limits rule in California

2025(See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell); Esparza, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 452 .) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability . . . .’ [Citation.] It ‘ “avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] When the law grants an immunity, it does not mean that the defendant’s conduct is not tortious,

2015(See, e.g., Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623 ; Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell).) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability ….’ [Citation.] It ‘“avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability….” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 378 .) “When the law

1997(Cf. People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396-397 [ 326 P.2d 457 ].) “In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 ].) In the present case, it was proper for the prosecutor to use these well-known examples of irrational murders to illustrate his point regarding the limits of the defense of insanity.

1997(Cf. People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396-397 [ 326 P.2d 457 ].) “In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 ].) In the present case, it was proper for the prosecutor to use these well-known examples of irrational murders to illustrate his point regarding the limits of the defense of insanity.

1997(Cf. People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396-397 [ 326 P.2d 457 ].) “In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 ].) In the present case, it was proper for the prosecutor to use these well-known examples of irrational murders to illustrate his point regarding the limits of the defense of insanity.

1997(Cf. People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396-397 [ 326 P.2d 457 ].) “In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 ].) In the present case, it was proper for the prosecutor to use these well-known examples of irrational murders to illustrate his point regarding the limits of the defense of insanity.

1980In addition, within the limits of the doctrine of People v. Mendez (1924) supra, 193 Cal. 39, 51-52 , discussed above (part I A, ante ), the defendant might even try to establish for this purpose that a third person did abruptly leave the jurisdiction at the critical time — evidence that would doubtless trigger prosecution demands for a further round of rebuttal. [25] Two recent Court of Appeal opinions have sought to explain this rule as it was reiterated in People v. Doran (1972) supra, 24 Cal. App.3d 316, 324 (see fn. 22, ante ), by asserting that evidence of absence of flight is excluded b

1980Two recent Court of Appeal opinions have sought to explain this rule as it was reiterated in People v. Doran (1972) supra, 24 Cal.App.3d 316, 324 (see fn. 22, ante), by asserting that evidence of absence of flight is excluded because it has no “tendency in reason” to prove that the defendant had an innocent state of mind and hence is simply not “relevant evidence” within the meaning of Evidence Code section 210.

1976(See Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; see also, In re Shaw (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 753, 756 [ 252 P.2d 970 ].) In addition, the jury was properly instructed as to the narrow limits of their inquiry.

1976(See Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; see also, In re Shaw (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 753, 756 [ 252 P.2d 970 ].) In addition, the jury was properly instructed as to the narrow limits of their inquiry.

1976(See Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; see also, In re Shaw (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 753, 756 [ 252 P.2d 970 ].) In addition, the jury was properly instructed as to the narrow limits of their inquiry.

1976(See Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; see also, In re Shaw (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 753, 756 [ 252 P.2d 970 ].) In addition, the jury was properly instructed as to the narrow limits of their inquiry.

1995If it be not, then it matters not what may be his loss, it is damnum absque injuria [damage without injury].” (Gray v. Reclamation District No. 1500, supra, 174 Cal. 622, 638-639 ; Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24 [ 119 P.2d 1 ].) In Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 303 , we noted the limits of the rule that compensation is not required for property damage resulting from a valid exercise of the police power.

1995If it be not, then it matters not what may be his loss, it is damnum absque injuria [damage without injury]." ( Gray v. Reclamation District No. 1500, supra, 174 Cal. 622, 638-639 ; Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24 [ 119 P.2d 1 ].) *384 In Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 303 , we noted the limits of the rule that compensation is not required for property damage resulting from a valid exercise of the police power.

2000Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 26 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 ; Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 300 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 .) The insurer, having specifically defined *720 the proceedings for which it would provide a defense, is not required to do more. ( Foster-Gardner, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 882-883, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 .) Such a "bright line" rule promotes stability and efficiency in the insurance system. ( Id. at pp. 882, 887, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 .) It would therefore seem to be incumbent upon us

1998Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 26 [It is a “settled rule that the insurer must look to the facts of the complaint and extrinsic evidence, if available, to determine whether there is a potential for coverage under the policy and a corresponding duty to defend.”]; ibid. [“[T]he determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.”]; Montrose Chemical Corp.. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 [“The duty to defend is determined by reference to the policy, the com

1998Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 26 [It is a “settled rule that the insurer must look to the facts of the complaint and extrinsic evidence, if available, to determine whether there is a potential for coverage under the policy and a corresponding duty to defend.”]; ibid. [“[T]he determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.”]; Montrose Chemical Corp.. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 [“The duty to defend is determined by reference to the policy, the com

1998Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 26 [It is a “settled rule that the insurer must look to the facts of the complaint and extrinsic evidence, if available, to determine whether there is a potential for coverage under the policy and a corresponding duty to defend.”]; ibid. [“[T]he determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.”]; Montrose Chemical Corp.. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 [“The duty to defend is determined by reference to the policy, the com

2024(See, e.g., Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 116 [“Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.

2024(See, e.g., Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 116 [“Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.

2024The limits of the defense are established. “ ‘The use of force against another for the purpose of recaption of a chattel, which the other is tortiously withholding from the actor, is not privileged if the other’s possession was rightfully acquired.’ ” (Deevy v. Tassi (1942) 21 Cal.2d 109, 118 ; see People v. Whearty (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 524, 528-529 [judgment of assault affirmed where defendants assaulted victim, who towed car belonging to one defendant at that defendant’s request, when victim refused to relinquish car unless defendants paid required fee]; Rogers v. Kabakoff (1947) 81 Cal.App

2023(Prichard v. Kimball (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764 [“The option thus formed a part of the lease, and was dependent on it.”]; Gatley v. Shockley (1932) 215 Cal. 604, 611 [“It is clear that the lease and option constituted but one contract, the provisions of which were interdependent”]; Wallace v. Imbertson (1961) 7 197 Cal.App.2d 392, 396 [“The existence of the option therefore depended on existence of the lease.

2023(Prichard v. Kimball (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764 [“The option thus formed a part of the lease, and was dependent on it.”]; Gatley v. Shockley (1932) 215 Cal. 604, 611 [“It is clear that the lease and option constituted but one contract, the provisions of which were interdependent”]; Wallace v. Imbertson (1961) 7 197 Cal.App.2d 392, 396 [“The existence of the option therefore depended on existence of the lease.

2023(Prichard v. Kimball (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764 [“The option thus formed a part of the lease, and was dependent on it.”]; Gatley v. Shockley (1932) 215 Cal. 604, 611 [“It is clear that the lease and option constituted but one contract, the provisions of which were interdependent”]; Wallace v. Imbertson (1961) 7 197 Cal.App.2d 392, 396 [“The existence of the option therefore depended on existence of the lease.

2015(Cruz v. Briseno (2000) 22 Cal.4th 568, 572 ; Caldwell, supra, at p. 978, fn.3 ; Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418 ; see Cruz v. Briseno, supra, at p. 572 [“Although the Court of Appeal devoted substantial analysis to the issue of [defendant]’s duty of care, we need not reach that largely factual issue if we find him immune … as a matter of law.

2015(Cruz v. Briseno (2000) 22 Cal.4th 568, 572 ; Caldwell, supra, at p. 978, fn.3 ; Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418 ; see Cruz v. Briseno, supra, at p. 572 [“Although the Court of Appeal devoted substantial analysis to the issue of [defendant]’s duty of care, we need not reach that largely factual issue if we find him immune … as a matter of law.