of reasonable care, the limits test of liability in negligence law, from Missouri's rule of strict tort liability. [4] Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d at 608 ; see also Comment a to Section 402A.

1979The Bank at all times acted “in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of [its] own.” The principal opinion relies on the holding in Jones v. Garden Park Homes Corporation, 393 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.1965), and then concedes that “the conduct in Jones can be distinguished from the conduct of defendant * * I believe the principal opinion creates a cause of action where none exists.

1979The Bank at all *140 times acted "in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of [its] own." The principal opinion relies on the holding in Jones v. Garden Park Homes Corporation, 393 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.1965), and then concedes that "the conduct in Jones can be distinguished from the conduct of defendant * * *." I believe the principal opinion creates a cause of action where none exists.

1969Missouri courts candidly admit a lack of assurance in comprehending the limits of the doctrine (Jefferson v. Biggar, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 933, 937 ; Young v. Dueringer, Mo.App., 401 S.W.2d 165, 168 ), and it will require a writer more perspicacious than the one at hand to avoid perplexity after scrutinizing the cases which clutch at or flirt with the tenet.

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1954The principle has been applied in the following cases: McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal.App.2d 510 , 73 P.2d 649 ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App.2d 429 , 47 P.2d 740, 745 ; Millikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449 , 192 S.E. 665, 669 ; Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138 Neb. 262 , 292 N.W. 712, 720 .

1930Under the contention made they have cited a number of cases: Robinson v. Mining Co., 178 Mo. App. 531 ; Thompson v. Paving Co., 199 Mo. App. 356 ; Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem.

1930Under the contention made they have cited a number of cases: Robinson v. Mining Co., 178 Mo. App. 531 ; Thompson v. Paving Co., 199 Mo. App. 356 ; Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem.

1918(Mo.) 453, l. c. 460. [See, also, Stevens v. Barber Supply Co., 67 Mo. App. 587 , l. c. 589-590; Murdock v. Ganahl, 47 Mo. l. c. 137; Bank v. Railroad, 172 Mo. App. 678 , 155 S. W. 1111 .] We will next consider the earnest and elaborate argument made by learned counsel for respondent, namely, that plaintiff is estopped from prosecuting this action against the defendant by reason of the fact that this plaintiff, the receiver for the Continental Assurance Company of America had, prior to the bringing of this action and with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances attendant upon the tra

1918(Mo.) 453, l. c. 460. [See, also, Stevens v. Barber Supply Co., 67 Mo. App. 587 , l. c. 589-590; Murdock v. Ganahl, 47 Mo. l. c. 137; Bank v. Railroad, 172 Mo. App. 678 , 155 S. W. 1111 .] We will next consider the earnest and elaborate argument made by learned counsel for respondent, namely, that plaintiff is estopped from prosecuting this action against the defendant by reason of the fact that this plaintiff, the receiver for the Continental Assurance Company of America had, prior to the bringing of this action and with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances attendant upon the tra

1918(Mo.) 453, l. c. 460. [See, also, Stevens v. Barber Supply Co., 67 Mo. App. 587 , l. c. 589-590; Murdock v. Ganahl, 47 Mo. l. c. 137; Bank v. Railroad, 172 Mo. App. 678 , 155 S. W. 1111 .] We will next consider the earnest and elaborate argument made by learned counsel for respondent, namely, that plaintiff is estopped from prosecuting this action against the defendant by reason of the fact that this plaintiff, the receiver for the Continental Assurance Company of America had, prior to the bringing of this action and with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances attendant upon the tra

1907They must touch or concern or extend to the support of the thing conveyed.” And that, “The covenant under consideration, as it stands on the report, falls outside of the limits of this rule, even in the narrow form.” This court has declared what is a collateral covenant, viz.: “A collateral covenant is such as appears to be foreign from the instrument, not touching- the land. or its value, or the value of its reservation, or of the term, but a distinct matter put in by the parties, which does not appear necessarily to influence the demise or grant.” And also tells what a dependent covenant is,

1907They must touch or concern or extend to the support of the thing conveyed.” And that, “The covenant under consideration, as it stands on the report, falls outside of the limits of this rule, even in the narrow form.” This court has declared what is a collateral covenant, viz.: “A collateral covenant is such as appears to be foreign from the instrument, not touching- the land. or its value, or the value of its reservation, or of the term, but a distinct matter put in by the parties, which does not appear necessarily to influence the demise or grant.” And also tells what a dependent covenant is,

1893Wright v. Fonda, 44 Mo. App. 634 ; George v. Railroad, 40 Mo. App. 433 ; Moffatt v. Conklin, 35 Mo. 455 ; Bank v. Murdock, 62 Mo. 73 ; Glass v. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 302 ; Fulkerson v. Thornton, 68 Mo. 469 ; Nugent v. Curren, 77 Mo. 328 ; Hassett v. Rust, 64 Mo. 328 ; Crews v. Lackland, 67 Mo. 621 ; Lenox v. Harmon, 88 Mo. 495 ; Waldern v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 516 ; Merritt v. Poulter, 96 Mo. 240 ; Noll v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 74 ; Bender v. Dungan, 99 Mo. 130 .

1893Wright v. Fonda, 44 Mo. App. 634 ; George v. Railroad, 40 Mo. App. 433 ; Moffatt v. Conklin, 35 Mo. 455 ; Bank v. Murdock, 62 Mo. 73 ; Glass v. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 302 ; Fulkerson v. Thornton, 68 Mo. 469 ; Nugent v. Curren, 77 Mo. 328 ; Hassett v. Rust, 64 Mo. 328 ; Crews v. Lackland, 67 Mo. 621 ; Lenox v. Harmon, 88 Mo. 495 ; Waldern v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 516 ; Merritt v. Poulter, 96 Mo. 240 ; Noll v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 74 ; Bender v. Dungan, 99 Mo. 130 .

1886An exception has been recognized in this state in favor of a mortgagee, who takes actual possession of the mortgaged property before other creditors of the mortgageor have seized it (Nash v. Norment, 5 Mo. App. 545 ; Greeley v. Reading, 74 Mo. 309 ), but there is nothing in this case to bring the bank within the limits of the exception as stated in those cases.

1886An exception has been recognized in this state in favor of a mortgagee, who takes actual possession of the mortgaged property before other creditors of the mortgageor have seized it (Nash v. Norment, 5 Mo. App. 545 ; Greeley v. Reading, 74 Mo. 309 ), but there is nothing in this case to bring the bank within the limits of the exception as stated in those cases.